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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis provides a detailed empirical evaluation of the role and function of the FTSE 100 
and FTSE Mid 250 index futures contracts, by considering the interrelated issues of hedging 
effectiveness and pricing efficiency. 
The aims of the thesis are outlined in chapter one, with chapter two providing a detailed 
review of the empirical literature relevant to this study. Chapter three investigates the hedging 
effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and FTSE Mid 250 index futures contracts in both an ex post 
and ex ante context. Despite relatively thin trading volume, the FTSE Mid 250 contract is 
shown to be an important hedging instrument. However, the results demonstrate the hedging 
effectiveness can only truly be examined by using an ex ante strategy in conjunction with spot 
portfolios that do not replicate market portfohos. Work into hedging effectiveness is further 
examined in chapter four using hedge ratios generated within the Extended Mean Gini 
fi-amework. The results indicate that for both contracts the hedge ratio series are characterised 
by a step fimction which is strongly related to the hedger's degree of risk aversion. 
Chapter five examines the pricing eflBciency of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. While 
there were many deviations fi-om fair value, both contracts appear to be quite efficiently 
priced, with opportunity for index arbitrage rare. Research into the economics of arbitrage is 
extended in chapter six by investigating the potential for intramarket and intermarket spread 
trading. While the intramarket spread is found to be very efficiently priced, trading well within 
its no-arbitrage limits, the intermarket is much less efiBciently priced fi-equently violating its 
no-arbitrage limits. 
Chapter seven, provides a summary of the thesis and concluding remarks concerning the 
relevance of the issues investigated are drawn. 
"The copyright o f this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from 
it should be published without their prior consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged". 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1) O V E R V I E W AND O B J E C T I V E S 
While stock index futures contracts represent a relatively recent innovation in 
financial markets, they have proven extremely popular with investors, and by giving 
traders the ability to hedge economy wide movements in asset values have become 
an integral part o f portfolio management. As a result index futures contracts have 
relevance to a much larger set o f traders than traditional futures contracts relating to 
physical commodities. The rapid growth in trading in index futures contracts globally 
testifies to their phenomenal success, wi th the value o f trading in index futures often 
outstripping that in the underlying spot market. Index futures are derivative contracts, 
in that the price o f the instrument is derived from the price o f an underlying basket o f 
stocks, and given that they are not as tightly regulated as the underlying security they 
allow investors greater flexibil i ty in managing market risk. 
Index futures confracts are standardised agreements to buy or sell an entire stock 
portfolio at a future date for a price determined when the confract is written. While 
the buyer and seller o f the contract trade through a clearing-house, both parties are 
compelled to f u l f i l l certain obligations to the agreement'. A n important reason for the 
success o f index futures markets is that they allow investors to acquire market 
exposure more effectively than through spot market fransactions, with minimal cash 
commitment owing to margin payments. Economically, these contracts provide a 
cost efficient means o f allocating risk and promoting price discovery and thereby 
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achieving an efficient resource allocation for the economy as a whole. Compared to 
trading in the spot market, index futures are endowed with specific advantages 
including lower transaction costs, exposure to the entire market from a single 
transaction, tighter dealing prices, faster execution o f transactions, greater leverage, 
short selling and taxable exemptions. As a result o f these frading advantages the 
futures market attracts a broad spectrum of users with different objectives who help 
to maintain high levels o f liquidity in the market. 
Although research into stock index futures trading has been an area where leading 
US academics have been very active^, trading activity in U K contracts has not been 
researched to any where near the same extent. The main purpose o f this thesis is to 
help to address this issue by empirically investigatmg the role and function o f index 
futures contracts traded in the U K . Although work into the useflihiess o f the 
estabhshed FTSE 100 contract has been forthcoming, to date no detailed examination 
has been conducted for the recently introduced FTSE M i d 250 (henceforth M i d 250) 
contract. Academic research into the role and function o f the two contracts has been 
motivated by the following considerations. First, index futures markets were 
established as a mechanism for facilitating the transfer o f price risk, by extending the 
range o f portfolio opportunities which are available to investors and portfolio 
managers. Thus the main justification for index futures is to allow hedging. Second, 
in order to perform their risk reduction role effectively index futures need to be 
correctly priced with respect to the underlying spot markets. Where they are foimd to 
be mispriced relative to their fair value estimates, hedging effectiveness w i l l be 
impaired and arbitrage opportunities may present themselves. The pricing o f index 
futures contracts can be tested wi th respect to index arbitrage, and spread trading. 
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Although the issues to be investigated are not exhaustive in coverage, they address 
what are perceived to be the most important aspects o f index futures trading and the 
empirical findings w i l l be o f particular interest to market participants, regulators and 
academics in the U K . The infroduction o f the M i d 250 contract provides market 
practitioners wi th the opportunity to take advantage o f their knowledge and their 
views on the prospects o f the two different areas o f the market. The U K index futures 
market also provides an example o f how additional instruments can be introduced to 
support and supplement existing confracts. 
Given the clear benefits that futures confracts afford investors it is surprising that 
until recently futures trading was confined to a small range o f agricultural and 
metallic commodities. Although futures contracts have been traded on the Chicago 
Board o f Trade since 1865, financial futures contracts were only infroduced in the 
early 1970's, largely in response to the financial turbulence arising from the 
breakdown o f the Bretton Woods system o f fixed exchange rates. The global 
transition from fixed to floating exchange rates was characterised by a rapid increase 
in the levels o f exchange rate and interest rate instability. As a consequence o f this 
rise in market volatility investment vehicles which were capable o f hedging these 
risks were demanded and the financial futures markets evolved. Following the 
decision to allow exchange rates to float foreign currency futures were successfully 
introduced on the International Money Market o f the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
in 1972, wi th interest rate futures being launched on the Chicago Board o f Trade in 
1975. However, the success and longevity o f these contracts owes much to the 
structural changes that occmred during the 1970's and 1980's, such as the 
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institutionalisation of the market, and the concentration of the market (Carhon 
(1984)). 
Following the success of foreign exchange and interest rate futures, the range of 
financial futures contracts was expanded to stock indexes in February 1982 with the 
introduction of the Value Line Composite Index (VLCI) contract, which was traded 
on the Kansas City Board of Trade. Additional US contracts were introduced later 
that year, with the Standard and Poor's 500 contract traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange in April 1982, and the New York Composite Index futures 
contract traded on the New York Futures Exchange in May 1982. By 1985 six index 
futures contracts were actively traded on five different US futures exchanges. 
The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) began trading index 
fiitures in the UK in May 1984 with the introduction of the FTSE 100 contract. 
Owing to the success of this contract, and the growing importance of medium size 
capitalisation stocks in the UK, LEFFE subsequently launched a second contract, the 
FTSE Mid 250 (henceforth the Mid 250) contract in February 1992^ This contract 
was designed to support and complement the well established FTSE 100 contract by 
providing effective tracking on the "second tier" of UK companies. 
1.2) U K INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS 
Currently, there are two index futures contracts traded in the UK, these being the 
FTSE 100 contract and the Mid 250 contract, and the key characteristics 
underpinning the trading nature and design of both the market indexes and 
underlying contracts are summarised in tables 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. The FTSE 
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100 index represents the 100 largest companies traded on the London stock market, 
while the Mid 250 index represents the next 250 largest companies (i.e. companies 
101 to 350 by market capitalisation). Both indexes are arithmetically weighted by 
market capitalisation and together they provide investors with exposure to over 90% 
of the UK's equity market. With respect to the index fixtures contracts, the unit of 
trading is £25 and £10 respectively for the FTSE 100" and the Mid 250 contract. 
Therefore, when both indexes stand at 4000 index points, the FTSE 100 contract is 
valued at £100,000 and Mid 250 contract is valued at £40,000. The contracts are 
traded in three month cycles, with contracts expiring in March, June, September and 
December. At any point in time, the nearest three contracts are available for the 
FTSE 100 and the nearest two contracts are available for the Mid 250. The last 
trading day for both contracts is the final business day in the delivery month, with the 
settlement prices being determined by the E.D.S.P^ at 10.30 am on the third Friday of 
the delivery month. Delivery is achieved through cash settlement. 
This thesis is concerned with UK index fixtures trading fi-om February 1994 
(following the introduction of the Mid 250 contract) to December 1996. The pricing 
performance of both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts over this period is 
illustrated by the spliced series in figure 1.1. It is clearly visible from figure 1.1 that 
while the overall performance of both contracts are remarkably similar, with both 
markets declining in the early part of the period and then recovering considerably 
later, significant short term pricing differences exist between the two contracts. For 
instance, the correlation coefficient for the daily log returns of the two confracts is 
only 0.753. While this relatively low correlation can be partly explained by the 
Pages 
Table 1.1) 
Key Features of F T S E 100 and F T S E Mid 250 Indexes 
F T S E 100 Index Mid 250 Index 
Number of Companies 
Index Weighting 
Market Capitalisation of 
Constituents 
Total Market 
Capitalisation 
Launched 
100 
Capitalisation 
Approx. 
£ 3 0 - 1 . 5 billion 
Approx. 
£500 billion 
January 1984 
250 
Capitalisation 
Approx. 
£ 1 . 5 - 0 . 1 billion 
Approx. 
£150 billion 
October 1992 
Source: L.I .F .F .E. (1994) 
Table 1.2) 
F T S E 100 and F T S E Mid 250 Futures Contract Specifications 
Unit of Trading 
Expiry Months 
Maturity Date 
Minimum Price Movement 
- Tick Size 
Launched 
F T S E 100 Contract 
Valued at £25 
per index point" 
March, June, September 
and December 
(nearest 3 contracts are 
available) 
Mid 250 Contract 
Valued at £10 
per index point 
March, June, September 
and December 
(nearest 2 contracts are 
available) 
Third Friday in the delivery Third Friday in the delivery 
month at 10.30am month at 10.30am 
0.5 index point: 
= £12.50 
May 1984 
0.5 index point: 
= £5.00 
February 1994 
Source: L.I .F .F .E . (1994) 
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smaller capitalisation bias of the Mid 250 index, sectoral weighting differences are 
probably of more significance. 
Figure 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the total daily open interest for the FTSE 100 and Mid 
250 contract over the research period respectively^ In figure 1.2 open interest for the 
FTSE 100 contract can be seen to have been relatively stable over this period. 
Although open interest reached a peak of 85,000 contracts, open interest has 
averaged approximately 65,000 contracts per day. By comparison, total daily open 
interest in the Mid 250 contract has frequently only been about 5% of this figure. 
Following the initial enthusiasm for the contract, open interest of almost 6,000 
contracts was rapidly established. However, over the research period considered the 
daily open interest has averaged approximately 4,000 confracts per day. Interestingly, 
the daily open interest for the Mid 250 confract has been characterised by a step 
fiinction, whereby any changes in the outstanding number of confracts occur at the 
roll-over period, with open interest remaining stable at other points. In figures 1.4 
and 1.5 daily trading volume figures for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts over 
the research period respectively are illustrated^ It is clear that the FTSE 100 contract 
is well established with average daily frading volume of 25,000 contracts. However, 
the Mid 250 confract suffers from exfremely thin liquidity with average trading 
volume of only 150 contracts per day. Furthermore, market liquidity tends to be very 
sporadic, and concentrated around the roll-over period when a "liquidity window" 
emerges and market participants move their positions forward. 
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While trading through the futures market is more cost effective than trading through 
the equity market, part of the difference in the levels of trading activity between the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts can be accounted for by the actual differences in 
transaction costs. UK transaction costs consist of the bid offer spread in the equity 
and futures markets, stamp duty, equity and futures commissions and any market 
impact costs which reflect the size of the trade and the liquidity of the market. Table 
1.3 shows the breakdown of round trip transaction costs affecting trading decision in 
UK equity and index futures markets. 
As table 1.3 illustrates, while transaction costs in the futures markets are significantly 
smaller than those in the equity market, the transaction costs associated with trading 
the FTSE 100 contract are a considerably smaller proportion of total roimd trip 
transaction costs than those associated with trading the Mid 250 contract. 
Furthermore, an examination of formal transaction cost alone ignores the market 
impact cost of any transaction. Given that market impact costs tend to be a function 
of market liquidity, it is clear that owing to the lower trading volume in the Mid 250 
contract the market impact costs of using this contract wil l be considerably greater 
than those associated with the FTSE 100 contract. Hence, the figures in table 1.3 
understate the true transaction costs savings firom using the established contract. 
Even so, an examination of transaction costs alone overlooks the important technical 
and structural differences which affect trading in UK equity and futures markets. 
Equity and futures markets can be distinguished by different institutional and 
settlement procedures. For instance, the UK stock market is a pure dealership market, 
where trading positions are settled on the basis of a two (or three) week account 
Page 13 
Table 1.3) 
Roundtrip Transaction Cost for U K Markets 
FTSE 100 (%) Mid 250 (%) 
Equity Index Bid - Offer Spread 0.69 1.10 
Stamp Duty 0.50 0.50 
Equity Market Commission 0.40 0.40 
Index Future Bid - Offer Spread 0.05 0.29 
Index Future Commission 0.01 0.02 
Total: Institutional Investors 1.65 2.31 
Total: Market Makers 0.75 1.41 
Source: Bolchover and Preece (1994), p. 4 
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period. While trading on the LIFFE fiitures markets occurs through "open outcry" 
with trading positions being marked to market on a daily basis. 
1.3) STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
Owing to the short life of stock index fiitures trading in the UK, research into the 
effectiveness of these contracts has been limited in scope, and the literature remains 
in its infancy. The aim of this thesis is to help to bridge the gaps in the literature, by 
providing a detailed empirical investigation into the role and function of stock index 
fiitures contracts in the UK. While work into the usefiihiess of the established FTSE 
100 contract has been undertaken, to date no detailed examination has been 
conducted for the recently infroduced Mid 250 confract. Therefore, the thesis will 
concenfrate on important aspects relating to the introduction of the Mid 250 confract 
and the additional benefits it has made to stock index futures trading in the UK. To 
allow for the diversity in the literature, the thesis wil l focus specifically on two 
related issues, which are central to evaluating the value of index fiitures trading in a 
UK context. Hence, the specific research objectives of the thesis are to investigate the 
hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts and the pricing 
efficiency of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts in both an index arbifrage and 
spread trading context. Furthermore, the research issues outlined wil l be examined 
using data over the period February 1994 to December 1996. However, because this 
data set has been built up progressively in stages, the length of the sample period 
employed varies for different chapters. 
The structure of thesis is as follows. In chapter two, the established literature which 
is relevant to the economics of stock index futures trading in the aforementioned 
Page 15 
areas wi l l be thoroughly reviewed. The purpose of this literature survey is to 
highlight the specific research issues investigated, the methodological techniques 
employed, together with a critical discussion of the empirical findings. Furthermore, 
by identifying the limitations in the existing literatijre, it is possible to provide a 
rationale for the research being undertaken. 
While the Mid 250 contract was introduced to enable investors to acquire market 
wide exposure to medium size capitalisation stocks, it is possible that the hedging 
effectiveness of this new contract may be seriously impaired by the low levels of 
trading volume and high transaction costs which discourage trading. To investigate 
this issue chapter three compares the hedging effectiveness of both the Mid 250 and 
FTSE 100 contract, to determine whether the Mid 250 contract provides any 
additional benefits. Hedging effectiveness is examined in both an ex post and ex ante 
context for a diverse range of spot portfolios. It is shown that in terms of risk 
reduction, the FTSE 100 contract provides a more effective hedge for spot portfolios 
dominated by large capitalisation stocks, while the Mid 250 contract provides a more 
effective hedge for portfolios dominated by lower capitalisation stocks. In particular, 
when consideration is given to professionally managed portfolios, hedging 
effectiveness is greater for the new contract in all cases. Furthermore, the problem of 
inter-temporal hedge ratio instability is considered. Using historical data, hedge 
ratios are estimated on the basis of a dynamic moving window procedure. It is shown 
that as the window size increases ex ante hedge ratios stabilise, coverging towards 
the ex post benchmark, and maximising risk reduction. 
Chapter four extends the work conducted in chapter three by examining the hedging 
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effectiveness of both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts using hedge ratios 
generated within an extended mean Gini (EMG) framework. The EMG approach 
provides a more robust alternative to the mean variance approach by distinguishing 
between different classes of risk averse hedgers, and producing hedge ratios that are 
consistent with the rules of stochastic dominance. The results illusfrate that the EMG 
hedge ratio series is characterised by a step fimction which is sfrongly related to the 
hedger's degree of risk aversion. The implication of this result is that each spot -
fiitures relationship is associated with several optimal hedge ratios. 
Given that index fiitures are frequently used to initiate short term hedging sfrategies, 
the effectiveness of these strategies in allocating risk depends crucially on whether 
the contracts are efficiently priced relative to their underlying fan value. Where they 
are found to be mispriced relative to their fair value estimates, hedging effectiveness 
wil l be impaired and arbifrage opportunities may present themselves. In chapter five 
the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 index fiitures confracts is 
examined. This is an important issue not only because of issues of efficiency but also 
because while index arbifrage strategies have been discouraged in the US, they have 
been actively encouraged in the UK. The results from this chapter indicate that while 
there are many deviations from fair value, both confracts appear to be efficiently 
priced, with mispricing being generally constrained within transaction cost limits. 
An alternative approach used for testing for fiitures market efficiency is spread 
trading, and because spread fransactions are associated with very low transaction 
costs, deviations from fair value which are often too small to be exploited by index 
arbitrage can be exploited by spread frading. An examination of spread mispricing is 
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important in that it enhances the discussion on the economics of arbitrage, with 
spread mispricing having important implications for the effectiveness of spread 
trading in the same way that index futures mispricing has important implications for 
hedging effectiveness. In chapter six, the fair value model used in chapter five is 
adapted to test the ex post profitability of intramarket and intermarket spread trading 
strategies based on the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. 
Finally, in chapter seven the main results in the thesis are summarised and 
concluding remarks are drawn. 
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Endnotes 
' The main regulations which govem the operation of futures markets are common to most 
exchanges and include characteristics such as standardisation of contracts, delivery, clearing 
requirements, margin requirements (initial, maintenance and variation) and trading limits. 
These requirements serve to reduce default risk and increase market liquidity. For a 
discussion of these characteristics see Daigler (1993), Sutcliffe (1993) and Tucker (1991). 
Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) demonstrate that futures contract are distinguishable from 
forward contract, in that they are designed to be traded, and hence are standardised contracts 
on well organised exchanges. Futures contracts are standardised in terms of quantity, 
quality, delivery date, location and counter party risk. 
^ The economic and social importance of the derivatives literature was recently 
acknowledged with the awarding of the 1997 Nobel Prize for Economics to Robert Merton 
and Myron Scholes for their work in derivatives. 
^ LIFFE introduced futures trading on the FTSE Eurotrack index - a European benchmark 
index which encapsulated the largest companies in Europe, excluding the UK - in June 
1991. However, trading in this contract was later suspended owing to insufficient trading 
volume. 
" The contract multiplier associated with the FTSE 100 contract was reduced on 17 
December 1997 from £25 to £10 for the June 1998 delivery month onwards in response to 
market demand. 
' The Expected Delivery Settlement Price (EDSP) is based on the average level of the 
underlying index between 10.10am and 10.30am on the last trading day. 
^ Owing to the large differences in the vertical scale of figures 1.2 and 1.3, and figures 1.4 
and 1.5, these plots are not directly comparable. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
T H E ECONOMICS OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES TRADING 
2.1) INTRODUCTION 
The justification for this thesis has been presented in chapter one, where it was 
argued that to date no detailed examination has been conducted into the contribution 
made by the introduction of the Mid 250 index futures contract. The purpose of this 
investigation is to concentrate on the important aspects relating to the introduction of 
the Mid 250 contract and evaluate what, i f any, are the additional benefits provided 
by the new contract with respect to the economics of stock index futures trading in 
the UK. Although index futures contracts have the potential to increase investor 
utility by extending the possible range of investment opportunities, by providing a 
low cost means of acquiring market exposure, in evaluating the contribution made by 
the Mid 250 contract it is necessary to take account of the specific costs and benefits 
of trading the new contract, together with the degree to which it supports the 
established FTSE 100 contract. To assess the success of the Mid 250 contract in this 
respect, the trading performance of the new contract will be examined in two specific 
areas; hedging effectiveness and pricing efficiency. First, since hedging provides the 
principal justification for the existence of futures markets, hedging performance will 
be considered in terms of the contract's ability to reduce the market risk faced by 
investors. Second, pricing efficiency in relation to index arbitrage and spread trading 
is investigated by measuring the degree to which futures prices stray from their fair 
value estimate. 
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An investigation of these areas in relation to the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts 
wi l l comprise the main body of the thesis, constituting the work undertaken in 
chapters three to six. However, in order to place this work in its correct context it is 
important to consider previous research which has addressed these issues. The 
remainder of this chapter consists of a literature review of the research in relation to 
the issues identified above. This review wil l serve to highlight both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the established literature, and provide the rationale for the work being 
undertaken. 
2.2) HEDGING WITH S T O C K INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS 
While the development of stock index futures contracts has been a relatively recent 
development, research into the hedging effectiveness of these contracts has been 
widespread. Although the majority of these studies relate to stock index futiu-es 
contracts traded in the US, more recently studies for other national index futures 
contracts have been published, reflecting the growth in popularity and importance of 
these contracts. Academic research examining the hedging effectiveness of these 
contracts has employed both the mean variance approach, which considers ex post 
and ex ante performance, together with the extended mean Gini (EMG) approach 
which takes account of different levels of investor risk aversion. This review of the 
hedging literature wi l l be based around this trichotomy. 
2.21) E X POST APPROACH TO HEDGING 
Figlewski (1984a) provided the first comprehensive investigation into the hedging 
effectiveness of stock index futures contracts. Figlewski examined how effectively 
the Standard and Poors 500 index futures contract was in hedging the risk associated 
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with five major US stock portfolios. Al l five stock indexes were diversified 
portfolios but characterised by a different market composition, and thereby possessed 
different levels of non-market risk. Two indexes were composed of only the largest 
capitalisation stocks, two included smaller capitalisation stocks and the fifth index 
contained only thirty stocks. The sample period extended from 1 June 1982 to 30 
September 1983. Hedges of daily, weekly and monthly duration were employed. 
Figlewski's weekly futures return series consisted of the S&P 500 series nearest to 
maturity. The nearest to maturity contract was chosen because it was associated with 
the greatest liquidity and therefore could be expected to be the most efficiently 
priced. Furthermore, the returns on the five index portfolios were inclusive of 
dividends. However, given that Figlewski found dividends to be of little explanatory 
significance, it has not been the practice to include dividends in subsequent studies. 
Both the minimum variance hedge ratio (henceforth MVHR) and the beta hedge 
ratios were generated for each of the five stock portfolios. 
On the basis of a risk reduction and return retention criterion, the MVHR was found 
to be superior to the beta hedge ratio for all of the index portfolios. For the larger 
capitalisation indexes risk reduction measured in terms of the lowering of the 
standard deviation of returns for hedges of one week duration was found to be in the 
region of 65% to 75%. While for the smaller capitalisation indexes risk reduction 
was found to be in the range of 35% to 40%. However, when evaluating hedging 
effectiveness on the basis of return retention, Figlewski found that the superiority of 
the MVHR over the beta hedge ratio became even more evident. The MVHR retained 
between 25% and 30% of the unhedged return for the larger capitalisation indexes 
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and between 40% and 53% of the unhedged return for the smaller capitalisation 
indexes. This compared with the beta hedge ratio, which retained between 12% and 
16% of the unhedged return from the larger capitalisation indexes and between 29% 
and 44% for the smaller capitalisation indexes. Consequently, Figlewski concludes 
that owing to basis risk: 
"the minimum variance hedge ratio was less than the portfolio's 
beta in every case, with the adverse effects of over hedging being 
more serious for the returns than the risk levels" (1984a, p.663). 
Figlewski also examined the contribution made by the various determinants of basis 
risk to hedging effectiveness. Specifically, consideration was given to the exclusion 
of dividends on hedging performance, and whether the size of the hedging period and 
the time to maturity of the futures contract have any bearing on hedging 
effectiveness. Figlewski found that dividend risk was insignificant. Furthermore, a 
duration effect was evident with a weekly hedge being more effective in terms of risk 
reduction than an over night hedge. However, a four week hedge was not foimd to be 
any better than a one week hedge, a result which was suggested to have arisen from 
sampling error. Finally, an expiration effect was not evident between zero to one 
month, nor one to two months from expirations, but hedging performance was found 
to deteriorate once hedges were lifted between two to three months from expiration. 
Nordhauser (1984) using the traditional hedging approach, examined whether a 
hypothetically constructed Value Line Composite fridex (VLCI) futures confract was 
capable of hedging two US mutual funds. Over the period 1962 to 1981, Nordhauser 
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found that by using the VLCI as a proxy for the futures contract, the resulting hedged 
portfolio could "substantially reduce the variability of the returns with only a minor 
reduction in the rate of retim" (p. 61). However, Nordhauser did not provide any 
explicit evaluation of hedging effectiveness. 
Figlewski (1985) investigated the effectiveness of hedging five US stock portfolios 
(the spot portfoUos were the same as in Figlweski (1984a)) using index futures 
contracts fraded on the VLC fridex, the S&P 500 Index and the NYSE Composite 
Index. The sample period employed covered the last seven months of 1982, with 
both beta and MVHR's being computed, with the duration of the hedges ranging 
from one day to three weeks. 
Figlweski found that the use of a beta hedge ratio was very ineffective for hedging 
over short durations. For instance, hedging the NYSE Composite Index overnight 
with its underlying futures contract eliminated only 15% of the risk associated with 
the unhedged portfolio. However, risk reduction improved as the length of the 
hedging period was extended to several weeks. The beta hedge ratios for the indexes 
composed of small capitalisation stocks were found to be even less effective, and 
over the shorter durations the hedged portfolio was found to be riskier than the 
unhedged spot portfolios. While risk reduction improved for hedges over a longer 
duration it amounted to a maximum of approximately 70% for the high capitalisation 
indexes and 30% for the low capitalisation indexes. 
The MVHR was found to dominate the beta hedge ratios in the vast majority of 
cases, being both smaller in size and superior in terms of risk reduction. Once again. 
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daily hedges were found not to be effective, with risk reduction increasing along with 
the absolute size of the hedge ratios for longer duration hedges. Figlewski suggested 
that the ineffectiveness of short duration hedges may have been a consequence of the 
use of non-synchronous prices for computing the value of the indexes. Furthermore, 
Figlewski rather surprisingly found that there was no obvious benefit from hedging a 
stock portfolio with its associated futures confract. hi fact, when measured in terms 
of risk reduction, cross hedges were often found to be more effective instruments 
than the underlying direct hedge. 
Junkus and Lee (1985) investigated the suitability of the S&P 500, NYSE Composite 
and VLCI index futures contracts as hedging vehicles for their underlying stock 
indexes. Junkus and Lee examined the appropriateness of four different hedging 
strategies, each of which were concerned with a different aspect of hedging 
motivation. The different hedging sfrategies included the fraditional 'one to one' 
hedging sfrategy, the Working (1953) sfrategy, the Johnson (1960) minimum 
variance sfrategy and the Rutledge ( 1972) utility maximising sfrategy. Daily hedge 
ratios were computed using data over the period 31 May 1982 to 1 March 1983 for 
the closest to maturity, farthest from maturity and an intermediate maturity confract. 
Junkus and Lee found considerable variation in the effectiveness of the various 
strategies. For instance, the fraditional strategy was often characterised by 
'overhedging' with the hedged portfolio on NYSE Composite and VLCI being 
associated with greater risk than the unhedged stock index. On the basis of risk 
reduction the Johnson sfrategy was foimd to be the most effective, reducing the 
greatest proportion of the variance on the long stock index. Finally, Junkus and Lee 
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did not find a consistent relationship between contract maturity and hedging 
effectiveness. 
Peters (1986) examined the components of basis risk which arise when using index 
futures contracts to hedge equity portfolios. Extending the work of Figlewski 
(1984a), Peters used the S&P 500 index fiitures contract to investigate the 
effectiveness of both the MVHR and beta hedge ratios as sfrategies for hedging the 
S&P 500, NYSE Composite and Dow Jones stock portfolios. For the period 15 
March 1984 to 31 March 1985 Peters decomposed the return on the index futures 
contract in terms of the return due to changes in the index, the return due to changes 
in the cost of carry and the return due to mispricing. Peters found that the MVHR 
dominates the beta hedge ratio in terms of risk reduction. It was found that changes 
in the index accounted for only 80% of the variance of the fiitures return, and 
therefore the hedger who adopted the beta hedge ratio ignored an additional 20% of 
futures variance which arises from sources other than the underlying index. 
Consequently, the hedger would be over-hedging. 
Peters used daily returns rather than weekly returns to reflect the interest in daily 
hedging performance. Consistent with Figlewski (1984a), Peters found that the 
MVHR dominated the beta hedge ratio in terms of lower risk and higher return for all 
stock portfolios. Peters' results suggested that for market practitioners who wished to 
hedge equity portfolios, the beta hedge ratio which is concerned with minimising 
only market risk rather than overall risk, was not the optimal hedge ratio. 
Grieves (1986) investigated how effectively corporate bonds could be hedged using a 
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composite hedge consisting of S&P 500 futures confracts and Treasury bond futures 
contract. Using monthly data over the period July 1982 to January 1985, and utilising 
a minimum variance hedging sfrategy, Grieves found that for industrial bonds, a 
composite hedge was more effective than a hedge consisting of Treasury bond 
confracts alone. Furthermore, as bond quality decreases hedging effectiveness 
improves, and the proportion of stock index futures in the hedged portfolio increases. 
However, this is to be expected since lower grade bonds tend to be more stock-like 
than their higher grade counterparts. 
Junkus (1987) considered the issue of hedge ratio instability by examining whether 
hedge ratios are characterised by any systematic changes during rising and falling 
equity markets. Using weekly returns over the period June 1982 to June 1985, Junkus 
tested the stability of both the MVHR and beta hedge ratios for three index futures 
contracts (S&P 500, NYSE Composite and VLCI) against a range of widely differing 
portfolios. However, when Junkus augmented the market model with a dummy 
variable which measured the differential effect of bull market conditions there was 
no consistent pattern which apphed to all index futures confracts. Therefore, given 
that the optimal hedge ratio was not associated with any significant variation during 
periods of major market movements, Junkus argued that portfolio managers were 
justified in using previously estimated hedge ratios when making market timing 
decisions. 
Graham and Jennings (1987) considered the hedging performance of the S&P 500 
index futures confracts with respect to ninety randomly selected equity portfolios, 
which were partitioned into nine different categories on the basis of systematic risk 
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and dividend yield levels. Systematic risk and dividend yield levels were chosen 
because they are determinants of stock selection. For each systematic risk - dividend 
yield category ten equally weighted portfolios consisting of ten shares each were 
constructed. Using weekly returns Graham and Jennings compared the effectiveness 
of the fraditional, beta and minimum variance hedging sfrategies, over one, two, three 
and four week durations in terms of the degree of return retention and degree of risk 
reduction. On the basis of return retention the MVHR was found to dominate the 
alternative strategies, preserving more of the unhedged return, over all three hedging 
periods for each portfolio category. Furthermore, a duration effect was also evident 
with four week hedges preserving more return than either the one or two week 
hedges. 
Evaluated on a risk reduction criterion, the minimum variance sfrategy did not 
dominate the other strategies to the same extent as was the case for return retention. 
While the MVHR was the most effective in terms of risk reduction for one week 
hedges, its superiority was found to diminish as hedge duration increased. Compared 
to Figlewski (1984a), stock index futiu-es were found to be less than half as effective 
at eliminating risk, when the spot instruments were imdiversified non-index 
portfolios, with risk reduction having been found to be within the 25% to 30% range. 
Lee, Bubnys and Lin (1987) investigated issues relating to the functional form and 
stability of the MVHR for the S&P 500, NYSE Composite and Value Line index 
futures contracts using daily data for the period April 1982 to August 1983. Lee et al 
compared the effectiveness of hedge ratios generated using price levels, price 
differences and logarithmic differences. They found that for all three contracts the 
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regression residuals based on raw price levels exhibited significant autocorrelation, 
and thus tended to produce inefficient hedge ratios which overstated the degree of 
hedging effectiveness. However, hedge ratios generated on the basis of price and 
logarithmic differences were found to be quite similar and capable of reducing 
between 60% and 85% of the unhedged portfolio risk. Furthermore, estimated hedge 
ratios were found to be unstable, and tended to rise as the time to confract expiration 
declined. Volume effects were suggested as an explanation for this phenomenon. 
Morris (1989) examined the hedging effectiveness of the S&P 500 index futures 
contract in reducing the risk associated with a fully diversified portfoUo of stocks 
composed of the largest companies on the NYSE. The portfolio of stocks constituted 
10%) of the NYSE capitaHsation. Using monthly data over the period 1982 to 1987, 
Morris found that use of the MVHR reduced the risk associated with the unhedged 
spot portfolio by 91%o. 
Malliaris and Urrutia (1991) questioned the assumption made by previous studies 
that hedge ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness are stable over the entire 
sample period. Changes in the amounts of information being impounded into prices 
may change over time, and this wil l influence hedging decisions aiid the stability of 
the optimal hedge ratio. Malliaris and Urrutia investigated the issue of stability for 
both the S&P 500 and NYSE index futures contracts, together with four foreign 
currency futures contracts. To test the stability of the estimated hedge ratios and 
measures of hedging effectiveness, the random walk hypothesis was employed. 
Using fortnightly hedges over the period January 1984 to December 1988, moving 
window regressions were estimated for a one year period, rolled forwards by three 
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months. Having generated hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness estimates for each 
quarter, the hypothesis that they both followed a random walk was tested using a 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the variance ratio approach of Lo and Mackinlay. 
Malliaris and Urrutia found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both hedge 
ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness for stock index futures contracts follow 
a random walk. The hypothesis was confirmed by both tests, indicating that both the 
estimated hedge ratios and measures of hedging effectiveness were random variables 
which have a tendency to change as the sample period changes. The main implication 
of the result is that hedgers cannot place perfect hedges, and a dynamic approach to 
hedging needs to be adopted, whereby hedgers continuously readjust their positions. 
However, Malliaris and Urrutia suggested that an adverse consequence of dynamic 
hedging was that of additional fransaction costs which accrue from repeatedly 
modifying the size of the futures position. Thus, in view of the cumulative cost of 
dynamic hedging, it may be more profitable over the life of the hedge to adopt an 
imperfect static hedge. However, where the adjusted hedge ratios associated with the 
dynamic approach are smaller in absolute size than those generated by the traditional 
approach, these additional transactions costs would be offset by reduced margin 
requirements. 
Lindahl (1992) also explored the issue of hedge ratio stability. Using weekly data 
over the period 1985 to 1989 for the M M I , and from 1982 to 1989 for the S&P 500 
index futures confracts, she investigated the issue of hedge ratio stability with respect 
to changes in hedge durations and the time to contract maturity. Hedge durations of 
one, two and four weeks were considered, with hedges being lifted at weekly 
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intervals between zero and twelve weeks before the contract expiration date. 
For both index futures contracts, Lindahl found evidence of a duration effect, with a 
rise in both the size of the MVHR and the respective measure of hedging 
effectiveness as hedge duration increases. The MVHR's were all less than unity, but 
were found to converge towards the beta hedge ratios as hedge duration increased. 
The duration effect was influenced by the fact that longer duration hedges were lifted 
closer to the expiration date, and the MVHR's were found to increase for hedges 
lifted closer to maturity. However, the coefficient of determination showed no 
tendency to increase as the expiration date approaches. A restricted least squares 
regression was found to corroborate the pattern evident from the sample of bivariate 
regressions, with the size of the MVHR's converging towards one as maturity 
approaches. Lindahl concluded that: 
"the minimum variance strategy, is a dynamic process that should 
be monitored as hedge duration increases and as expiration is 
approached. To remain fully hedged additional confracts need to 
be added to the original position" (1992, p. 43). 
Ghosh (1993) argued that the traditional approach to estimating hedge ratios was 
theoretically misspecified, because by failing to take account of the influence of 
lagged values the model excluded the influence of short run dynamics, with the 
consequence that any resulting hedge ratios would be sub-optimal. Using daily 
logarithms of the prices over the sample period January 1990 to December 1991, 
Ghosh estimated hedge ratios for the S&P 500 index, NYSE Composite index and 
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DJIA with respect to the S&P 500 index futures contract using an error correction 
mechanism which takes account of the long run equilibrium relationship between the 
spot and futures series. Ghosh found that the coefficients relating to the error 
correction mechanism (ECM) were significant for all three spot indexes, indicating 
that the equilibrium error in the last period had a significant influence on the 
subsequent change in the spot price. Furthermore, the log likelihood ratio statistics 
for all three indexes are highly significant indicating that the hedge ratios estimated 
using ECM's were preferable to hedge ratios estimated by traditional method. Ghosh 
found that both the optimal hedge ratio and the coefficient of determination for the 
error correction mechanism are higher than those estimated by the fraditional 
approach, indicating greater hedging effectiveness. 
While all of the previous studies which have been reviewed relate to index fiitures 
confracts traded in the US, the first investigation into the hedging effectiveness of the 
FTSE 100 confract traded on LIFFE, was conducted by Hohnes (1996). Using 
weekly data over the period July 1984 to June 1992, Hohnes considered which was 
the appropriate econometric technique for generating the optimal hedge ratio, 
whether there were duration or expiration effects and whether hedge ratios were 
characterised by stability. 
When comparing the MVHR's estimated by the standard OLS approach, error 
correction mechanism and generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedsatic 
(GARCH) process. Holmes found that while all three approaches were very effective, 
removing between 78% and 90% of the risk associated with the underlying FTSE 
100 spot portfolio, the traditional OLS approach was the most effective. Furthermore, 
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on the basis of risk reduction and return retention, the MVHR was also found to 
dominate the beta hedge ratio, a finding which is consistent with Lindahl (1992). 
Hohnes investigated the possibility of a duration effect using hedges of one, two and 
four week duration. The MVHR's, together with the measures of hedging 
effectiveness were found to increase for longer duration hedges, indicating that 
hedging effectiveness increased with hedge duration. Expiration effects were tested 
for by using multiple regression models for hedges of different duration. While no 
consistent relationship was evident, hedge ratios tended towards unity as expiration 
approached. Finally, regarding the issue of the stability of the MVHR, while they 
were found to vary over time, unit root tests indicated that all hedge ratios were 
stationary. 
In a paper that examined the impact of portfolio composition on both systematic risk 
and hedging effectiveness. Holmes and Amey (1995) constructed portfohos of UK 
stocks and gave consideration to the FTSE 100 confract. They showed that as the 
number of stocks in the portfolio increased from 1, through 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 the 
hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 confract increased markedly. However, they 
found that while previous studies had suggested that the FTSE 100 confract was 
capable of removing approximately 80% of the risk of the spot portfolio when that 
portfolio was the underlying index, risk reduction was only about 60% when the 
portfolio comprised of 25 stocks. Holmes and Amey concluded that previous studies 
had overstated the actual hedging effectiveness of this confract. 
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2.22) E X ANTE APPROACH TO HEDGING 
Little attention has been given to the issue of ex ante hedging effectiveness and the 
associated problem of inter-temporal hedge ratio instability. This section provides a 
brief review of the research papers which have investigated the issue of ex ante 
hedging performance for a range of financial futures confracts. 
Manner (1986) considered the hedging effectiveness of Canadian dollar futures in an 
ex ante framework using hedges of one, two, three and four week duration, and the 
near, middle and far contract over the period July 1981 to September 1984. The 
effectiveness of the MVHR was examined in an ex ante context by estimating the 
optimal hedge ratio for one period and then applying it to a subsequent period. These 
results were then compared against those achieved using the traditional approach. 
Manner found that the useflilness of the MVHR on an ex ante basis was rather 
limited, since although ex ante hedge ratios were found to be more effective than the 
traditional approach, the difference was not statistically significant. 
Lasser (1987) analysed the risk reduction potential of the minimum variance hedge 
ratio applied on an ex ante basis with regard to freasury bill and freasury bond futures 
contracts. Using data over the period January 1978 to December 1982, hedges of 
two, four, six and eight weeks duration were employed. Lasser found that ex ante 
hedges generated on the basis of a longer estimation period proved to be more 
effective hedges. However, the ex ante hedges were not found to be significantly 
better than the traditional hedge. 
Benet (1990) investigated the ex ante risk reduction potential of a large number of 
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foreign exchange futures confracts, comparing the difference in performance between 
minor and major currency futures. Monthly data over the period August 1973 to 
December 1985 was used. Benet found a discrepancy between hedge ratios 
calculated on an ex post and ex ante basis. This problem was especially acute for the 
minor currencies, and a number of adjustment techniques were employed to alleviate 
this problem. Benet suggested that these resuhs represented a more indicative 
measure of the effectiveness of these markets to currency fraders. 
Holmes (1995) investigated the ex ante hedging effectiveness of UK index futures 
contracts. Using data over the period 1984 to 1992, hedging effectiveness was 
examined for hedge ratios of one and two week duration with respect to the FTSE 
100 contract. Two types of ex ante hedge ratios were evaluated. Firstly, annual ex 
post hedge ratios generated in one period and then subsequently employed in a later 
period, and secondly, ex ante hedge ratios estimated using a rolling regression 
procedure. Holmes found that while the performance of ex ante hedge ratios was not 
as good as the ex post hedges, they were still very effective, eliminating up to 80% of 
the risk of the underlying index. Furthermore, the ex ante hedge ratios were found to 
dominate both the fraditional and beta hedge ratio strategies. 
2.23) E X T E N D E D MEAN GINI APPROACH TO HEDGING 
Cheung, Kwan and Yip (henceforth CKY (1990)) proposed the use of the mean Gini 
as an alternative measure of risk in the context of hedging with derivative 
instruments. CKY investigated the hedging effectiveness of futures and option 
contracts in both a mean variance and mean Gini framework on a daily basis over the 
period September 1983 to December 1984 for five currency confracts - Steriing, the 
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Canadian dollar, the German mark, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc. C K Y 
argued that because the mean Gini coefficient does not require the same restrictive 
distributional assumptions as the mean variance approach it is better suited to 
measuring price variability in a futures context'. C K Y found that using the mean 
variance framework results in the selection o f hedge portfolios that are sometimes 
dominated stochastically by another alternative. By contrast the mean Gini approach 
is specifically designed to exclude the adoption o f a dominated position. 
Comparing the risk reduction potential o f both futures and option contracts C K Y 
found that fiitures were more effective than options as a hedging vehicle in both the 
mean Gini and mean variance frameworks. In both frameworks the futures contracts 
reduced spot market risk by more than 55%, while options contracts reduced the spot 
market risk by about 45%. 
Hodgson and Okunev (1992) extended the analysis o f C K Y (1990) by employing the 
extended mean Gini coefficients. The extended mean Gini approach can be used to 
determine hedge ratios for different classes o f risk averse investors. Hodgson and 
Okunev pointed out that this approach would be o f particular value to professionally 
managed funds who have different classes o f clientele who match the different risk 
averse categories. Using a basket o f shares in the Ausfralian A l l Ordinaries Index and 
A l l Ordinaries futures contract over the period July 1985 to September 1986 they 
compared the hedging effectiveness o f the mean variance approach with the extended 
mean Gini approach for differing levels o f risk aversion. For low levels o f risk 
aversion hedge ratios generated by the E M G approach are similar in absolute size to 
the M V H R , but at higher levels o f risk aversion investors adopted hedge ratios that 
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were significantly different fi-om the mean variance approach. This finding arose 
because while the mean variance approach weights all return realisations equally, the 
E M G approach increasingly focuses on the worst return realisations, and attributes a 
greater weight to this subset o f observations as risk aversion increases. 
Hodgson and Okunev also investigated the issue o f dynamic hedging where the 
investor is assumed to continuously readjust their futures position over the life o f the 
contract. While the hedge ratios estimated on the basis o f mean variance analysis 
were found to be generally stable over time, extended mean Gini hedge ratios 
estimated for moderately to strongly risk averse investors were rather unstable. This 
finding suggested that a strongly risk averse investor who adopted a simple buy and 
hold strategy could be seriously mishedged. Therefore, Hodgson and Okunev argued 
that the extended mean Gini approach offers more flexibility in determining hedge 
ratios than the minimum variance approach, which is seriously, flawed because "it 
assumes the variance is observable and that there is only one class o f risk averse 
investors" (1992, p. 211). 
Kolb and Okunev (1992) compared the M V H R wi th the E M G hedge ratios computed 
for a wide range o f the risk aversion parameter. Using daily data for a variety o f 
fiitures contracts that included the S&P 500 index fixtures contact over the period 
January to December 1989 the empirical properties o f the E M G hedge ratio were 
examined. Generally these results are consistent with the findings o f Hodgson and 
Okunev (1992). For instance, the E M G hedge ratios for low levels o f risk aversion 
are quite similar to the MVHR' s , but at higher levels o f risk aversion there are 
substantial differences. Kolb and Okunev also investigated the stability o f the hedge 
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ratios over time using a moving window procedure. While the minimum variance 
hedge ratio was fairly stable, the E M G hedge ratio (for high levels o f risk aversion) 
was not, indicating that the hedger would be required to continuously adjust their 
fiatures position. 
Kolb and Okunev (1993) compared the hedging performance o f the risk minimising 
and uti l i ty maximising hedge ratio i n an E M G fi-amework. Kolb and Okunev argued 
that because their are different classes o f risk averse investors, the hedge ratio that 
minimises risk in E M G space would not necessarily maximise utility. Using monthly 
Cocoa spot and fiitures prices for Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Brazil over the 
period 1952 to 1976, Kolb and Okunev generated risk minimising and utility 
maximising hedge ratios for different levels o f risk aversion. They found that at very 
low levels o f risk aversion, the risk minimising and utility maximising hedge ratios 
differed significanfly, wi th the util i ty maximising hedge ratio characterised by 
reverse hedging (or speculative) behaviour. However, at high levels o f risk aversion 
the risk minimising and utility maximising hedge ratios converged towards one 
another. 
Lien and Luo (1993) used a non parametric estimation procedure to estimate E M G 
hedge ratios. Using weekly S&P 500 spot and fiitures data over the period January 
1984 to December 1988 they investigated the relationship between the optimal hedge 
ratio and changes in the risk aversion parameter. Lien and Luo found that the optimal 
hedge ratio decreases with increasing risk aversion. Lien and Luo also investigated 
the effect o f moving window sizes on the stability o f EMG hedge ratios. They found 
that while at low levels o f risk aversion hedge ratios were stable, at higher levels o f 
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risk aversion hedge ratios were characterised by a "widely swung step function" o f 
the data windows. 
2.24) SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The literature review relating to the hedging effectiveness o f index futures contracts 
highlights a number o f important points. First, o f the various techniques which have 
been used to estimate the optimal hedge ratio, the M V H R provides superior hedging 
performance. Measured in terms o f risk reduction the M V H R is found to be more 
effective than the hedge ratios estimated using either an E C M or GARCH model, and 
w i l l be employed in the empirical investigations in chapters three and four. Second, a 
duration effect is evident, wi th longer hedges being more effective. In confrast, there 
is no strong evidence o f expiration effects. Third, the nature o f the portfolio hedged 
is an important determinant o f hedging performance. For example, Figlewski (1984a) 
found hedging effectiveness was less for portfolios comprising small stocks, Graham 
and Jennings (1987) foimd the hedging o f portfolios comprising only ten stocks was 
much less effective than for portfolios matching an index and Hohnes and Amey 
(1995) found similar results for the U K . While the composition o f the spot portfoUo 
is clearly important, previous studies have failed to address true hedging 
effectiveness by examining hedging performance for actual stock portfolios. 
Portfolios used for examining hedging effectiveness have been either market indexes 
or constructed by the researcher. 
From the brief review i t is clear that ex ante hedging effectiveness has been largely 
confined to currency and interest rate futures, and where the ex ante effectiveness of 
index futures has been examined, research once again focused on the use o f spot 
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portfolios which mirror the underlying fiitures contract. To date, no examination has 
been undertaken o f ex ante hedging effectiveness with stock index fiitures where 
cross hedges are involved. In other words, no studies have investigated the 
effectiveness o f stock index fiitures for hedging actual portfolios. 
Previous studies which have applied the mean variance approach to hedging have 
implici t ly assumed that there is only one optimal hedge ratio (the risk minimising 
hedge ratio) which is appropriate for all categories o f risk averse investors. However, 
considering that there are numerous categories o f risk averse investors who engage in 
fiitures trading for a variety o f reasons, the assumption o f one optimal hedge ratio is 
clearly flawed. The extended mean Gini approach addresses this problem by 
allowing for a range o f optimal hedge ratios which accommodate the observed 
diversity in hedging behaviour. While this new approach has only very recently been 
applied to the stock index fiitures literature on hedging it is akeady clear that the 
robustness o f the E M G framework in distinguishing between different categories o f 
investors offers great promise i n examining hedging behaviour. 
While research into the hedging effectiveness o f U K index fiitures has been 
undertaken, to date there has been no work conducted on the effectiveness o f U K 
stock index fiitures using hedges o f short duration or in relation to spot portfolios 
comprising o f small capitalisation stocks. Furthermore, no attention has been given 
to the hedging effectiveness o f the M i d 250 contaract and to whether this new contract 
provides market participants wi th another important means by which to hedge stock 
portfolio risk. In chapter three hedging effectiveness w i l l be investigated within a 
mean variance framework. This chapter addresses shortcomings o f previous work in 
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a number o f important ways. Firstly, the first assessment o f the hedging effectiveness 
o f the M i d 250 contract is presented. In addition, comparisons are made between the 
performance o f this contract and that o f the FTSE 100 contract for a number o f 
different portfolios. Given that one aim o f the introduction o f the new confract is to 
enable more effective hedging o f small capitalisation stocks, this is clearly important. 
Secondly, together wi th assessing hedging performance for spot portfolios mirroring 
broad market indexes, cross hedging performance is analysed by examining the 
hedging o f actual spot portfoUos held by professional managers in the form of 
investment trust companies (ITC's). Since returns on ITCs represent the returns on 
professionally managed, well diversified portfolios, evaluation o f hedging 
effectiveness i n relation to these portfolios provides new insights into the capabilities 
for hedging actual portfolios. Thirdly, consideration is given to the hedging 
effectiveness o f a 'synthetic' FTSE 350 contract, which comprises o f various 
weighted combinations o f the FTSE 100 and M i d 250 contracts. 
The analysis undertaken in an ex post context is extended further by examining the 
hedging effectiveness o f the Johnson M V H R approach within an ex ante context for 
the same broad range of spot portfolios. As such, the chapter makes a number o f 
important contributions to the literature. Firstly, the analysis presents the first test o f 
the ex ante hedging performance o f the M i d 250 confract. Secondly, ex ante hedging 
effectiveness is compared with the ex post benchmark. This is an important issue 
because a high degree o f ex post hedging effectiveness is meaningless i f the hedger 
cannot attain similar levels on an ex ante basis. Finally, the inter-temporal stability of 
ex ante hedge ratios w i l l be investigated, together wi th the extent to which stability is 
a function o f window size. 
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The hedging effectiveness o f the FTSE 100 and M i d 250 conti-acts w i l l be fiirther 
examined using hedge ratios generated within an E M G framework. In chapter four 
E M G hedge ratios w i l l be evaluated with respect to spot portfolios comprising o f 
different market indexes. To date this approach has not been employed in relation to 
either U K futures contracts or cross hedges. Given the relevance o f this approach to 
different categories o f investors these results are important in casting light on the 
strength o f the relationship between risk aversion and hedge ratio selection. 
2.3) PRICING OF S T O C K INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS 
The work on hedging effectiveness in chapters three and four are both related to the 
pricing efficiency o f the FTSE 100 and M i d 250 index fiitures contracts. For 
instance, the imposition o f no-arbitrage limits improves the correlation between spot 
and fiitures prices, which increases hedging effectiveness. Therefore, an analysis of 
the pricing efficiency o f index fiitures contiacts is an important issue for research 
when investigating the economics o f stock index fiitures trading. 
Since the introduction o f index fiitures contracts in 1982 both researchers and 
practitioners alike have been interested in the extent to which actual index fiitures 
prices deviate from the theoretical values predicted by the no-arbitrage condition. A 
vast literature has evolved examining the related issues o f pricing efficiency and 
index arbitrage in stock index fiitures markets. The overall findings indicate that 
mispricing is common, and that substantial and sustained deviations exist o f actual 
fiitures prices from their theoretical values. While the majority o f the earlier studies 
focused on the issue o f mispricing in US markets, more recently greater 
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consideration has been given to the issue o f pricing efficiency in non-US index 
futures markets. 
The theory o f arbitrage pricing suggests that in an efficient market where the actiial 
futures price trades at the theoretical value predicted by the cost of carry model the 
no-arbitrage condition applies. Only when the actual futures price deviates from its 
theoretical value by more than the existing transaction costs w i l l profitable arbitrage 
be possible. Where the no-arbifrage condition ceases to exist, an index arbifrage 
fransaction should be promptly triggered resulting in the rapid elimination o f any 
mispricing. I f the futures contract is found to be underpriced the arbitrageur initiates 
a long futures arbitrage position, which involves buying the fiitures confract and 
simultaneously short selling the equivalent stock portfolio. Altematively, i f the 
futures confract is found to be overpriced the arbitrageur initiates a short futures 
arbitrage position which involves selling short the futures confract and 
simultaneously buying the equivalent stock portfolio. The traditional arbifrage 
strategy assumes that the positions are held until maturity but given the assumption 
often made that arbifrage capital is limited, researchers have examined the 
profitability o f the early and delayed unwinding options. 
Specifically, wi th respect to stock index futures pricing the empirical literature has 
focused on two related issues. Firstly, researchers have employed various forms of 
the cost o f carry model to determine the theoretical fair futures price to use as a 
benchmark for evaluating any mispricing. Secondly, a contract's history o f profitable 
arbitrage deviations has been examined to determine whether it contains any 
information which can be used to predict any subsequent price movements in the 
Page 43 
underlying market. While this literature review is not exhaustive, its intention is to 
highlight the main findings together wi th a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses o f the principal empirical investigations in this area. The remainder o f 
the section is structured as follows. The review w i l l initially concentrate on the 
pricing o f stock index futures contracts traded in the US, and then subsequently on 
the pricing o f non-US stock index fiitures contracts. 
2.31) PRICING OF INDEX FUTURES IN US MARKETS 
Cornell and French (1983a) compared the actual and predicted prices for the S&P 
500 and NYSE Composite index fiitures contracts for selected days over the period 
June to September 1982. Cornell and French found that the no-arbitrage model 
generally over predicted the actual fiitures price, leading to the fiitures price trading 
at a discount to its theoretical value. Cornell and French suggested that this 
discrepancy could possibly be attributed to a "tax timing" option which arises from 
differential tax treatment i n both stock and fiitures markets. As a consequence the 
equilibrium price o f the index fiitures contract may be below the predicted fair value 
by an amount equal to the value o f the tax timing option. 
Modest and Sundaresan (1983) investigated the potential for stock index arbitrage for 
S&P 500 stock index fiatures contracts using daily data over the period Apri l to 
December 1982. Modest and Sundaresan found that the fiitures price violated the 
limits o f the arbitrage window by trading at a discount to the theoretical fiitures price. 
Modest and Sundaresan accounted for this discount by arguing that arbifi-ageurs 
selling short seldom obtain fu l l use of the proceeds o f their short sales. The short 
seller must pay dividends on the shares borrowed and i f the proceeds are not 
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available for investment in the money market, then a long futures arbifrage position 
is only profitable where the futures price trades at a discount which is in excess o f the 
dividend yield on the underlying index portfolio. 
Figlewski (1984a) investigated deviations from the no-arbitrage condition for the 
S&P index futures confract, using daily data for the period encompassing Jime 1982 
to September 1983. Figlewski found that in the period immediately following the 
onset o f trading in this contract the index futures contract was significantly 
underpriced. However, in later periods deviations from the theoretical value were 
greatly reduced, implying that as the market developed it simultaneously became 
more efficient. Figleski argued that "noise" was the primary cause o f any mispricing, 
and as the market matured approximately 70% of any arbifrage opportunity was 
eliminated within a day 
Figlewski (1984b) used daily data for the period 1 June 1982 to 30 December 1982 
and found that both the NYSE composite and S&P 500 index futures confracts were 
significantly underpriced. Discounts on the NYSE composite index futures were 
larger than those on the S&P 500 index futures, and the deferred confracts were more 
underpriced than the nearby confracts. Figlewski rejected both the short selling and 
tax timing option arguments as explanations for the observed discounts because even 
when considered together they appeared insufficient to account for the magnitude o f 
the observed mispricing. Rather Figlewski attributed the existence o f early index 
futures discounts to a temporary disequilibrium caused by a lack o f knowledge and 
experience amongst investors regarding the workings o f these markets, which 
resulted in a reluctance to trade. Figlewski suggested that as investors acquired 
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greater familiarity wi th the way index fiitures markets operate: 
"Futures discounts should diminish and, finally, all but disappear 
as large investors begin to integrate stock index fiitures into their 
overall equity investment programs" (1984b, p. 47). 
Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) employed ti-ansactions data on the S&P 500 
index fiatures contract at quarter hour intervals, together with stock index quotes, 
over the period Apr i l 1982 to June 1987 in order to investigate the pricing behaviour 
o f index fiitures prices, together wi th the extent to which they deviate from their fair 
values. Specifically, Mackinlay and Ramaswamy were concerned with whether 
mispricing increased on average with maturity, and whether mispricing was path 
dependent. Mackinlay and Ramaswamy reported the following findings. Firstly, 
when investigating the extent to which non-synchronous (or stale) prices were a 
problem in index quotes Mackinlay and Ramaswamy found that this problem can be 
alleviated by using differencing intervals o f a longer duration. Even so, whenever the 
autocorrelation in the index series was high, the fiitures series also appeared to be 
characterised by high autocorrelation, which led Mackinlay and Ramaswamy to 
conclude that issues other than just stale prices accounted for the autocorrelation. 
Secondly, the variability o f futures price changes exceeded the price changes in the 
underlying index, even after controlling for non-synchronous prices in index quotes. 
Mackinlay and Ramaswamy suggested that this indicated that information was 
incorporated into the fiitures market more rapidly than the spot market. Thirdly, 
using a linear theoretical framework Mackinlay and Ramaswamy found that the 
magnitude o f the average absolute mispricing fel l as maturity approached. This 
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finding was consistent with the view that as maturity approached arbifrage risk 
arising from dividend and interest rate uncertainty fell . Furthermore, pricing errors 
were found to have declined over time, indicating that the market had become more 
efficient as it had matured. Finally, the issue o f path dependence in the mispricing 
series was investigated. Path dependence in the mispricing series was found to have 
arisen because once the no-arbitrage window had been violated in one direction, the 
arbitrageurs' option to unwind early ought to preclude significant mispricing in the 
opposite direction. Mackinlay and Ramaswamy found that each individual contract 
was generally dominated by either upper or lower bound deviations. Thus: 
"The evidence is consistent wi th the notion that the arbifrageurs' 
option to unwind prematurely introduces path dependence into the 
mispricing series" (1988, p. 156). 
Saunders and Mahajan (1988) proposed an arbifrage model o f index futures pricing 
based on the familiar CAPM framework which related to the returns on an index 
portfolio. The C A P M based model was used to test for any mispricing by regressing 
the futures adjusted returns against the spot index returns, where the alpha and beta 
parameters test for both significant unsystematic and systematic inefficiencies 
respectively. Saunders and Mahajan investigated the pricing efficiency o f both the 
NYSE index fiitures contract and the S&P 500 index futures contract using daily data 
over the period October 1 1982 to September 1984. The sample period was split into 
8 quarterly sub-periods wi th 4 different confract maturities being considered at the 
begiiming o f each sub-period - 3 months, 6 months, 9 months and one year 
respectively. 
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Saunders and Mahajan found that for the NYSE index fiitiires confi-act the hypothesis 
that the beta coefficient equals unity was rejected only for the first two sub-periods 
and accepted for the subsequent six sub-periods. The results for the S&P 500 index 
fiitures contract were very similar. Over the sample period betas for both conti-acts 
declined and were insignificantly different from one from June 1983 onwards. 
Saunders and Mahajan's evidence supported the efficiency o f fiitures markets finding 
that as the market matures price discrepancies have shrunk. Furthermore, no 
systematic relationship was observed to exist between the parameter estimates and 
the length o f time to maturity o f the different contracts, suggesting that efficient 
arbitrage pricing was common to all contracts o f different maturity. 
Swirmerton, Curcio and Bennett (1988) empirically examined whether deviations 
from the no-arbitrage condition which trigger index arbitiage contained any 
information which could be used to predict subsequent intraday price movements in 
the underlying market index. Using minute by minute data for the Major Market 
Index ( M M I ) fiitures contract over the period March to December 1986, Swinnerton 
et al found that fiitures price deviations were only modest indicators o f subsequent 
intraday movements in the underlying index. They found that positive deviations 
provide stronger indicators of subsequent price changes than negative deviations, 
arguing that this reflected the Uptick rule which restricted short sales and impeded 
the operation o f the undervaluation strategy. Swinnerton et al found that while 
deviations wi th a lead time o f five minutes provided the best prediction o f fiiture cash 
index movements, fiitures mispricing retained some predictive ability for up to a 
thirty minute lead time. 
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Merrick (1989) explored the profitability o f the early unwinduig option associated 
wi th arbitrage positions, by employing daily data on the first sixteen S&P 500 index 
futures contracts, over the period 17 May 1982 to 21 March 1986. Merrick found that 
mispricing reversals occurred frequently within the data and this suggested that 
arbitrage strategies that included an option to unwind early should prove profitable. 
Merrick assumed that an arbitrage position would be undertaken as soon as the 
transaction cost limits o f the no-arbitrage window were violated, and that the 
arbitrageur would subsequently unwind that position on the first profitable occasion. 
On the basis o f this trading rule Merrick foimd that the early unwinding option was 
exercised on 99.5% o f occasions, with the duration over which the arbitrage position 
was held ranging from 4.6 days to 25.2 days. The profits accruing from the early 
unwinding option were found to constitute 34% o f total profits. However, the major 
flaw wi th unwinding a position as soon as it became profitable to do so was that the 
arbitrageur would lose the opportunity to exploit an even more profitable mispricing 
reversal at some point in the future. Consequently, Merrick amended his frading rule 
to unwind a position only i f the resulting profit was at least one index point. 
Following this revised trading rule Merrick found that the early unwinding option 
was exercised on only 36% o f occasions, and that in the case o f nine o f the sixteen 
contracts all o f the trades were held to maturity. Given the more restrictive trading 
rule, the average duration over which the arbitrage position was held increased, 
ranging from 14 to 57.3 days and the profits arising from the early unwinding option 
rose to 44%) o f total profits. The profits associated with the early unwinding option 
had risen hy 51% fol lowing the infroduction o f the second frading rule, even though 
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the number o f potential unwinding opportunities had fallen by 63%. Furthermore, the 
early unwinding option led to transaction costs discounts on the arbitrage transaction 
o f 27%. 
Merrick also considered the contribution that the options to unwind may have on any 
subsequent expiration day price movements. Merrick argued that it may be possible 
to predict expiration day price movements by examining the history o f arbitrage 
opportunities prior to the contract maturity date. The contract's mispricing history 
should serve as a usefiil indicator o f the net accumulated cash position o f 
arbitrageurs. For instance, where the contiact had been characterised by net 
overpricing, arbitrageurs would be associated with an accumulated net long cash 
position, which would suggest a fall in the cash price at maturity. Alternatively, 
where the contract had been characterised by net underpricing, arbitrageurs would be 
associated wi th accumulated net short cash positions which would suggest a rise in 
the stock price at maturity. However, this rule correctly predicted only 38% of the 
expiration date price movements over the sample period. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1990) utilised the mispricing series calculated by Mackinlay 
and Ramaswammy (1988) for the S&P 500 index, to determine the optimal arbitrage 
strategy for a trader who was subject to both transaction costs and position limits. 
They demonstrated that the imposition o f position limits increased the value o f the 
arbitrageurs option to unwind early. Brennan and Schwartz (1990) examined the 
profitability o f the early unwinding arbitiage strategy and found that where 
unprofitable arbitrage positions were initiated on the expectation o f a subsequent 
profitable mispricing reversal, this produced an average profit o f one index point per 
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confract. 
Bhatt and Cakici (1990) working with daily data on the S&P 500 investigated 
potential arbitrage opportunities over the period Apr i l 21 1982 through to June 19 
1987. Closing prices on the nearest to maturity contract and next nearest to maturity 
contract were examined. Specifically, Bhatt and Cakici considered whether the 
mispricing series was significantly different from zero. It was found over the sample 
period that the near confract was characterised by a premium of 0.2%) and the next 
nearest to maturity confract by a premium o f 0.42%. These finding are in confrast to 
earlier studies which found that the S&P 500 index futures contract had been frading 
at a discount. It was suggested that this may have reflected a risk adjusted retum to 
the arbifrageur. The incidence and size o f any mispricing was found to be greatest 
for the confract furthest from maturity. Even so, mispricing generally fell for both 
maturity confracts over the sample period, supporting the argument that as a market 
matures fraders become more informed leading to more efficient pricing. Finally, 
Bhatt and Cakici found that the mispricing series for both maturity contracts were 
systematically related to the accumulated dividend payment and the length o f time to 
maturity rather than being stochastic over time as had been suggested by Brennan 
and Schwartz (1990). 
Habeeb, H i l l and Rzad (1991) investigated the potential for maximising index 
arbifrage profitability through the adoption o f optimal entry and exit rules. Habeeb et 
al explored the potential returns available to arbifrageurs who adopted a path 
dependent trading strategy after taking account o f entry and exit costs. Habeeb et al 
employed data on the S&P 500 index futures contract at five minute intervals over 
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the period December 21 1987 to June 15 1990. Arbitrage was initially triggered when 
any mispricing exceeded the entry rule for two consecutive observations and the 
resulting arbitrage position was unwound early when the subsequent mispricing 
reversal satisfied some predetermined exit rule. Clearly any arbitrageur who was 
prepared to exploit both limits of the arbitrage window improved their arbitrage 
profitability. A variety of entry and exit rules were examined and arbitrage was found 
to be most profitable when the arbitrageur required an entry inducement of 0.9 to 0.8 
index points and exit inducement of 0.2 to 0.4 index points. Habeeb et al concluded 
that: 
"Much of the art of stock index arbitrage involves the skill with 
which different traders or portfolio managers can assess different 
market environments and adjust the entry and exit levels 
accordingly" (1991, pp. 184 - 5). 
Chung (1991) examined the pricing efficiency of the Major Market Index fiitures 
contract and the profitabihty of index arbitrage. Chung used transactions data over 
the period June 24 1984 to August 31 1986 and calculated mispricing on a second by 
second basis. The fair pricing formula was adapted to accommodate transactions 
costs for different classes of traders, various execution lags and the Uptick rule. The 
evidence suggested that the frequency of any mispricing had declined dramatically as 
the market had matured. For instance, in 1986 arbitrage was triggered in only 1% of 
cases for the most unfavourably placed trader and in only 9% of cases for the most 
favourably placed trader. It was suggested that previous studies had overstated the 
frequency of arbitrage violations by using the reported index rather than transactions 
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data. 
Chung argued that the profitabihty of index arbitrage had been exaggerated because 
other studies have focused on ex post rather than ex ante tests, neglecting the issue of 
execution risk. Chung suggested that: 
"What appears ex post as a riskless profit opportunity is not 
necessarily a real ex ante exploitable profit opportunity because 
there is no guarantee that the prices at the next available 
transaction wil l still be favourable for the arbitrageur" (1991, p. 
1792). 
Allowance was made for the presence of execution risk by assuming alternative 
execution lags of twenty seconds, two minutes and five minutes. Chung's findings 
demonstrated that ex ante profits are not riskless and that as the length of the 
execution lag increased so did the probability of the arbitrageur incurring a realised 
loss. Thus Chung concluded that the size of the ex post mispricing often represented 
a poor indicator of the ex ante profitability of index arbitrage. 
Klemkosky and Lee (1991) employed a fair value pricing formula modified to 
account for the effects of differential transactions costs, marking to market and 
taxation. Using transactions data at ten minute intervals they evaluated the 
profitability of index arbitrage for the near S&P 500 contract for a variety of 
arbitrageurs over the period March 18 1983 to December 17 1987. Klemkosky and 
Lee produced a no-arbitrage condition which was a function of the market position 
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and tax status of the relevant arbitrageur. It was found that the no-arbitrage condition 
was violated on 42% of occasions for the most favoured arbitrageurs, and on 5% of 
occasions for the least favoured arbitrageurs. The fi-equency and extent of 
overpricing was found to be much greater than that for underpricing. However, the 
inclusion of taxation into the fair value assessment was found to reduce mispricing 
considerably - by 43% for member firms and 61% for institutional investors. 
Klemkosky and Lee found that mispricing was a positive fimction of the length of 
time to maturity, with the fi-equency and size of mispricing bemg significantly less on 
expiration days than on non-expiration days. Consistent with the evidence provided 
by Chung (1991), Klemkosky and Lee found that an execution lag reduced the 
profitability of index arbitrage considerably. Even so, arbitrage remained profitable 
for all arbitrage classes for a period of ten minutes after the initial arbitrage trigger. 
Sofianos (1993) examined the profitability, timing and riskiness of index arbitrage 
for the S&P 500 index fiitures contract, using a unique data set based on Daily 
Programme Trading (DPT) reports provided by the NYSE member firms. Sofianos 
considered 2,659 S&P 500 index arbitrage trades over the period January 15 1990 to 
July 13 1990. The mispricing series was calculated fi-om transactions data on a 
minute by minute basis. Sofianos found that profitable arbitrage opportunities were 
short lived, lasting on average about three minutes, with arbitrage transactions often 
being initiated when the mispricing series was within the limits of the arbitrage 
window. Unsurprisingly 70% of arbitrage positions were unwound early following a 
profitable mispricing reversal. When allowance was made for modest transactions 
costs there were eleven arbitrage opportunities per day. The sample was 
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characterised by 175 profitable mispricing reversals, an average of one reversal a 
day. However, some reversals occurred within four minutes, while others took as 
long as eight days. Sofianos argued that arbifrage transactions were riskier than had 
previously been suggested because of the practice of "legging" whereby stock and 
fiitures transactions are not initiated simultaneously. Of the arbitrage transactions 
considered 37% were characterised by legging. Tracking risk was also found to be 
significant with the average number of stocks in the cash leg of the arbifrage 
transacfion being only 280, though 8% of arbitrage trades were established with less 
than seventy stocks. This practice of using a surrogate basket to initiate the stock 
side of an arbitrage transaction was found to be marginally more profitable but 
considerably riskier. 
2.32) PRICING OF INDEX FUTURES IN NON-U.S. MARKETS 
Bowers and Twite (1985) examined index arbitrage opportunities on a daily basis for 
the Australian A l l Ordinaries index futures contract over the period February 16 
1983 to December 27 1984. Bowers and Twite partitioned their data set into three 
distinct sub-periods. In the initial sub-period, consistent with studies in the US, the 
Australian Al l Ordinaries index fiitures confract was found to frade at a discount to 
its theoretical value. During the intermediate period, ranging from April 1983 to 
January 1984, while arbitrage opportunities remained, the sign of the deviation 
switched, with the index fiitures contract trading at a premium. While in the final 
period the index futures confract once again reverted to trading at a discoimt, there 
was evidence to suggest that investors were exploiting arbitrage opportunities more 
rapidly than had previously been the case, reflecting the greater experience of market 
participants in the later period. 
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Brenner, Subrahmanyan and Uno (henceforth BSU (1989a)) examined the arbitrage 
relationship between the price of the Nikkei Stock Average (NSA) index traded on 
the Tokyo stock exchange and the price of the NSA index fiitures contract traded on 
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SMEX). BSU employed daily 
closing prices over the period September 3 1986 to Jime 7 1988. Consistent with 
results for the US, deviations of actual futures prices fi-om theoretical prices tended to 
be large with actual prices generally lower than theoretical prices. Negative 
deviations were observed on 75.1% of occasions and positive deviations were 
observed on 24.9% of occasions. Mean negative deviations were found to be three 
times the size of mean positive deviations. 
Many of the deviations from fair value were too large to be explained purely by 
transaction costs, and BSU considered the possibility of profitable arbitrage after 
allowing for transactions costs of 1% and 2%. At the 1% fransactions cost level, 
arbitiage was found to be profitable on 41.4% of occasions, of which 91.2% 
represented underpricing opportunities and 8.8%) represented overpricing 
opportunities. While at the 2% transactions cost level profitable arbitrage 
opportunities were found to have arisen on only 17.6%) of occasions, of which 97.4% 
represented underpricing opportunities and 2.6% represented overpricing 
opportunities. 
The dominance of negative mispricing was largely accounted for by specific trading 
restrictions which constrained the arbitiageurs ability to sell stocks short as part of a 
long fiitures arbitrage strategy. However, as BSU pointed out the magnitude of 
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mispricing does decrease in size over time, and: 
"Possible explanations for this secular decline in mispricing 
include the relaxation of legal restrictions on certain investors, 
creation of better institutional arrangements for short sales, and 
greater awareness of the possibilities for substitution between 
stocks and fiitures contracts" (1989a, p. 381). 
While the magnitude of mispricing was found to decline over time, there was a 
tendency for mispricing to be characterised by persistence, whereby positive or 
negative mispricing remained positive or negative for several days. Autocorrelation 
coefficients for all contracts were found to be significant for four days. 
Brenner, Subrahmanyan and Uno (1989b) examined deviations from the no arbifrage 
condition for two Japanese index fiitures confracts. The pricing efficiency of both the 
Nikkei Stock Average index fiitures confract traded on SIMEX and the Osaka Stock 
Futures 50 (OSF 50) index fiihires contract fraded on the Osaka Securities Exchange 
(OSE) were considered using daily data over the period June 9 1987 to June 1988. 
After allowances were made for 1% transactions costs BSU found that the majority 
of arbitrage opportunities could be profitably exploited. For the OSF 50 confract the 
mispricing series was overpriced on 56.6% of occasions, of which 68.8% of these 
opportunities could be profitably exploited, and underpriced on 43.4% of occasions, 
of which 59.3% of these opportunities could be profitably exploited. For the NSA 
contract the mispricing series was overpriced on 19.5% of occasions, of which only 
11.8% of the overpricing could be profitably exploited, and underpriced on 80.5% of 
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occasions, of which 52.1% of the underpricing could be profitably exploited. 
Mispricing for both contracts was found to be persistent, and evidence from 
autocorrelation coefficients suggested that the series were characterised by a sfrong 
path dependence. 
Yadav and Pope (1990) investigated the pricing efficiency and potential for index 
arbitrage on the FTSE 100 index fiitures contract traded on LIFFE. Yadav and Pope 
employed daily opening and closing prices for the sixteen confracts over the period 
July 1 1984 to June 30 1988. The data set was partitioned into two sub-samples to 
evaluate the effects of the financial deregulation which ensued the Big Bang on 
October 27 1986. 
Consistent with studies in the US, Yadav and Pope found that the forward pricing 
cost of carry model provided a downward biased estimate of actual fiitures prices. 
The mispricing series for the near contract indicated that mispricing for the whole 
sample was large and persistent with the fair value formula frequently being violated. 
In the pre-Big Bang period the fiitures price traded at a systematic discount from its 
theoretical value. Post Big Bang mispricings were still large with the market 
dominated by frequent mispricing reversals. In the pre-Big Bang period, the market 
was underpriced on 80% of occasions and overpriced on only 20% of occasions. 
While in the post-Big Bang period, the market was underpriced on 59% of occasions 
and overpriced on 41% of occasions. The fact that the chronic discount which 
characterised the early part of the sample gradually disappeared and resulted in more 
efficient pricing was according to Yadav and Pope, evidence of both the market 
maturing and the simultaneous growth in the arbitrage sector. 
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Yadav and Pope examined mispricing for the next nearest to maturity confract for the 
four weeks prior to the expiration of the near contract. The absolute magnitude of 
mispricing for the second nearest to maturity confract was considerably larger than 
the near contract. Although like the near contract the next nearest to maturity 
confract was found to be trading at a discount in the pre-Big Bang period and a 
premium in the post Big Bang period. 
Given the evidence of potentially profitable arbifrage opportunities Yadav and Pope 
attempted to simulate the profitability of the market by using a number of simple 
trading rules on an ex post and ex ante basis. It was found that significant arbifrage 
profits could have been generated using these various rules. Consistent with the 
findings of Merrick (1989), additional profits arising from the unwinding options 
were found to represent a significant proportion of total profits. Interestingly, prior to 
Big Bang the additional potential profit was due mainly to delayed unwmdings, 
while post Big Bang most of the additional profit resulted from the early unwinding 
option. Yadav and Pope found that even when allowing for the most restrictive 
trading conditions 70% of positions were closed out prior to expiration. According to 
Yadav and Pope the fact that positions tended to be closed out before maturity 
indicated that: 
"arbifrage related programme trading may not carry a significant 
risk of expiration day price, volume and volatility effects on 
underlying stocks" (1990, p. 594) 
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Finally, Yadav and Pope found that the absolute size of any mispricing was related to 
the length of time to maturity. The absolute size of any mispricing decreased as the 
maturity date approached. 
Strickland and Xu (1992) working with houriy data for the period January 4 1988 to 
December 29 1989 examined the time series properties of the mispricing series for 
the FTSE 100 index ftitures confract. Strickland and Xu employed data on both the 
near contract and the next nearest to maturity contract. They found that for the near 
contract the futures market was consistently more volatile than the cash market and 
that frequent arbitrage opportunities prevailed. There was a tendency for mispricing 
to be negative and persistent. The average mispricing for the entire sample was -
0.468%) which was comparable to the figure of-0.4% of Yadav and Pope (1990). The 
mispricing series was generally found to remain within the transactions cost limits of 
+0.5% and -1.5%). This finding was consistent with the view that when the fiitures 
price deviated towards its transaction costs limits arbifrageurs intervened to pull it 
back towards fair value. However, the absolute size of mispricing is significantly 
larger for the far contract than the near confract, with a greater number of negative 
mispricings and less mispricing reversals. 
Strickland and Xu examined the profitability of delayed and early unwinding options. 
A delayed unwinding sfrategy depended on the relative mispricing between the near 
and next nearest to maturity contracts. Overall, the absolute values of mispricing are 
considerably larger for the far confract than the near confract, with the far contract 
being more underpriced than the near contract. The delayed and early unwinding 
options were found to be very profitable, and the larger were the fransactions costs 
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limits the greater was the contribution that these sfrategies made to total arbifrage 
profits. Strickland and Xu also found that the mispricing series was not random but 
systematically related to the length of time to mahirity and accumulated dividend 
payment. Furthermore, an AR(2) process proved to be a close approximation for the 
mispricing series, and parameter estimates suggested that the series was stable over 
time. 
Stulz, Wasserfallen and Stucki (1990) considered the pricing efficiency of the Swiss 
Market Index (SMI) fiitures contract, an over the counter market composed of 
Switzerland's twenty four most actively fraded shares. This market was interesting 
because contract expiration occurs only twice a year and compared to other well 
established futures confracts, the market was characterised by limited liquidity. The 
sample consisted of SMI daily closing prices extending over the period January 23 
1989 to October 20 1989. Stulz et al found that the SMI fiitiires confract was very 
efficiently priced, with mispricing errors generally being found to lie within 
transaction cost limits. The largest mispricing of 1.3% was only marginally in excess 
of fransaction costs, and Stulz et al concluded that given the low liquidity and market 
impact costs that arise from large trades, such opportunities are unlikely to prove 
profitable. 
Ho, Fang and Woo (1992) used minute by minute fransactions data to investigate the 
incidence of arbifrage opportunities on the Hang Seng index futures contract for 
different maturity contracts on seventeen randomly selected trading days over the 
period April to July 1991. Ho, Fang and Woo found that arbifrage opportunities 
were less common than had been suggested by studies using daily data, with 69% of 
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observations being efficiently priced. Where the futures price was found to deviate 
from its no arbitrage limits it was overpriced on 89% of occasions and underpriced 
on just 11% of occasions. The high incidence of overpricing resulted from execution 
problems which were common to the Hong Kong frading system. 
Lim (1992b) suggested that previous studies which have investigated index arbitrage 
in Japanese markets using daily closing prices have been subject to the execution 
impossibility problem resulting from non-synchronous prices and have overstated the 
profitability of index arbitrage in these markets. Lim focused on the four contracts: 
June 1988, September 1988, June 1989 and September 1989 and employed 
fransaction data at five minute intervals for the NSA contract fraded on SIMEX for 
five randomly selected days for each contract. Lim found that mispricing was less 
common than had been suggested by Brenner, Subrahmanyan and Uno (1989a and 
1989b), with the mispricing series fluctuating within the range -1.2 to +1.2% from 
fair value. Given the relatively tight limits within which the fiitures mispricing series 
was held, arbifrage opportunities were found only to be available to well placed 
market makers. Lim argued that these significantly different conclusions were due to 
differences in data frequency. Having determined that arbitrage opportunities were 
rather rare, Lim examined the statistical behaviour of the mispricing series when it 
ties within the arbitrage window. It was found that many of the statistical properties 
characterising the relationship between spot and futures prices in US markets - i.e. 
stale pricing, relative volatility, lagged prices - were not evident in this market. 
Lim and Muthuswamy (1993) investigated the potential for index arbitrage on the 
NSA contract using a modified cost of carry model which allowed for the effect of 
Page 62 
taxation and provided a more detailed specification of transactions costs. This study 
extended the data set of Lim (1992b), by employing fransactions data at five minute 
intervals on five randomly selected days for the June 1988, September 1988, 
September 1989 and March 1991 contracts. Lim and Muthuswamy's results were 
largely consistent with those of Lim (1992b) with arbitrage opportunities over this 
period rare. It was suggested that an increase in uncertainty which arose from 
changes in the market's composition led to greater volatility in spot and fiitures 
prices, resulting in a widening of the limits of the no-arbitrage condition. 
Furthermore, Lim and Muthuswamy found that even i f arbifrage opportunities had 
occurred, it would have been difficult to realise any profits owing to execution lags. 
Grunbichler and Callaghan (1994) examined the pricing efficiency of the nearest to 
maturity DAX index futures contract using transactions data at five and fifteen 
minute intervals over the period December 1990 to September 1991. Grunbichler and 
Callahan found that for 90% of the intervals examined the DAX index futures 
contract fraded at a discount. The average level of underpricing was below 0.5% and 
the majority of overpricing below 1%. After allowance had been made for 
transactions costs it was doubtful whether any arbifrage opportunities could have 
been profitably exploited. The tendency for the near DAX index fiitures confract to 
be fairly priced was attributed to the unique institutional and market characteristics in 
the German futures market, such as screen trading and the restrictions on short 
selling. 
Buhler and Kempf (1995) examined the profitability of index arbitrage for the DAX 
index futures contract for contracts of differing maturities using minute by minute 
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transactions data for the period November 23 1990 to December 17 1992. Buhler and 
Kempf found that the prices predicted by the cost of carry model did not provide a 
very close approximation of actual fiitures prices, and all the relevant futures 
irrespective of maturity were characterised by significant average underpricing 
within the range -0.46% to -1.18%. The further the confract was from the expiration 
date the more underpriced it was found to be. As the futures confract became the near 
contract mispricing approached zero, reflecting the increase in trading activity. 
Buhler and Kempf assumed (after extensive discussions with market participants) 
that an arbitrageur required an additional risk premium of 0.25% of the index value -
in excess of normal transaction costs - before engaging in index arbifrage. Given 
these wider arbitrage bounds, over the entire sample period arbitrage was triggered 
on 26.65% of the occasions when the fiitures confract was underpriced, compared 
with only 0.163% of the occasions when the futures contract was overpriced. 
An examination of the ex ante profitability of these arbifrage tiiggers found that all 
long futures arbifrage opportunities were profitable i f executed within one minute of 
the mispricing being identified. Even after allowing for an execution lag of fifteen 
minutes over 90% of arbifrage opportunities remained profitable. Buhler and Kempf 
argued that their ex ante arbitrage sfrategy was considerably more profitable that that 
reported by Chung (1991) for the US because he took no account of the premium 
required by arbifrageurs. 
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2.33) SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Stock index futures prices have been found to trade at sizeable and sustained 
deviations from the theoretical values predicted by the cost of carry model, giving 
rise to profitable arbitrage opportunities. With respect to this review of the empirical 
literature regarding the related issues of the pricing efficiency of futures confracts and 
index arbifrage, a number of important points can be highlighted. Firstly, the 
standard cost of carry forward pricing formula tended to be misspecified leading to 
biased estimates of the actual futures price. Attempts were made to correct this 
problem by allowing for the effects of marking to market, differential fransaction 
costs and taxation. Secondly, a large number of the index futures confracts both in 
the US and elsewhere were characterised by chronic underpricing relative to fair 
value in the early stages of their trading life. Various explanations were espoused to 
account for this phenomenon such as a tax timing option and short selling 
difficulties. However, the suggestion that the market was in a state of "fundamental 
disequilibrium" owing to the inexperience and lack of knowledge of the relevant 
traders appears more tenable, especially as the discounts often disappeared in a 
subsequent period. This indicated that as the market matured pricing inefficiencies 
have shrunk. Even so, there was evidence to suggest that rather than fiitures markets 
being characterised by a steady improvement in efficiency, pricing efficiency 
fluctuated over time. Thirdly, while the simple buy and hold to maturity sfrategy was 
found to provide limited arbitrage opportunities, arbifrage capital consfraints and 
frequent mispricing reversals have given rise to early and delayed unwinding options. 
These options offered significant fransactions costs discounts, and were found to 
have made an important contribution to overall arbifrage profits, resulting in 
arbitrage being undertaken while the mispricing series was still within the bounds 
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dictated by the no-arbitrage condition. The tendency for arbitrageurs to exercise the 
early and delayed unwindings options led to the mispricing series often being 
characterised by path dependence. Fourthly, the mispricing series was found to be 
systematically related to accumulated dividend payments and the length of time to 
maturity. The size and frequency of mispricing was found to fall as the maturity date 
approached. This finding was consistent with profitability of the delayed unwinding 
option. In summary, arbifrage was found to be much more complicated in practice 
than suggested in theory, once execution risk, fracking risk and restrictions to short 
selling have been accounted for. 
In the UK, stock index arbitrage strategies are considerably more difficult to 
implement than in other markets owing to specific technical and stuctural features 
which impede trading in equity and index futures markets. In spite of these 
difficulties, index arbitrage has been positively encouraged in London (ISE (1987)) 
due to concern over the large pricing differences which exist between spot and 
futures markets. While research into the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 contract 
relative to the underlying index has been conducted both on a daily and infra-daily 
basis, to date no research has been undertaken investigating the pricing efficiency of 
the Mid 250 confract or the potential for index arbitrage within this market. I f the 
Mid 250 confract is to effectively function as an efficient means of risk fransfer for 
lower capitalisation UK stocks then it is important that it be priced according to fair 
value. However, owing to thin trading in this confract and the illiquid nature of many 
of its market constituents, there are strong reasons to believe that the Mid 250 
contract is likely to be mispriced. While deviations from fair value usually signal the 
presence of an arbitrage opportunity, the trading impediments which exist in the UK 
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together with the infrequent frading of stocks make index arbifrage exfremely 
difficult in the Mid 250 market. In chapter five, the pricing efficiency and the 
potential for arbitrage is investigated for both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. 
2.4) PRICING OF INTRAMARKET AND INTERMARKET SPREADS 
The review of literature relevant to chapter five indicates that futures mispricing is an 
important component of the return on a futures confract, which has relevance for the 
earlier investigations relating to hedging effectiveness. An alternative test of futures 
pricing efficiency involves examining spread trading, which by enabling futures 
traders to allocate risk amongst themselves provides additional hedging 
opportunities, and contributes to the discussion on the 'economics of arbitrage'. 
While much speculative activity in financial futures markets is conducted by the 
frading of spreads, the price behaviour of spreads has received little attention in the 
academic literature. This is surprising given that considerable research has been 
conducted into the pricing of futures confracts relative to their underlying spot 
instruments; and compared to arbitrage, spread trades tend to be easier and less 
expensive to execute. Spread trading involves taking both long and short positions in 
two different but economically related futures confracts in order to profit from 
pricing relationships that are believed to be temporary. 
While this review of the literature is not exhaustive, its purpose is to highlight the 
range and diversity of spread frading relationships which have been investigated, 
together with their relative strengths and weaknesses. It wil l be shown that as a 
trading strategy, spreading provides essential liquidity to distant contract months, and 
in doing so underpins the viability of the futures market. The remainder of this 
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section is structured as follows. This review will firstly consider spread trading 
relationships focusing on traditional agricultural and metallic futures markets, and 
wil l then subsequently examine spread trading relationships relevant to financial 
futures markets. 
2.41) SPREAD TRADING IN TRADITIONAL FUTURES MARKETS 
Ma (1985) examined the potential for profitable spread arbitrage between the gold 
and silver futures markets. The pricing relationship underpinning this model was 
based on the assumption that a short term equilibriimi parity existed between the gold 
and silver markets, and that any deviation fi-om this parity could be profitably 
exploited. Using daily gold and silver prices based on London fixing quotes over the 
period January 1972 to October 1984, Ma modelled historical realisations of the 
gold-silver spread using a moving average model. Employing alternative lag 
specifications of the moving average model, an ex ante equilibrium spread (parity) 
was generated and compared to the actual level of the spread parity. I f the ex ante 
spread differed significantly from its current level, a spread was initiated. Ma found 
that by altering the widths of the confidence interval and the order of the moving 
average process, ex ante spread arbitrage profit opportunities existed on a daily 
basis. Although it was possible to make profits on the basis of this rule, excess 
returns were largely wiped out once allowances had been made for transaction costs. 
Monroe and Cohn (1986) investigated the pricing efficiency of the gold futures 
market relative to the T-bill futures market by constructing an intermarket spread 
between the two markets. The rationale for this spread was that it was assumed that 
gold prices of different maturity should reflect some interest rate which was closely 
Page 68 
related to the T-bill rate. Therefore, gold futures prices should display a strongly 
defined relationship with the equilibrium T-bill futures price, and any deviation from 
this relationship was likely to constitute a spread arbitrage opportunity. Using intra-
daily transaction data for the gold and T-bill markets from the CME over the period 
March 1976 to July 1982, Monroe and Cohn explored spread arbitrage opportunities 
for the three contracts closest to maturity. 
Over the entire sample average returns per contract were not found to be sufficient to 
violate transaction cost limits, which provided evidence that average futures returns 
were in equilibrium. However, Monroe and Cohn tested the efficiency of the spread 
by employing a trading strategy based on a 60 day moving average of the difference 
between the implied gold and T-bill rate. Trades were initiated whenever the spread 
differential deviated from the moving average by more than one standard deviation. 
Two liquidating rules were evaluated. The first rule required that the established 
position be closed out on the next trading day, while the second rule required that the 
position be held until the spread difference was reversed or confract expiration was 
reached. 
While both strategies generated positive returns, the returns associated with the first 
exit rule were not sufficient to cover the transaction costs of the typical trader. 
However, the reversal rule generated profits which were four to five times larger than 
the initial rule, easily violating transaction costs and providing evidence of market 
inefficiency. Furthermore, the contribution of the gold leg of the spread to overall 
returns was found to be consistently larger than the T-bill leg. A finding which is in 
part accounted for by the thinness of the gold futures market relative to the T-bill 
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market. 
Poitras (1987) examined the potential for profitable spread arbitrage using a "golden 
tiulle" strategy which involved taking positions in both a gold intramarket spread and 
interest rate futures. The strategy involved comparing the implied carry return (ICR) 
on the gold futures spread with the associated Eurodollar and T-bill rates. For 
fundamental reasons the differential between the Eurodollar and T-bill rates was 
larger than the differential between the gold ICR's and Eurodollar rate. Consequently, 
the gold ICR was weakly bounded from below by the T-bill rate and weakly bounded 
from above by the Eurodollar rate. Using daily settlement prices for gold fiitures 
(COMEX), T-bill and Eurodollar futures (IMM) for the 15 months prior to maturity, 
over the period April 1982 to March 1985, Poitras devised a frading rule based on the 
relationship between the three rates. For instance, whenever the gold ICR came 
within a predetermined number of basis points of either the Eurodollar or T-bill rates, 
a golden turtle frade was initiated, and was subsequently liquidated when the gold 
ICR came within a predetermined number of basis points of the other boundary. 
The profitability of the golden turtle trading rule depended crucially on the arbitrage 
triggers adopted, which were calculated as a percentage of the size of the T-bill -
Eurodollar differential. Poitras tested both the 25% and 35% triggers. Trades based 
on the 25% trigger ranged from 2-13 months, with an average of 6.5 months per 
trade. While trades based on the 35% trigger ranged from 0.25 to 9.5 month, with an 
average of 2.5 months. Overall this strategy was found to be both profitable and 
relatively riskless, with only 3 from 38 frades generating losses. 
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Carter (1989) examined the potential for profitable spread trading opportunities 
between thin and liquid futures markets for substitutable commodities. This issue is 
of interest because illiquid markets are likely to be less efficient and characterised by 
greater price variability. Although some difference in the amount of price variability 
between the two markets was expected, arbitrage should limit the size of the spreads. 
This hypothesis was tested by spreading three liquid US contracts against three 
illiquid Canadian contracts. The spreads investigated were the US long term 
government bond - Canadian long term government bond spread, the US com -
Canadian barley spread, and the US soyabean - Canadian rapeseed spread. Daily 
opening and settlement prices were obtained for all six nearby confracts over the 
period January 1980 to August 1987, from the Chicago Board of Trade, the 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange and the Toronto Commodity Exchange. 
With respect to the three spread positions. Carter devised a frading rule based on the 
assumption that the spread price differential was a random variable with a normal 
distribution, and hence it was possible to calculate the expected size of the spread 
based on past historical information. Large deviations from this mean value were 
perceived as profitable spread opportunities, and the trading rule was devised to 
capture these large price variations. Using this approach. Carter employed samples of 
50 and 30 observations to compute Z values, and spread positions were initiated 
whenever, the absolute Z value was greater than 2.5 (i.e. the expected probability of 
occurrence was less than 1%) and the position was reversed by an hypothetical 
liquidating trade whenever the absolute Z value was less than 1. 
Overall, the results indicated that only the long term government bond spread proved 
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profitable, with the corn-barley spread and the soyabean-rapeseed spread resuUing in 
small average losses. Carter argued that these losses indicated an absence of arbitrage 
opportunities between the respective legs of the spreads, and the conclusion that 
barley and rapeseed markets were as efficient as the com and soyabean markets 
cannot be rejected. 
Abken (1989) examined the potential profitability of the seasonal behaviour of 
intramarket heating oil spreads. Using monthly data on the No. 2 heating oil futures 
contract traded on NYMEX over the period January 1980 to December 1987, Abken 
found that spread returns tended to narrow and become increasingly negative during 
winter months when the heating oil futures price structure became characterised by 
backwardation. Therefore, Abken argued that potential profits existed from 
exploiting the subsequent reversion in seasonal spread prices. 
By seasonally partitioning the sample into summer and winter periods, Abken 
computed the monthly returns accruing from a long or bull spread. It was found that 
while average returns on the spread during the winter season were large and 
significantly positive, returns during the summer season were small and often 
insignificant. Abken suggested that seasonal variations in the margin requirements 
led to a reluctance on the part of traders to commit capital, and that the inadequacy of 
speculative capital during winter months was the most likely cause of this spread 
return anomaly. 
Johnson, Zulauf, Irwin and Gerlow (1991) examined the soy complex crush margin 
to test for speculative opportunities in the crush spread. This intermarket spread 
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involved taking simultaneous positions in the soybean, soyoil and soymeal futures 
markets. The net processing (or crushing) margin for the soyabean complex was the 
difference between, the sum of the soybean and soyoil futures price, and the soybean 
futures price, minus the cost of crushing. An implied crushing margin of zero was 
consistent with zero arbitrage profits. A positive margin indicated a normal soybean 
crush position (long soybeans, short soymeal, short soyoil) should be initiated 
because profits were expected from processing soybeans. While a negative margin 
indicated a reverse crush position (short soybeans, long soymeal, long soyoil) should 
be initiated because processing losses were expected. The profitability of this 
strategy was tested on an ex ante basis over the period January 1966 to November 
1988, using data from Dunn and Hargitt Incorporated, a commercial supplier of 
futures data. 
Johnson et al initiated five hypothetical soy complex trades on a monthly basis, with 
the frades being subsequently liquidated 9.5, 7.5, 5.5, 3.5 and 1.5 months later, with 
positions having been taken in the confracts maturing closest to the liquidation date. 
Over the entire sample period, Johnson et al found that average returns net of 
transaction costs were positive only for positions held in excess of 5.5 months, with 
trades being held for less than 5.5 months being characterised by average losses. 
Therefore, while there was minimal evidence of profit opportunities for spread 
trading the nearby contracts, profit opportunities existed for trades of distant 
contracts. Furthermore, the reverse crush frade produced larger average profit and 
generated profits more frequently than the normal crush trade. Finally, when the 
sample was partitioned into two-equal sub periods, frading profits were found to be 
more prevalent in the latter period suggesting inefficiencies had persisted. 
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Wahab, Cohn and Lashgari (1994) derived a simple no-arbifrage model to estimate 
the theoretical fair price for the gold-silver spread, to determine the profitability of 
trading in precious metals. The model represented a no-arbifrage cost of carry model 
for pricing forward confracts on storable commodities. Using daily spot and futures 
prices over the period January 1982 to July 1992, Wahab et al found that the spot and 
futures spread series were cointegrated, and by estimating an error correction model 
were able to generate forecasts of future spread changes. Where the model indicated 
a positive change, a long position in gold and a short position in silver was initiated. 
Conversely, where the model indicated a negative change, a short position in gold 
and a long position in silver were taken. It was found that frading profits which were 
positive on a pre-transaction cost basis, became losses once fransaction costs were 
accounted for. 
Barrett and Kolb (1996) investigated the pricing behaviour of a range of inframarket 
and intermarket agricultural spreads to determine whether predictable seasonal 
patterns in the prices of these commodities gave rise to profit opportunities. Using 
daily futures data collected from Dunn and Hargitt over the period 1960 to 1990, 
Barrett and Kolb tested the profitability of spreads consisting of com, wheat, oat and 
soyabean futures both in calendar and contract time. 
In determining whether agricultural spreads offer investors profitable opportunities, 
Barrett and Kolb considered whether the mean daily profit arising from each spread 
trade was significantly different from zero. For the spreads based on calendar time, 
only 15 of the 189 hypothetical intermarket frades and only 2 of the 150 hypothetical 
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intra market spreads were significant at the 5% level. In addition, for the spreads 
based in contract time, only 2 of the 42 hypothetical intermarket spreads and 2 of the 
35 hypothetical infra market spreads were significant at the 5% level. Barrett and 
Kolb argued that these results were not considerably different from what chance 
alone would predict, and did not constitute evidence of a regular seasonal pattern 
which would give rise to reliable speculative profits. In fact these results were 
supportive of the hypothesis of market efficiency. 
2.42) SPREAD TRADING IN FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS 
Easterwood and Senchak (1986) examined the profitability of the "turtle frade" which 
involved testing for spread opportunities between the T-bond and T-bill futures 
markets. The turtle frade suggested that at any point in time, the three month 
repurchase (or repo) rate implied by the intermarket T-bond spread comprising of 
adjacent futures delivery months should be equivalent to the three month T-bill 
futures rate for the equivalent time period. However, owing to market fiictions the 
two rates had the potential to diverge, and on such occasions spread arbitrage 
opportunities were likely to exist. Easterwood and Senchak employed daily 
settlement prices relating to T-bonds and T-bill contracts over the period January 
1979 to November 1983 to test the profitability of this strategy. 
A hypothetical turtle trade was initiated whenever there was at least a 50 basis point 
difference between the price of the T-bond spread and the T-bill futures confract, 
which was then monitored until either of two liquidation conditions had been met. 
The established position was liquidated when either the absolute difference between 
the two rates became less than 20 basis points or the "first position day" of the 
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delivery month was reached. This latter condition precluded the possibility of having 
to take delivery. Overall the strategy was found to realise an average loss of $72 per 
trade which was not statistically significant. However, individual frades were 
characterised by considerable variation with trade returns varying from $12,094 to -
$11, 581, with a standard deviation of $3,736. Distinguishing between spread type, 
Easterwood and Senchak found that while bull spread combinations (long the bond 
spread and short the bill) realised a significant loss of $325 per frade, bear spread 
trades (short bond spread and long bill confract) realised an average gain of $622 per 
trade. On average, there was a tendency for bear turtle spreads initiated more than 
three months from contract maturity to be the most profitable strategy. However, 
such a strategy accounted for only 21% of all frades undertaken. 
Rentzler (1986) studied turtle trades which involved predicting relative price 
movements between the T-bond spread and T-bill futures and purchasing the 
investment which offered the highest relative retum and selling the investment which 
offered the lowest relative retum. Although the turtle trade represented an arbifrage 
transaction it was not riskless given the presence of time and grade basis risk. Using 
daily settlement prices for the T-bond futiires (CBT) and T-bill fufrires (IMM) over 
the period August 1977 to June 1983, Rentzler employed the 9 months of data before 
maturity to test the profitability of the trade. When it was considered that the two 
rates were significantly out of line, positions were taken which would prove 
profitable i f the rates reverted to their recent equilibrium relationship. Where the 
implied repo rate was considered to be overpriced relative to the T-bill rate a bull 
turtle trade was initiated which involved a long T-bond spread position and short T-
bill futures position. AUematively, where the implied repo rate was considered to be 
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underpriced relative to the T-bill rate a bear turtle trade was initiated which involved 
a short T-bond spread and a long T-bill futures position. 
In designing the strategy for initiating trades, Rentzler decided that a deviation 
between the two rates was significant i f it was more than k standard deviations from 
a m day moving average. Where k = 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and m = 10, 15, 20. The position 
was then held until there was a significant deviation (measured in terms of k) in the 
opposite direction. At this point the trade was reversed with a bull (bear) spread 
becoming a bear (bull) spread. Over the entire sample the frading rule outlined 
produced consistently large profits even after adjustments had been made for 
transaction costs. Over two thirds of all frades proved profitable. Furthermore, the 
profits did not diminish over time and were found to be independent of market 
conditions, performing well in both bull and bear markets. While all combinations of 
k and m resulted in positive average profits, those initiated with larger values of k 
produced the largest average profits. Finally, when distinguishing between the 
relative positions of the turtle trade it was evident that when k = 2, profits are 
predominantly generated from bill trades, while when k = 1, profits are 
predominantly generated from the bond spread leg of the trade. 
Billingsley and Chance (1988) provided the first examination of spread frading in the 
context of index futures markets, by testing the profitability of both infra and 
intermarket spreads. Using weekly data over the period April 1982 to January 1986, 
the performance of intramarket spreads comprising of the near and next nearest to 
maturity S&P 500 contracts and intermarket spreads comprising of the near S&P 
500 contract and near NYSE contract were tested to see whether or not they were 
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priced according to their theoretical no arbitrage levels. Both sophisticated spreads 
which involved undertaking offsetting positions in the respective equity markets, and 
simple spreads which were based on futures price levels were examined. The sample 
period was partitioned into sub-periods around September 1983 to detect for any 
changes in the spread pricing relationship. 
With respect to the intramarket spread, over the entire sample period the average 
spread was found to be correctly priced, being insignificantly different from zero. 
However, the spread was priced at a significant discount in the earlier period and a 
significant premium afterwards. When examining spread mispricing on a weekly 
basis it was found that the spread mispricing violated its fransaction cost limits on 
only 10% of occasions, which was considerably less than the fransaction cost 
violations associated with each specific leg of the spread over the same period. On 
examining the performance of the simple infra market spread based on weekly 
futures retums, although the overall mean retum was found to be insignificantly 
different from zero, the spread retum did in fact violate fransaction cost limits on 
31%) of occasions. However, the dilemma faced by spread fraders was that on an ex 
ante basis they would not know which legs to buy and which to sell. Furthermore, the 
standard deviation estimates reported by Billingsley and Chance indicated that 
through holding an inframarket spread the underlying volatility associated with the 
individual legs could be reduced by over 90%. 
When initiating an intermarket spread between the near S&P500 confract and the 
near NYSE contract allowance had to be made for the spread ratio applicable to the 
two legs. The overall mean spread value was found to be a significant 0.258%, 
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indicating that the spread traded at an overall premium. Even so, while the average 
spread was overpriced on a weekly basis, the degree of mispricing was only 
sufficient to exceed transaction cost limits on one occasion. As for the simple 
spreads, the mean spread was positively priced but this was not significant. Finally, 
while over 50% of these spreads exceeded transaction cost, these opportunities could 
not be profitably exploited on an ex ante basis, because once again the trader would 
not know which legs to buy and which to sell. 
Allen and Thurston (1988) investigated the wide price discrepancies which were 
observed between implied forward rates and the corresponding futures rates in the T-
bill market. Using T-bill fiitures prices together with 7, 14, 21, 30 and 90 day term 
repo rates for the 16 confracts spanning the period December 1982 to September 
1986, Allen and Thurston computed spread rates between forward and futures 
instruments. Their results showed that the differences between the forward and 
associated futures rate are sfrongly positive, and have a tendency to persist because 
financing rates are not low enough to allow traders to completely arbitrage a market 
without incurring considerable risk. 
Yadav and Pope (1992b) examined the potential for inframarket spread frading on the 
FTSE 100 index futures contract, using intra daily data over the period April 1986 to 
March 1990. Yadav and Pope employed the forward pricing formula to determine the 
fair value of the deferred contract which was measured in terms of the nearest to 
maturity contract. The spread mispricing series was expressed as the log of the ratio 
of the price of the deferred contract to the fair price of the deferred confract. 
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Over the entire sample average spread mispricing was not found to be significantly 
different from zero, with 49.2% of observations being characterised by positive 
spread mispricing and 50.8%) of observations being characterised by negative spread 
mispricings. On a contract by contract basis, spread mispricing was significantly 
positive for 7 contracts and significantly negative for 6 contracts, with 3 confracts not 
being significantly different from zero. Furthermore, neither the average spread 
mispricing nor the associated standard deviation were found to be characterised by 
any systematic reduction over time. 
Spread mispricing was also found to be persistent, whereby mispricing persisted in a 
particular direction for extended intervals, as was the case for index arbifrage. Yadav 
and Pope calculated the degree of persistence through the use of non-parametiic mns 
tests, which measured the average length of a run (or the average frequency of a 
mispricing reversal). The average length of time between mispricing reversal was 22 
trading hours. Overall the mn test results demonsfrated that: 
"the number of runs is significantly less than the number of runs 
expected i f successive observations were independent; the 
hypothesis of no persistence being conclusively rejected" 
(1992b, p. 368). 
According to Yadav and Pope the implication of a high degree of persistence was 
that the early unwinding option was unlikely to be profitable in any subsequent 
spread arbitrage sfrategy. 
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The profitability of the FTSE 100 intermarket spread was examined with respect to 
two simple trading rales, these were the hold-to-expfration and the early unwinding 
option frading rales. On an ex post basis spread arbitrage offered a significant 
number of profitable opportunities for the most favourably placed class of 
arbitrageurs. In contrast to index arbitrage over 80% of the spread arbifrage positions 
were held to maturity. Alternatively, on an ex ante basis, while the actiial magnitude 
of spread arbitrage profits had been reduced, over 70% of the arbifrage frades 
remained profitable when held to maturity. However, the ex post profits generated 
from the early unwinding option were completely eliminated when this sfrategy was 
tested on an ex ante basis. Therefore risky spread arbitrage strategies were likely to 
be unatfractive. 
Grinblatt and Jegadeesh (1996) examined the relative pricing of spreads between 
Eurodollar futures and forward contracts. Daily Eurodollar futures prices (CME) and 
forward prices implied by the term stracture of the spot LIBOR quotations from Data 
Resources Incorporated were employed over the period April 1982 to December 
1992. The sample was partitioned into two sub-periods: April 1982 to June 1987 and 
July 1987 to December 1992. Over both sub-periods the average yield differential 
was significantly different from zero, with this average differential being smaller in 
the second sub-period. Grinblatt and Jegadeesh evaluated a number of different 
hypotheses that could potentially explain both the futures-forward yield difference, 
and variations in this relationship over time. The factors considered as possible 
explanations for the observed yield difference between the forward and futures 
contract were the issues of marking-to-market, default risk, liquidity risk and market 
depth, taxation and the stracture of futures and forward markets. 
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The marking-to-market feature is the principal confractual difference between 
forward and futures contracts, with futures contracts being settled on a daily basis, 
while forward contracts are settled only at matiirity. Grinblatt and Jegadeesh tested 
the marking-to- market hypothesis but found that it was too small to account for the 
actual magnitude of observed futures-forward rate differences. The default risk 
hypothesis suggested that forward contracts should have a risk premium factored into 
them to cover the inherent default risk of trading in OTC markets, which would lead 
to forward contracts trading at a premium to futures confracts. However, this 
hypothesis could not account for either the size or the sign of the yield differential in 
the early part of the sample. Altematively, the liquidity risk hypothesis suggested that 
transaction costs are a function of market liquidity. Therefore, since forward 
contracts are less liquid than futures confracts, the equilibrium forward rate should be 
in excess of the equilibrium futures rate to offset the larger market impact costs of 
frading in the forward market. However, this hypothesis was not corroborated by the 
evidence, since the Eurodollar futures rate was generally in excess of the forward 
rate. Finally, tax differences in the forward and futures markets were considered. 
However, since the effect of taxation was found to be symmetrical with respect to 
gains and losses, they only affect the scale of payoffs at maturity and not the 
expected value of the payoff. 
Acknowledging the failure of the previous hypotheses, Grinblatt and Jegadeesh 
argued that the large yield differential could be attributed to market inefficiency. 
When examining the timing of the flow of information between the forward and 
futures markets they found that although information was rapidly fransferred from 
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the forward to the futures market, there were delays in the speed at which 
information was transferred from the fiitiires to the forward markets. Therefore, they 
argued that it was reasonable to assume that the Eurodollar yield differential resulted 
from relative mispricing owing to a lack of arbifrage activity, and concluded that: 
"The finding that mispricing persisted for many years is surprising 
in that the conventional wisdom is that a market quickly arbifrages 
away any mispricing. It appears that market frictions and 
ignorance may limit the arbitrage activity and prolong the price 
adjustinent process" (1996, p. 1522). 
Board and Sutcliffe (1996) investigated the implications that dual listings of stock 
index futures contracts have for implementing profitable spread trading sfrategies. 
Dual listing arises where the same futures contracts are traded simuhaneously on 
different futures exchanges. Board and Sutcliffe employed the no-arbifrage condition 
to test for deviations from fair value and implemented hypothetical spread frades 
based on relative mispricing between the different legs of the spread. Using opening 
and closing prices for the Nikkei index futures confract over the period September 
1988 to June 1993, spread profitability was examined with respect to the near Nikkei 
confract fraded on the Osaka and Singapore exchanges, and Singapore and Chicago 
exchanges respectively. The sample period for the Osaka-Singapore frade was 
partitioned around October 1990 (the date associated with the onset of Nikkei futures 
trading on the Chicago exchange) to allow a comparison between the two intermarket 
spreads. 
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With respect to the Nikkei spread comprising o f positions in both the Osaka and 
Singapore markets, the mean spread mispricings are much larger in the earher sub-
period than in the later sub-period, a difference which is statistically significant at the 
5% level. Board and Sutcliffe suggested that this reduction in the size o f spread 
mispricing could be attributed to a "learning effect". In addition the distribution o f 
spread mispricing was also found to be symmetrical indicating that there was no 
systematic tendency for spreads to be priced either at a premium or discount. The 
actual size o f spread mispricings were found to be considerably smaller than those 
reported for spot futures arbitrage (see Brenner, Subrahmanyan and Uno (1989b)). 
For instance, only on 5.1% of occasions were spread mispricings found to violate the 
1% transaction cost l imit . 
The mispricing series relating to the Osaka - Singapore spread was also found to be 
characterised by a number o f specific time series properties. Firstly, the tendency for 
mispricing series associated with index arbitrage to converge to zero as maturity 
approached, was not evident in the spread mispricing series. Board and Sutcliffe 
argued that because a spread involves offsetting short and long positions, the decline 
in dividend and interest rate uncertainty which is associated with a time to maturity 
effect, would be cancelled out. Secondly, although the spot - futures mispricing series 
was found to be characterised by significant positive autocorrelation, this feature was 
not present in the spread mispricing series. In fact there was little evidence that 
spread mispricings have a tendency to persist in one direction over time. This finding 
is in contrast to Yadav and Pope (1992b) who found that significant spread 
mispricing runs constituted evidence o f persistence. Finally, in the context o f index 
arbitrage the limits o f the arbitrage window were often found to be highly 
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asymmetric and path dependent owing to the difficulties associated with the short 
seUing o f stock and the option to unwind estabUshed positions early. However, these 
issues do not impede spread trading and consequently the spread mispricing series 
was found to be largely symmetrical and associated with minimal path dependence. 
The second testable spread which Board and Sutcliffe examined was that between the 
Nikkei futures contract traded in Singapore and Chicago. This spread was 
complicated by the fact that the respective contract multipliers were denominated in 
different currencies. To overcome the inherent currency risk associated with this 
spread is was necessary to forecast the dollar - yen exchange rate at the contract 
maturity date before the spread was initiated. This additional source o f uncertainty 
together wi th the fact that the two markets are situated in different time zones 
implied that the arbitrage window would be larger than that associated with the 
Osaka-Singapore spread. Spread mispricings associated with the Singapore - Chicago 
spread were fomid to be both larger and more frequent than those associated with the 
Osaka - Singapore spread, wi th the 1% (2%) transaction cost threshold being violated 
on 10.5% (2%) o f occasions. Finally, the time series properties evident in the Osaka -
Singapore spread mispricing series were also evident in the Singapore - Chicago 
spread mispricing series. 
2.43) SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
In summary, spread trading is an essential strategy which is widely employed by 
traders in futures markets, and arises from perceived anomalies between the relative 
prices o f two or more related futures contracts. Unfortunately, wi th respect to the 
spread trading literature the vast majority o f previous studies have focused on the 
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examination o f the profitability o f specific frades, and the theoretical development o f 
spread frading behaviour has been rather limited. While spread frading strategies 
were fraditionally applied to agricultural futures, the strategy has become 
increasingly more widespread with respect to financial futures. Although there are 
difficulties in generalising across the various studies, it was often found to be the 
case that strategies which were profitable on a pre-fransaction cost basis, resulted in 
losses once allowances were made for transaction costs. This fmduig would tend to 
reinforce the overall conclusion that futures markets are generally efficient. 
While spread trading is vital to the well functioning o f any futures market, spread 
trading activity in index futures markets has received very little attention compared 
to the literature examining index arbifrage relationships. However, the infroduction 
o f the M i d 250 contract in conjunction with the well established FTSE 100 confract 
provides a unique opportunity to examine both inframarket and intermarket spread 
frading relationships. Although the FTSE 100 and M i d 250 confracts are technically 
quite good substitutes, the chapter investigating mispricing suggests that owing to 
differences in frading volume the M i d 250 is not as efficient as the FTSE 100 
contract, and that the far FTSE 100 confract is not as efficiently priced as the near 
FTSE 100 contract. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume that inframarket 
and intermarket inefficiencies are likely to exist, and these pricing inefficiencies w i l l 
manifest themselves in spread trading opportunities. Findings o f systematic patterns 
in the relative price movements between the two contracts suggest that subsequent 
changes are predictable. Whether or not these predicted variations can be profitably 
exploited through an effective trading rule is an issue which can only be resolved 
empirically. 
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2.5) CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed the empirical literature which relates to 
important issues regarding the economics of stock index futures trading in the U K , 
and which have been identified as warranting fiirther investigation. While both o f 
these areas have been well researched in the context o f US index fiitures contracts, 
and work has been forthcoming for the FTSE 100 contract, to date no research has 
been undertaken in any o f these areas wi th regards to the UK ' s M i d 250 contract. The 
main fimction o f the thesis is to help to bridge this gap in the literature, by examining 
the hedging effectiveness and the pricing efficiency o f index fiitures contracts. Hence 
the focus o f this research is to concentrate on the important aspects relating to the 
introduction o f the M i d 250 contract and the additional benefits, i f any, that the 
introduction o f the M i d 250 contract has made to index fiitures trading in the U K . 
The findings fi-om each of these investigations w i l l be o f interest to investors, market 
practitioners, regulators and the general public alike. 
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Endnotes 
' There is considerable evidence to suggest that the normality assumption is not appropriate 
in the case of futures contracts. Taylor (1985) finds evidence that returns on futures 
contracts are characterised by excess kurtosis, which supports the use of the mean Gini 
approach. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
T H E HEDGING E F F E C T I V E N E S S OF THE FTSE 100 AND FTSE MID 
250 CONTRACTS: COMPARING THE E X POST AND E X ANTE 
APPROACHES 
3.1) INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one i t was argued that index futures contracts provide a mechanism for 
facilitating the transfer o f price risk for basis risk and extend the range of portfolio 
opportunities which are available to investors through hedging. Thus hedging was 
found to provide the principal justification for the existence o f fiiUires markets. The 
stated purpose o f this thesis is to empirically investigate the role and function o f U K 
index futures contracts. Specifically, an important concern is the degree to which the 
recently introduced Mid , 250 contract complements the well established FTSE 100 
contract. To resolve this issue, this chapter considers whether the M i d 250 contract 
provides investors wi th any additional hedging benefits, in addition to those aheady 
provided by the FTSE 100 contract. 
As was illustrated in chapter one, the new contract is associated with very thin 
liquidity and this suggests that while the M i d 250 contract offers new risk reduction 
opportunities in principle, owing to the low levels o f trading volume, its practical 
significance may be limited, in that it might provide little extra hedging opportunity 
compared to the FTSE 100 contract. The hedging role o f the new contract is 
investigated by examining whether the M i d 250 contract is an effective means o f 
hedging a range o f stock portfolios and comparing its hedging performance with that 
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o f the FTSE 100 confract. The chapter offers a number o f improvements on previous 
studies o f the hedging role o f stock index futtires confracts. In particular, a wide 
range o f spot portfolios are used for determining the hedging performance o f the two 
confracts, by utilising not only portfolios which mirror the indexes on which the 
futures confracts are written but also a spread o f investment trust companies. By 
examining hedging effectiveness over such a range of spot portfolios, it should be 
possible to determine whether the new futures confract adds substantially to the 
opportunity set available to investors in terms o f hedging effectiveness. 
It is evident from the literature review in chapter two that most previous studies have 
evaluated the hedging effectiveness o f index futures confracts by employing an ex 
post sfrategy wi th spot portfolios that mirror the composition o f the underlying 
contract. This may have seriously exaggerated the risk reduction potential o f these 
instruments. Such an approach presumes that the hedger has perfect foresight with 
respect to the future behaviour o f spot and futures series. In reality, investors only 
have imperfect information sets and in the presence of inter-temporal hedge ratio 
instability the use o f futures contracts to remove market risk is associated with 
forecasting problems. Therefore, by investigating hedging effectiveness using a 
dynamic ex ante sfrategy in conjunction with spot portfolios that do not just replicate 
market indexes, it is possible to provide a more reliable evaluation o f the risk 
reduction potential o f U K index futures confracts. 
The remainder o f this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2) theoretical 
issues relating to the derivation o f the optimal hedge ratio in an ex post and ex ante 
context are considered. In section 3.3) the research issues being empirically 
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investigated within this chapter are outlined. In section 3.4) data and methodology 
issues are presented. In section 3.5) the key findings ui relation to the use o f an ex 
post hedging strategy are reported, and in section 3.6) the key findings in relation to 
the use o f an ex ante hedging strategy are reported. Finally, in section 3.7) 
conclusions are drawn. 
3.2) THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Futures contracts have an important practical role to play by expanding the 
opportunity set available to investors through the introduction o f negative correlation 
not typically found in spot markets. In the case o f stock index futures, the existence 
o f these contracts allows investors to avoid market risk which cannot easily be 
avoided using spot assets alone due to restrictions on short selling. Traditionally, the 
management o f the market risk associated with an investor's portfolio involves 
expensive stock selection and market timmg decisions. A diversified portfolio which 
contains excellent stock selection, and would be expected to outperform the market 
may experience losses during a general downturn. In the past investors were required 
to liquidate their positions and sell stocks, or acquire put options to insure against 
market risk. These activities were expensive and often unreliable. However, the onset 
o f tiading in stock index futures has provided investors with a reliable and 
economical method o f managing market risk through the act o f hedging. 
Hedging involves a futures market transaction which is undertaken to reduce the risk 
associated wi th some other risky spot market position', and it is thought to provide 
the main justification for the existence o f futures markets. According to Daigler 
(1993): 
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"Although speculative interest provides shorter-term volume, 
speculative activity can be wavering and uncertain, especially 
since speculators hold a position for only several weeks. Market 
makers on the floor provide intraday hquidity, but without 
speculators and hedgers the market makers soon depart to another 
pit. Likewise, arbifrageurs provide only limited liquidity for the 
market. Hedgers are the key to the markef (p. 221). 
In order to illusfrate the mechanics o f hedging using index futures confracts we shall 
assume a perfect capital market in which market imperfections such as taxes, 
transaction costs and indivisibilities are overlooked. Initially the hedge ratio is 
assumed to be constant, although the importance o f a dynamic hedging sfrategy w i l l 
be considered later. Assume an investor holds a fu l ly diversified portfolio o f stocks 
which exactly replicates the market index (e.g. FTSE M i d 250 index). Furthermore, 
suppose that the current value o f the stock portfolio is V , , the current price o f the 
stock index is Si and the number o f spot index units held is Xg. Therefore, the investor 
V 
possess units o f the market index. For instance, i f the current value o f the stock 
portfolio is £20 mil l ion and the current price o f the stock index is 4000 points, the 
investor holds the equivalent o f five thousand units o f the stock index (Xg = 5000). 
Should the investor wish to adjust the portfolio's exposure to market risk this can be 
achieved by taking an offsetting position in the futiires market. By allowing Xp to 
become the number o f index units fraded in the futures market, the hedge ratio 
becomes: 
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Hedge Ratio (h) = = ^ ^-^^ 
Where the hedge ratio (h) refers to the current value o f the stock index sold forward 
as a proportion o f the current value o f the portfolio being hedged. The hedge ratio 
(equation 3.1) is responsible for determining the specific risk and return properties o f 
the hedged portfolio (i.e. a weighted portfolio o f the spot and futures positions). 
Portfolio theory demonstrates that the expected return and variance on the hedged 
portfolio can be expressed by equations 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
E(R,) = x^E(R,) + x,EiR,) 3.2) 
^ \ ^ 4 ^ 1 + 4<^'F + 2XSX^ cis,F 3.3) 
Where the expected return on the hedged portfolio E(R^ is the weighted sum o f the 
expected returns on the spot portfolio (E(Rs)) plus the expected returns on the futures 
contract (E(RF)), a^ R^ is the variance o f the return on the hedged portfolio and Og, p is 
the covariance between the returns on the futures contract and the returns on the spot 
portfolio. However, by setting Xg = 1 and substituting into equation 3.1, the expected 
return and variance o f the hedged portfoUo can be equivalently expressed in terms of 
equations 3.4 and 3.5 respectively: 
E(R,) = EiR,) + hE{R,) 3.4) 
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cy\ =GI+ h'al + 2hcs,, 3.5) 
Changes in the hedge ratio are responsible for determining the level o f risk and return 
on the hedged portfolio. Figure 3.1 which illusfrates the Portfolio possibility frontier 
for the hedged portfolio, shows that by adjusting the hedge ratio associated with the 
hedged portfolio the hedger can attain any o f a range o f portfolios. Changes in the 
hedge ratio alter the weights which the investor attaches to their spot and futures 
market positions. In figure 3.1, where h = 0 the futures market makes no contribution 
to the investors portfolio, and the risk-return combination is determined purely by the 
spot portfolio. However, the investor has the opportimity to alter the risk and return 
characteristics o f their spot portfolio by establishing a position in the futures market 
and adopting a non-zero hedge ratio. 
A l l points along the portfolio possibility frontier to the left o f the unhedged stock 
portfolio involve taking a short position and selling futures confracts against the 
established stock portfolio. Since selling futures contracts involves assuming a 
negative hedge ratio, then with regards to equation 3.5 and 3.4 the hedged spot 
portfolio w i l l be associated with a simultaneous reduction in risk and return. 
Alternatively, all points along the portfolio possibility frontier to the right o f the 
unhedged portfolio involve taking a long position and buying futures confracts 
against the established spot portfolio. Since buying futures contracts involves 
assuming a positive hedge ratio, then with regards to equation 3.4 and 3.5 the hedge 
portfolio w i l l be associated with a simultaneous increase in risk and retum^ Given 
that the investor's stock portfolio is assumed to exactly mirror the M i d 250 index, the 
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Figure 3.1) 
Portfolio Possibility Frontier for the Hedged Portfolio 
E ( R s ) 
h = + 0.5 
h = -0.5 
Risk (a\,) 
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returns achieved fi-om selling the futures contract w i l l be perfectly inversely 
correlated with the returns on the spot position. Since the spot and futures markets 
are assumed to move in perfect tandem, a rise (fall) in the price o f the M i d 250 index 
would be exactly offset by a fal l (rise) in the price o f the futures contract. Therefore, 
where h = -1 a perfect hedge is achieved, with the hedged portfolio associated with 
zero risk and a rate o f return equal to the riskless rate o f interest. Although the 
investor's choice o f hedge ratio w i l l depend on their specific risk preferences, in no 
case should a hedge ratio in excess o f - 1 be chosen. 
In practice, spot and futures positions rarely move in 'lock step' and a perfect hedge 
is generally unattainable, resuhing in the risk minimising hedge ratio diverging from 
- 1 . In fact, hedging effectiveness is imperfect whenever the composition o f the 
investor's stock portfolio differs from the stock index underlying the futures confract 
or where basis risk exists. The basis receives a great deal o f attention in the futures 
literature and refers to the difference between the spot price o f an instrument and the 
respective futures price o f the instrument. Basis risk measures the volatility o f this 
relationship over time. Changes in the basis are measured as: 
A Basis = (Pf - i ^ ! , ) - (Pf - P,:,) 3.6) 
= (Pf - P,') - {Pf_, - P ; , ) 
Where P^ t P^ t-i refer to the price o f the spot instrument in time periods t and t-1 
respectively, and P'', and P ,^.i refer to the price o f the futures confract in time 
periods t and t-1 respectively. Although basis risk infroduces uncertamty into 
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hedging decisions, fortunately this uncertainty still tends to be less than the outright 
price risk o f being unhedged in spot market operations. As Castelino (1990) argues: 
"by deciding to hedge the hedger relieves himself o f the burden o f 
predicting price levels (of the spot market) in exchange for 
predicting price differences (between futures and cash, the basis)" 
(p. 272). 
Basis risk arises from various sources, each of varying importance, and according to 
Figlewski (1984a) is a more significant problem for stock index futures contracts 
than for other financial futures confracts. Firstly, the unhedged spot portfolio held by 
the hedger is unlikely to be identical in composition to the market index on which the 
contract is written, and therefore the hedged portfolio w i l l be associated with an 
unsystematic risk component. The size and composition o f the spot portfolio to be 
hedged is therefore o f particular relevance in hedging decisions. Secondly, an index 
portfolio w i l l typically make dividend payments, while the index futures confract w i l l 
only track the capital value o f the stock index. Since index futures can only hedge the 
risk associated wi th stock price movements, the risk arising from uncertain dividend 
payments w i l l remain, and constitute a source o f basis risk in the hedged portfolio. 
Where dividend payments are stochastic they may result in potentially unhedgeable 
variations in return. Even so, Figlewski (1984a) argues that dividend risk is not of 
great significance and i t has typically been ignored by subsequent researchers^ 
Thirdly, while the futures price must equal the index price at maturity, at any point 
before mattirity the futures price has the potential to deviate from the index price, 
which infroduces an additional source o f basis risk which impairs hedging 
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effectiveness. Merrick (1988b) demonsfrates that the reversal o f an initial contract 
mispricing by arbitrageurs has important implications for the return on the hedged 
portfolio. Although the activities o f arbifrageurs largely determine the degree to 
which the futures price and the index price can diverge, difficulties in assembling the 
stock side o f the arbitrage transaction limit the extent to which index arbitrage 
transactions can be executed. Issues relating to the pricing o f index futures contracts 
w i l l be explored in more detail in chapter six. Finally, "noise" which derives from a 
multitude o f sources and manifests itself in temporary distortions in the spot and 
futures price relationship is the principal source o f basis risk. The cumulative effect 
o f these alternative sources o f noise is considerable, but is often indistinguishable 
from other sources o f basis risk. However, Figlewski (1984a) argues that noise as a 
proportion o f total risk should fal l as hedge duration increases. Therefore, longer 
duration hedges should be associated with less risk than shorter duration hedges. In 
addition the duration o f the hedge should also influence the size o f the hedge ratio, 
wi th longer duration hedges resulting in hedge ratios that are larger in absolute 
magnitude. This relationship exists because basis risk as a proportion o f total risk 
should fal l over larger intervals. Thus any noise in the spot and futures price series 
should reduce over time, wi th the correct economic relationship between spot and 
futures prices prevailing over the long term. The duration effect is a directly testable 
hypothesis which can only be resolved empirically. 
Cross hedging arises where an investor wishes to hedge the market risk associated 
wi th a spot portfolio for which no underlying futures contract exists. Since cross 
hedging involves hedging the market risk o f a portfolio by initiating a position in an 
economically related futures contract, the choice o f the optimal hedging vehicle 
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becomes an important issue\ According to Castelino et al (1991) the choice o f the 
optimal hedging vehicle for a cross hedge w i l l depend on the degree o f correlation 
between the unhedged spot portfolio and the instrument underlying the futures 
confract. I t is this source o f uncertainty that makes the cross hedge riskier than 
hedging the underlying instrument. The extent to which the spot and futiires positions 
track one another w i l l determine the success o f the hedge. Furthermore, in the 
absence o f f u l l convergence between the spot and futures instruments at contract 
maturity, a hedged portfolio held until maturity w i l l not be riskless. In this sense, 
cross hedging risk is the unsystematic risk associated with the spot portfolio. 
Investors may also favour using a composite hedge or combination o f different 
futures contracts to hedge a spot portfolio (see Anderson and Danthine (1981) and 
Sutcliffe (1993)). For instance, a portfolio o f U K stocks might be hedged using a 
mixture o f different futures contracts (e.g. FTSE 100 and M i d 250 index futures 
contracts). The principal benefit accruing from using a composite hedge, is that the 
hedged portfolio is likely to be associated with lower risk than in the case o f a single 
hedge. While the variance associated with the hedged position using a single futures 
contract is given in equation 3.5, the variance associated with the composite hedge (a 
^CH) using two futures confracts (e.g. FTSE 100 and M i d 250 confract) is: 
^CH + + ^250 ^^250 + 2/2,00 5,100 
2//250 ^ 5,250 2/?,oo 2^250 ^ 100,250 
Where a^ s > ^ ^m » ^^50 refer to the variance o f returns on the unhedged spot 
portfolio, the variance o f returns on the FTSE 100 confract and the variance o f 
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returns on the Mid 250 contract. G J , ,OO, ^100,250 refer to the covariance of returns 
between the unhedged spot portfoUo and the F T S E 100 contract, the covariance of 
returns between the unhedged spot portfolio and the Mid 250 contract and the 
covariance of returns between the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 contracts respectively. 
Finally, hjoo and hjso refer to the hedge ratios associated with the F T S E 100 contract 
and Mid 250 contract respectively. 
Successful hedging involves replacing price risk in the spot market with basis risk. 
However, given the lack of any uniform view as to what motivates the hedger, a 
variety of hedging models have evolved, each offering a different interpretation for 
this phenomenon. Together these models capture a broad spectrum of opinion with 
regard to the fiinction of hedging, and the implications for hedging will be different 
depending on which theory the hedger subscribes to. Consideration is given to four 
models of hedging which have been widely adopted by previous research: the 
traditional one to one hedge; the Working model of hedging; the minimum variance 
hedge and the beta hedge^ 
The traditional (also referred to as the classical or naive) model is the earliest and 
most simple model of hedging, and stresses the risk-avoidance potential of futures 
markets. Hedgers are assumed to take futures positions that are equal in magnitude 
but opposite in sign to the established spot market position. The traditional model 
rather naively assumes that the spot and futures prices are perfectly positively 
correlated, and that the price risk in the spot market will be completely offset by 
movements in the futures market, producing a riskless hedged position which 
rewards investors with the risk-free rate of return. Proponents of this view claim that 
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even where spot and futures prices are less than perfectly positively correlated, price 
movements are to a large degree random in character and therefore need not be 
considered. However, because spot and futures markets are not perfectly correlated, 
the traditional hedge cannot guarantee to be a risk minimising position. In fact in the 
case of a cross hedge, use of the traditional strategy has the potential to result in a 
hedged portfoUo which is riskier than the unhedged spot portfolio. 
The Working (1953) model challenges the traditional view of hedging as a risk 
minimising activity and suggests that hedgers operate much like speculators with 
their principal motivation for hedging being expected profit maximisation, with risk 
reduction at best a secondary consideration. Working argues that: 
"the basic idea that complete effectiveness of hedging depends on 
parallelism of movements of spot and futures prices is false, and 
an improper standard by which to test the effectiveness of 
hedging. The effectiveness of hedging intelligently used with 
commodity storage depends on inequalities between the 
movements of spot and futures prices and on reasonable 
predictability of such inequalities" (1953, pp. 547-549). 
Working's view of hedging has been perceived as amounting to speculating on 
changes in the basis, with the size of the basis on the hedge initiation date and the 
predicted value at the hedge lifting date playing a crucial role in the decision of 
whether to hedge or not. According to Working, hedgers with a long position in the 
spot market will only hedge if the initial basis is negative, because as the spot price 
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rises relative to the futures price over the life of the hedge, the hedge will prove 
profitable. 
Both the traditional and Working models of hedging evolved before the onset of 
modem portfolio theory and do not reflect the observed diversity and sophistication 
which characterises users of futures markets. As Anderson and Danthine (1981) 
argue: 
"The set of futures market participants is far more diverse than the 
traditional dichotomy of hedgers and speculators suggests." 
(1981,p.ll84)) 
The minimum variance approach to hedging has attempted to reconcile the earlier 
views of hedging by subsuming them as special cases, within the context of portfolio 
theory. The minimum variance strategy was developed by Johnson (1960), who 
argues: 
"In general, hedging activity appears to be motivated by the desire 
to reduce risk, as described in traditional theory, but levels of 
inventory held appear to be not independent of expected hedging 
profits as emphasised by Working. Furthermore, that an individual 
may hold a mix of hedged and speculative positions in response to 
his expectations concerning absolute price changes is a practice 
not well explained in either traditional or in Working's theory ... 
In fact the very distinction between hedging and speculation is 
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fuzzy; when the trader takes market positions on the basis of 
expectations concerning relative price changes, he is speculating 
insofar as he is not betting on a 'sure thing' " (p. 142). 
The Johnson strategy seeks to minimise the variance of returns on the hedged spot 
portfolio (equation 3.5). To find the hedge ratio which minimises the risk on the 
hedged portfolio, we differentiate the variance of the hedged portfolio with respect to 
h and set the result equal to zero 
aaL , . . 3.8) 
dh 
= 2hGp +2GSP = 0 
or 
Where equation 3.9 refers to the minimum variance hedge ratio (henceforth MVHR), 
which is the proportion of the spot portfolio to be hedged when the hedger's goal is 
to maximise risk reduction. The negative sign attached to the M V H R refers to the 
fact that most long spot positions are best hedged by taking a short position in the 
futures market. The greater is the covariance between the returns in the spot and 
futures market relative to the variance of returns in the futures market, the greater this 
hedged proportion should be. The M V H R only equates to the traditional hedge where 
the returns on the spot and futures markets are perfectly correlated with identical 
variances. 
Page 103 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the hedge it is necessary to compare the 
Variance of the hedged portfolio to the variance of the unhedged spot portfolio. By 
substituting equation 3.9 into equation 3.5, the variance of the hedged portfolio 
where the M V H R is employed becomes: 
2 2 , ^S.F ^^S,F 
— 
' 2 a . . ^ 3.10) 
Given that the coefficient of correlation between the spot and futures returns is 
^S.F 
p = '•—, it follows that the variance on the hedged portfolio can be expressed as 
<^ =<yl (1- P') 3.11) 
The greater is the correlation between the spot and futures returns, the smaller is the 
amount of price risk associated with the hedged portfolio. At the limit where = 1, 
the return on the hedged portfolio is riskless. The ex post effectiveness (e) of the 
M V H R is measured by the coefficient of determination (p^), and can be expressed as 
e = 1 
-I 
3.12) 
= 1 - ( 1 - P ^ ) = P^ 
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As Figlewski (1984a) has shown, the ex post MVHR can be estimated by regressing 
spot portfolio returns against futures returns using historical information. When this 
is achieved the coefficient of determination coincides with Johnson's measure of 
hedging effectiveness (e). 
Where the investor's spot portfolio is hedged using a single futures contract, 
generating the hedge ratio which minimises the risk on the hedged portfolio is a 
relatively simple procedure. To extend the analysis, and calculate the risk minimising 
hedge ratios for a composite hedge where a single spot portfolio is hedged by two or 
more futures contracts, is rather more complicated. In the case of a spot portfolio 
which is jointly hedged by two futures contracts, the MVHR can be determined by 
differentiating the variance of the hedged portfolio with respect to both of the futures 
contracts separately. In relation to the variance of the composite hedge in equation 
3.7, which refers to a hedged portfolio comprising of a U K spot portfoho and fiitures 
market positions in the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 contracts, the MVHR's can be 
calculated by differentiating equation 3.7 with respect to h,oo and h j j o respectively, 
and setting each of the derivatives equal to zero: 
5 ^ c . _ . . . . ^ . . . 3.13) 
= 2 ^100^^100 + 2a 5_ + 2 /ZjsoCJ ,00,250 = 0 
00 
1 ^ = 2 h^,o^l,o + 2CT5,250 + 2 100,250 = ^ ^ 
To isolate terms containing h,oo and hjjo, equations 3.13 and 3.14 can be equivalently 
expressed as equations 3.15 and 3.16 respectively: 
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^ 1 0 0 ^ 1 0 0 + ^ 2 5 0 ^ 100,250 "" 5,100 3.15) 
^ 5 0 ^ 2 5 0 "'"^00*^100,250 " ^ S , 2 5 0 3.16) 
Firstly, to determine the M V H R in relation to the F T S E 100 contract, we multiply 
equation 3.15 by ^ : 
^ 100,250 
^ 1 0 0 250 , u „ 2 5,100 250 ^.17) " 100 " 250 , 7 ^ 
"lOO "250 ^ 250 -
^ 100,250 ^ 100,250 
To eliminate the influence of h j j o we subtract equation 3.16 from equation 3.17: 
, < o < ^ _ f , ^ ^ _ ^ s , m < o 3.18) 
"lOO ' ' lOO'^ 100,250 ^ " 5 , 2 5 0 
100,250 100,250 
To eliminate the term in the denominator of equation 3.18 we multiply through by 
^ 100,250 • 
^100 ^ 100 250 ^ 1 0 0 ^ 100,250 ~ ' - ^ 5 , 1 0 0 ^ 250 5,250 ^ 100,250 3.19) 
Factorising equation 3.19 for h j o o : 
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^100 100 250 ^ 100,25o) ~ 5,100 ^ 250 ^ 5,250 ""^  100,250 3.20) 
Finally, to determine the M V H R for the F T S E 100 contract we divide through by the 
multiple of h,oo: 
, _ - ^ 5 , 1 0 0 ^ 250 + <^  5,250 <^  100,250 _ 3.21) 
100 ~ „ 2 _ 2 _ _ 2 ~ " l O O 
" 100 " 250 " 100,250 
Secondly, to determine the MVHR for the Mid 250 contract, we repeat the 
^ 2 
transformations outlined above, by multiplying equation 3.16 by 
^ 250,100 
, ^ 250 ^ ? 0 0 , , „ 2 _ ^ 5,250 ^^100 3.22) 
"250 " l O O " 100 ~ 
^ 250,100 ^ 250,100 
To eliminate the influence of h,oo we subtract equation 3.15 from equation 3.22: 
, ^ k ^ _ / , a ^s,2so<o 3.23) 
'^ '250 ^'250" 100,250 ~ ^ "5,100 
^250,100 '^ 250,100 
To eliminate the term in the denominator of equation 3.23 we multiply through by 
^ 250,100 • 
^250 *^ 250 *^100 ^250 *^ 250,100 ~ *^ 5,250 *^ 100 +^5,100*^250,100 3.24) 
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Factorising equation 3.24 for hj 
^250 250 ^ 100 *^ 250,10o) 5,250 ^ 100 "*" 5,100 ^ 250,100 3.25) 
Finally, to determine the M V H R for the Mid 250 contract we divide through by the 
multiple of h,oo: 
, _ ~ <^  5.250 <7 ?00 + '^5,100^^ 250,100 _ 3.26) 
250 - _ 2 2 _ 2 ~ "250 
*^ 250 ^ 100 " 250,100 
The M V H R for the F T S E 100 contract when used in combination with the Mid 250 
confract, and the M V H R for the Mid 250 confract when used in combination with the 
F T S E 100 confract are expressed in equations 3.21 and 3.26 respectively. It is clear 
that the covariance between the F T S E 100 confract and Mid 250 confract enters both 
equations, and where the covariance is found to be zero, both equations collapse to 
the standard M V H R for the single futures contract. 
Using the M V H R as the basis for a hedging strategy implicitly assumes that the 
investor is infinitely risk averse, in that they are willing to give up an iirfinite amount 
of expected return in exchange for an infinitely small reduction in risk. While such an 
assumption concerning the risk-return frade off is clearly unrealistic, it has the 
advantage of providing an unambiguous benchmark against which to assess hedging 
performance* and it has therefore been widely adopted in previous research. 
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Hedging models based on the beta coefficient which emanates from the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) framework have been found to generate powerful hedge 
ratios. The beta coefficient gauges the volatility (or systematic risk) associated with a 
spot portfolio measured in terms of the volatility associated with the market 
portfolio. The market portfolio to be employed in determining the value of the beta is 
not the true market portfolio, but rather the stock index which underlies the futures 
contract. In using the beta coefficient to hedge the spot portfolio, the number of 
futures confracts to be held for a full hedge needs to be adjusted with respect to the 
portfolio beta. Clearly, the traditional hedge ratio and the beta ratio are identical 
when the portfolio to be hedged is identical in composition to the spot index which 
underlies the futures contract. However, where the composition of the spot portfolio 
and index differ then the beta hedge ratio will deviate from unity, being greater than 
unity for portfolios that out-perform the market, and less than unity for portfolios that 
under-perform the market. The beta hedge ratio is measured as: 
a , . , 3.27) 
^=-—^ 
Where the beta hedge ratio (hp) is equal to the negative of the covariance of the 
returns on the unhedged spot portfolio and the spot index (ug ,), divided by the 
variance of returns on the spot index (a^,). Peters (1986) demonsfrates that the beta 
coefficient is unlikely to be an optimal hedge ratio, since it only takes into account 
market risk, and risk which arises from futures price volatility is often overlooked. 
Where the portfolio to be hedged is the underlying spot index, the beta hedge will 
equal unity, and by comparing the M V H R with unity, a direct comparison can be 
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made between h* and the beta hedge. Furthermore, in practice the beta hedge ratio 
has been found to be larger than the minimum variance hedge ratio, and therefore 
like the fraditional hedge ratio is often associated with the problem of overhedging. 
From the preceding theoretical discussion, it is apparent that in evaluating the 
effectiveness of stock index futures as hedging instruments it is necessary to consider 
the extent of risk reduction which these confracts permit. Furthermore, the value of 
the beta and minimum variance hedge ratios need to be determined, together with the 
effect that hedge duration, spot portfoUo composition and hedge ratio stability have 
on hedging effectiveness. 
In order to estimate the optimal hedge ratio which minimises risk it is necessary to 
assume that the hedger possesses perfect foresight and knows the future values of the 
covariance and variance relationships in equation 3.9 at the point when the hedge is 
initiated. In reality this is not the case, and in the presence of basis risk the 
relationship between the spot and futures prices has a tendency to change leading to 
hedge ratio instability. Thus the ex post hedge ratio generated in one period may be 
inappropriate for use in a subsequent period, leading to a discrepancy between ex 
post and ex ante effectiveness. Where hedge ratios are generated on an ex ante basis 
the covariance relationship in equation 3.9 has the potential to vary considerably 
leading to hedge ratio variability. This problem becomes most acute where the 
underlying spot portfolio represents a cross hedge. Under these circumstances the 
hedger must determine the optimal ex ante hedge ratio with respect to expectations 
conditioned by historical information. 
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3.3) E M P I R I C A L INVESTIGATION 
In this chapter the ex post and ex ante hedging effectiveness of the F T S E 100 and 
Mid 250 index futures contracts are investigated for a diverse range of spot 
portfolios. The empirical section is structured into two stages, with the first stage 
examining hedging effectiveness within an ex post framework, and the second stage 
examining hedging effectiveness within an ex ante framework. As was earlier 
demonstrated futures contracts play an important practical role by expanding the 
investor opportunity set through the introduction of negative correlation not typically 
found in spot markets. In this section we investigate whether the new contract is 
effective for hedging a range of stock portfolios and compare its hedging 
performance with that of the F T S E 100 contract. In addition to providing the first test 
of the hedging effectiveness of the new contract, this section offers improvements on 
previous studies of stock index futures hedging. In particular, a wide range of spot 
portfolios are used for assessing hedging performance, by using not only portfolios 
which mirror indexes underlying futures contracts, but also a spread of investment 
trust companies (henceforth ITCs). Examining hedging effectiveness over such a 
range of spot portfohos makes it possible to determine whether the new contract adds 
substantially to investors' opportunity sets by markedly enhancing hedging 
performance. Additional features are that this study provides the first analysis of 
daily hedging using U K futures and, also investigates the effectiveness of using a 
'synthetic' F T S E 350 index futures confract (comprising of various weighted 
combinations of the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 contract) to hedge. 
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Specifically, this first stage of the empirical investigation addresses shortcomings of 
previous work conducted into ex post hedging effectiveness in a number of important 
ways: 
• the first assessment of hedging effectiveness of the Mid 250 confract is presented. 
In addition, comparisons are made between the performance of this confract and 
that of the F T S E 100 confract for a number of different portfolios. Given that one 
aim of the introduction of the new confract is to enable more effective hedging of 
small capitalisation stocks, this is clearly important. 
• in addition to assessing hedging performance for spot portfolios mirroring broad 
indexes, cross hedging performance is analysed by examining the hedging of 
actual spot portfolios held by professional managers in the form of ITCs. Since 
returns on ITCs represent the returns on professionally managed, well diversified, 
portfolios, evaluation of hedging effectiveness in relation to these portfolios 
provides new insights into the capabilities for hedging actual portfolios. 
• consideration is given here not only to the hedging effectiveness of the F T S E 100 
and Mid 250 when used separately, but also to their use in combination. 
• the first investigation of hedging effectiveness of stock index futures in the U K 
over short periods is provided, by examining daily hedges. 
While the hedging effectiveness of stock index futures confracts has been thoroughly 
investigated, the great majority of these studies are limited in that they focus solely 
on the issue of ex post hedging effectiveness. Ex post hedging effectiveness 
presumes that the hedger has perfect foresight with respect to the future behaviour of 
spot and futures prices, and therefore the hedger is able to estimate the optimal hedge 
ratio for the subsequent period on the basis of this information. In reality, investors 
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only have imperfect information sets and in the presence of hedge ratio instability the 
use of futures contracts to remove market risk is associated with forecasting 
problems. Previous studies of hedging effectiveness which adopt an ex post approach 
are likely to have tended to overstate the extent to which stock index futures are able 
to eliminate market risk. 
The second stage of the empirical investigations imdertaken in this chapter extends 
the work on ex post hedging effectiveness of U K index futures, by employing an ex 
ante strategy for both the F T S E 100 index futures confract and the Mid 250 contracts, 
with respect to the same range of spot portfolios used in the ex post analysis. It is 
clear from the literature review in chapter two that work into ex ante hedging 
effectiveness has been largely confined to currency and interest rate futures, and 
where the ex ante effectiveness of index futures has been examined, research focuses 
on the use of spot portfolios which mirror the underlying futures confract. 
Furthermore, no examination has been conducted into the hedging effectiveness of 
the Mid 250 confract on an ex ante basis. Specifically, with respect to ex ante 
hedging effectiveness the following issues will be addressed: 
• the ex ante hedging performance of the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 index futures 
will be examined. Consideration will be given to the use of both dfrect hedges 
and a varied range of cross hedges. The cross hedges involve portfolios 
comprising of both broad based stock indexes and actual spot portfolios 
typically held by small investors, in the form of investment trust companies. 
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• how the ex ante hedging effectiveness compares with the ex post benchmark. 
This is an important issue because a high degree of ex post hedging 
effectiveness is meaningless if the hedger cannot attain similar levels of 
effectiveness on an ex ante basis. 
• consideration is given to whether there is an optimal window size (i.e. 
estimation period) for estimating the ex ante MVHR, and whether the window 
size affects hedge ratio stability. 
4.4) DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Hedging performance is examined for the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 index futures 
contracts traded on L I F F E by using spot and futures return data over the period 25 
February 1994 (date of introduction of the Mid 250 index future) to 20 December 
1996. Thirty-seven spot portfolios comprising of five indexes and thirty-two 
investment trust companies (henceforth ITC) are used. The five market indexes are 
the FTSE-100, the Mid 250, the FTSE-350 (comprising the largest 350 companies), 
the F T All Share ( F T A L L S H ) and the F T Invesfrnent Trust (FTIT) index. ITC's were 
chosen because they represent managed diversified portfolios which are similar in 
composition to those held by private investors, and the recent growth in the number 
of these funds traded indicates that they are a popular route for undertaking capital 
investment. Therefore, it is of interest to determine whether there is the potential for 
reducing the market risk of these portfohos through the use of index futures. Seven 
categories of ITCs are used^: 
(i) General funds: at least 80% of the assets are in U K registered companies; 
(ii) Capital Growth funds: at least 80% of the assets are in U K registered companies, 
with stocks chosen to accentuate capital growth; 
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(iii) Income Growth funds: at least 80% of their assets are in U K equities whose 
policy is to accentuate income growth; 
(iv) High Income funds: at least 80% of assets are in equities and convertibles; the 
aim is to achieve a yield in excess of 125% of that of the F T Actuaries All-Share 
Index; 
(v) Smaller Company (SC) funds: at least 50% of assets are in smaller and medium 
sized companies; 
(vi) Venture and Development Capital (VDC) funds: a significant portion of the 
trusts' portfolio is invested in securities of unquoted companies; and 
(vii) Property funds: at least 80% of the assets of these funds are in listed property 
equities. 
For each of the first six categories returns on five ITCs are used to analyse hedging 
effectiveness. In the case of Property funds, only two ITCs are used due to a lack of 
appropriate fluids with sufficiently long returns series. To alleviate problems 
resulting from thin trading in these funds, only ITC's with a market capitalisation in 
excess of £20 million at the beginning of the period under investigation are included. 
The funds provide a broad range of portfolios, which differ in terms of objectives and 
composition. In particular, the Smaller Company funds and the Venture and 
Development Capital funds represent investments in relatively low capitalisation 
stock. Hedging such funds is expected to be less effective with the FTSE-100 
contract, given the composition of the underlying index. It is therefore of interest to 
determine if this is the case and whether the Mid 250 contract adds markedly to 
hedging performance for such portfolios. 
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The first stage of the empirical analysis focusing on ex post hedging effectiveness 
employs both daily and weekly hedges, while the second stage of the analysis which 
investigates ex ante hedging effectiveness employs only weekly hedges. Hedge 
durations of longer than a week are not considered due to problems of sample size, hi 
all cases the futiu-es contract nearest to maturity is used. After removing non-trading 
days the daily series consists of 715 observations and the weekly series 147 
observations. The returns series for each spot portfolio and each ftitures contract 
refers to the logarithmic price change. Logarithmic price changes are used since they 
minimise any non-stationarities which arise from changes in price levels. Returns are 
calculated as follows: 
f P. ^ 3.28) 
Where R, is the daily or weekly return on either the spot or ftitures position and P, is 
the price at time t. Price is the daily or weekly closing price. Al l data was obtained 
from Datastream. 
In the first stage of this empirical analysis which focuses on ex post hedging 
effectiveness three hedging strategies are considered. First, the fraditional hedge is 
examined. Second, the MVHR, as shown in equation 3.9 is used. The MVHR can be 
estimated by regressing spot returns on fiitures returns using historical information, 
where h* is the negative of the slope coefficient, b, in the following equation: 
RS, = a + bRF, + e, 3.29) 
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Where RS, is the return on the spot portfoho in time period t, RF, is the return on the 
futures contract in time period t, e, is an error term and a, b are regression parameters, 
where -b is the MVHR, h* ^ 
Third, given that cross hedges are being considered, we use the beta hedging 
strategy. The beta hedge ratio is calculated as the negative of p in the following 
equation: 
RS, = a + ^RIND, + s, 3.30) 
Where RIND, is the return on the index underlying the futiires contract, 8, is an error 
term and all other terms are as previously defined. 
Consideration is given to mean and standard deviation of returns on the unhedged 
and the hedged positions. The effectiveness of each of the hedges is measured in 
terms of the degree of risk reduction and is calculated as: 
Risk reduction = ^ " ~ ^  ^ x 100 
Where a„ is the standard deviation of returns on the unhedged (i.e. spot) position and 
is the standard deviation of returns on the hedged position. The risk reduction 
statistic expressed in equation 3.31 refers to the percentage reduction in risk 
associated with the unhedged spot portfolio which is achieved through hedging. 
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The effectiveness of the three strategies is investigated using the FTSE 100 and the 
Mid 250 contracts individually, hi addition, for the MVHR a composite hedging 
strategy is examined, where the two futures contracts are combined into a 'synthetic' 
FTSE 350 index futures contract. Returns on the synthetic contract are the weighted 
average of returns on the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts, with the weights attached 
to the two contracts varying fi-om 2:-l to -1:2. Weights always sum to 1 and change 
at intervals of 0.25. Thus, 13 composite hedges are considered for each of the thirty-
seven spot portfolios. In relation to the issues being investigated this panel approach 
has a number of advantages over the alternative approach of choosing composite 
hedges for each contract individually as shown in equations 3.21 and 3.26. Firstly, 
the panel approach is much simpler to implement with a single hedge ratio being 
estimated for the synthetic contract rather than hedge ratios being estimated for each 
of the individual contracts. In doing so the approach alleviates the indivisibility 
problem that would inevitably arise. Secondly, the composite hedge ratios shown in 
equations 3.21 and 3.26 are considerably more complicated than the traditional 
MVHR, and there is the potential for the individual variance and covariances to be 
characterised by instability over time. Thirdly, by creating various weighted 
'synthetic' FTSE 350 contracts, the panel approach provides a detailed picture of the 
impact on hedging effectiveness arising fi-om changes in the contribution made by 
the Mid 250 contract to the composition of the 'synthetic' hedge. This is an 
important issue given that one of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate what 
are the additional benefits fi-om using the Mid 250 conti-act. 
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The second stage of the empirical analysis investigates ex ante hedging effectiveness, 
using the Johnson (1960) minimum variance strategy, employing hedges of one week 
duration. The ex ante hedging effectiveness of UK index ftitures contracts in 
managing the market risk inherent in the UK stock market is examined, and 
compared with evaluations of hedging effectiveness using the ex post approach .^ 
While the static ex post MVHR's used in this stage are estimated using equation 
3.29, the ex ante MVHR's are based on a dynamic strategy where hedge ratios are 
estimated using a rolling regression (or moving window) procedure. 
The ex ante MVHR is estimated using equation 3.29 for the first w observations 
(where w refers to the window size), and as the window moves over the sample the 
equation is subsequently re-estimated for each group of w consecutive observations 
by dropping the most obsolete data point and replacing it by a new data point. In this 
manner, historical information ranging from observation t to observation t+w was 
used to generate the hedge ratio to be used in period t+w+1. Window sizes of three 
and six month duration (i.e. thirteen and twenty-six observations respectively) were 
employed to reflect the three and six month contract cycle. For instance, when using 
a twenty-six week window the hedge ratio employed in week 93 was estimated on 
the basis of information contained within the range of observations 67 to 92. By 
utilising different window sizes it is possible to evaluate the impact which different 
amounts of historical information have on hedge ratio stability, and in turn on 
hedging effectiveness. In comparing the performance of the ex post and ex ante 
strategies, hedging effectiveness is evaluated over the sample period extending from 
observation 28 to observation 147. The initial 27 observations are excluded from the 
comparison because they are used to estimate the first ex ante hedge ratio which the 
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26 week window requires. Therefore, this approach resuks in 120 ex ante hedge 
ratios for each spot portfolio. 
The empirical findings are reported in the subsequent sections. In section 3.5 the 
results relating to the issues investigated with respect to ex post hedging 
effectiveness are discussed, while in section 3.6 the results corresponding to work 
undertaken with regards to ex ante hedging effectiveness are considered. 
3.5) R E S U L T S : E X POST HEDGING E F F E C T I V E N E S S 
The success of any direct hedging strategy is dependent on the amount of basis risk 
which underpins the relationship between the futures contract and its underlying spot 
market. Therefore, before investigating the issues outlined in the previous section it 
is useful to consider how basis risk has evolved for both contracts over the sample 
period. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the basis at daily intervals for the FTSE 100 and ' 
the Mid 250 markets respectively. 
In figure 3.2, the basis for the FTSE 100 can be seen to fluctuate within the range of 
33.4 to -41.4 with an average of -8.3 basis points and a standard deviation of 11.8. 
Similarly in figure 3.3 the basis for the Mid 250 was found to fluctuate within the 
range of 34.9 to -45.9 with an average of -9.71 basis points and a standard deviation 
13.50. In both markets the basis was positive on 24% of occasions and negative on 
76% of occasions. From this information it can be seen that the basis risk associated 
with the Mid 250 market is greater than that associated with the FTSE 100 market, 
which is consistent with the view that the Mid 250 is likely to be a more noisy 
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market. This would suggest that hedging effectiveness is likely to be greater for the 
FTSE 100 contract with respect to its underlying spot market than for the Mid 250 
contract. 
The empirical analysis begins by investigating whether the new contract adds 
markedly to the ability to hedge broad based spot portfolios. Therefore, the reduction 
in risk achieved by the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contract when the spot portfolio is an 
index is examined first. The five indexes described above are considered. Results 
using traditional and beta hedge strategies for daily and weekly hedge durations are 
presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. For each table panel A shows the mean 
and standard deviation of returns for spot portfolios'"; panel B shows results when 
hedging with the FTSE 100 contract; and panel C shows results when using the Mid 
250 contract. In panels B and C the hedge ratio, mean and standard deviation of 
returns and percentage reduction in the standard deviation from the unhedged 
position are shown. 
In relation to daily data, table 3.1, panel A shows that the five spot portfolios differ 
considerably in terms of their risk-return profiles over the sample period. For 
example, the FTSE 100 index gave an annual mean return of 7.7%), with a standard 
deviation of returns of 10.9%o, compared to figures for the Mid 250 of 4.5% and 7.0% 
respectively. In terms of hedging, the traditional hedge is very effective when the 
spot portfolio is that which underUes the contract under consideration, as expected. 
For example, panel B shows that hedging the FTSE 100 spot index with the FTSE 
100 contract achieves risk reduction of over 64%, while using the Mid 250 contract 
to hedge the Mid 250 index achieves risk reduction of 45.2% (see panel C). These 
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Table 3.1) 
The Hedging Effectiveness of the F T S E 100 and FTSE Mid 250 Contracts: 
Daily Data. 
Hedge Mean S. D. of Decrease 
Ratio Retum Retums in S.D.* 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged 
FTSE 100 7.669 10.912 
FTSE 250 4.464 6.999 
FTSE 350 6.937 9.737 
FTALLSH 6.579 9.218 
FTIT 1.691 8.138 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSE 100 contract 
Traditional hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 -0.146 3.924 64.038 
FTSE 250 1.000 -3.351 9.296 -32.816 
FTSE 350 1.000 -0.878 4.805 50.651 
FTALLSH 1.000 -1.236 5.220 43.372 
FTIT 1.000 -6.124 9.112 -11.971 
Beta hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 -0.146 3.924 64.038 
FTSE 250 0.503 0.533 5.005 28.491 
FTSE 350 0.888 -0.003 3.755 61.436 
FTALLSH 0.838 0.030 3.658 60.320 
FTIT 0.586 -2.889 5.884 27.689 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid 250 contract 
Traditional hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 3.293 6.938 36.422 
FTSE 250 1.000 0.087 3.834 45.225 
FTSE 350 1.000 2.560 5.681 41.651 
FTALLSH 1.000 2.202 5.312 42.376 
FTIT 1.000 -2.686 5.506 32.337 
Beta hedge 
FTSE 100 1.223 2.317 7.064 35.264 
FTSE 250 1.000 0.087 3.834 45.225 
FTSE 350 1.172 1.808 5.875 39.657 
FTALLSH 1.123 1.664 5.489 40.454 
FTIT 0.961 -2.515 5.410 33.520 
* This measures the percentage of the standard deviation of retums of the unhedged portfoHo that is 
removed by hedging. 
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Table 3.2) 
The Hedging Effectiveness of the F T S E 100 and F T S E Mid 250 Contracts: 
Weekly Data. 
Hedge Mean S. D. of Decrease 
Ratio Return Returns in S.D.* 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged 
FTSE 100 7.687 11.169 
FTSE 250 4.474 9.276 
FTSE 350 6.953 10.469 
FTALLSH 6.594 10.033 
FTIT 1.695 9.027 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
Traditional hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 -0.020 2.500 77.613 
FTSE 250 1.000 -0.466 7.398 20.254 
FTSE 350 1.000 -0.122 3.266 68.800 
FTALLSH 1.000 -0.172 3.679 63.328 
FTIT 1.000 -0.851 7.222 19.991 
Beta hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 -0.020 2.500 77.613 
FTSE 250 0.695 -0.134 5.606 39.566 
FTSE 350 0.932 -0.048 2.752 73.711 
FTALLSH 0.890 -0.052 2.820 71.896 
FTIT 0.678 -0.501 5.270 41.621 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid250 contract 
Traditional hedge 
FTSE 100 1.000 0.458 5.717 48.811 
FTSE 250 1.000 0.012 2.610 71.868 
FTSE 350 1.000 0.356 4.523 56.794 
FTALLSH 1.000 0.306 4.188 58.264 
FTIT 1.000 -0.373 4.789 46.952 
Beta hedge 
FTSE 100 1.008 0.453 5.720 48.800 
FTSE 250 1.000 0.012 2.610 71.868 
FTSE 350 1.006 0.352 4.527 56.755 
FTALLSH 0.976 0.321 4.160 58.534 
FTIT 0.843 -0.278 4.424 50.994 
* As table 3.1. 
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results indicate the new contract is not as effective at hedging its underlying index as 
is the more established confract, using the traditional sfrategy. The new confract is 
also less effective at hedging the FTSE 350 and FTALLSH indexes. Given the 
composition of the FTSE 350 and the FTALLSH indexes, these resuhs are not 
surprising. 
Results for other cross hedges are of more interest. First, panel B shows that the 
FTSE 100 contract was not effective at hedging either the Mid 250 or the FTIT 
indexes using the traditional hedge. For both hedges the standard deviation of retums 
is higher and mean retums lower for the hedged position than for the unhedged 
position. In confrast, the Mid 250 confract offers an effective means by which to 
cross-hedge. Table 3.1, panel C demonstrates that using this confract for a fraditional 
hedge, when the spot portfolio is the FTSE 100, achieves risk reduction of over 36%. 
Similarly, risk reduction in relation to the FTIT spot portfolio is ahnost one third. 
Now consider the beta hedge. The fraditional and beta hedges are identical when the 
spot portfolio is that underlying the confract. For cross-hedging, the FTSE 100 
contract is superior when hedging the FTSE 350 and FTALLSH (risk reduction of 
61.4% and 60.3% respectively for the FTSE 100 confract, compared to 39.7% and 
40.5% respectively for the Mid 250 confract). However the Mid 250 confract again is 
superior for cross-hedging other indexes. The FTSE 100 confract achieves risk 
reduction of below 29% when the spot portfolio is the Mid 250 or the FTIT. In 
contrast, for the FTSE 100 and FTIT spot portfolios, the Mid 250 index achieves risk 
reduction in excess of one third with the beta sfrategy. The results suggest that for 
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daily hedging the new contract provides an important additional hedging vehicle for 
some broadly diversified portfolios. 
Table 3.2 shows results for traditional and beta weekly hedges. Results are very 
similar to those for daily data, although the new contract's value is more marked. 
When the spot portfolio is that underlying the conti-act, risk reduction is substantial 
with both futures (over 70%>), as in previous stiidies for the FTSE 100 (see Hoknes 
(1995, 1996)). Thus, hedging effectiveness improves as hedge duration rises. For 
cross hedges, the new contract again achieves superior risk reduction for the FTIT 
(47%) compared to 20% for the FTSE 100 conti-act). 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report daily and weekly results respectively for the mean and 
standard deviation of returns using the MVHR. Results relate to the same spot 
portfolios as in tables 3.1 and 3.2. For convenience panel A again shows details of 
unhedged positions. Panels B and C show resuhs for hedging with the FTSE 100 and 
Mid 250 contracts respectively. Panel D reports results for the 'synthetic' FTSE 350 
contract. Results are reported for the optimal combination of the two contiacts". The 
optimal combinations of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contiacts for daily data for the 
four spot portfolios are 0.75:0.25 (FTSE 100), 0:1 (Mid 250), 0.75:0.25 (FTSE 350), 
0.75:0.25 (FTALLSH) and 0.25:0.75 (FTIT). Thus, for example, in consti-ucting a 
synthetic futures which minimises the return variance when hedging the FTIT 
portfolio, the optimal mix involves a weighting of 0.25 in the FTSE 100 contiact and 
0.75 in the new contiact. 
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Table 3.3) 
Hedging Effectiveness Using the MVHR Strategy: Daily Data. 
Hedge Mean S. D. of Decrease 
Ratio Retum Retums in S.D.* 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged 
FTSE 100 7.669 10.912 
FTSE 250 4.464 6.999 
FTSE 350 6.937 9.737 
FTALLSH 6.579 9.218 
FTIT 1.691 8.138 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
FTSE 100 0.803 1.392 2.960 72.873 
FTSE 250 0.391 1.411 4.781 31.682 
FTSE 350 0.710 1.390 2.943 69.776 
FTALLSH 0.669 1.352 2.912 68.409 
FTIT 0.451 -1.831 5.616 30.994 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid250 contract 
FTSE 100 1.050 3.072 6.927 36.521 
FTSE 250 0.766 1.111 3.343 52.242 
FTSE 350 0.985 2.625 5.681 41.656 
FTALLSH 0.941 2.463 5.290 42.614 
FTIT 0.779 -1.718 5.209 35.991 
D) Composite hedges** 
FTSE 100 0.924 1.245 2.882 73.591 
FTSE 250 0.766 1.111 3.343 52.242 
FTSE 350 0.823 1.211 2.609 73.206 
FTALLSH 0.777 1.173 2.555 72.281 
FTIT 0.743 -2.201 4.892 39.890 
* As table 3.1. 
**Results are reported for the optimal combination of FTSE-100 and FTSE-Mid 250 contract in terms 
of maximum risk reduction. The optimal combinations are 0.75:0.25, 0:1, 0.75:0.25, , 0.75:0.25 and 
0.25:0.75 respectively. 
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Table 3.4) 
Hedging Effectiveness Using the MVHR Strategy: Weekly Data. 
Hedge Mean S. D. of Decrease 
Ratio Return Returns in S.D.* 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged 
FTSE 100 7.687 11.169 
FTSE 250 4.474 9.276 
FTSE 350 6.953 10.469 
FTALLSH 6.594 10.033 
FTIT 1.695 9.027 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
FTSE 100 0.882 0.108 2.026 81.860 
FTSE 250 0.601 -0.032 5.483 40.895 
FTSE 350 0.819 0.075 2.367 77.390 
FTALLSH 0.781 0.066 2.473 75.356 
FTIT 0.595 -0.411 5.166 42.765 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid250 contract 
FTSE 100 0.985 0.467 5.715 48.827 
FTSE 250 0.918 0.062 2.483 73.228 
FTSE 350 0.970 0.374 4.514 56.885 
FTALLSH 0.938 0.344 4.144 58.696 
FTIT 0.809 -0.257 4.411 51.134 
D) Composite hedges** 
FTSE 100 0.959 0.139 1.975 82.317 
FTSE 250 0.918 0.062 2.483 73.228 
FTSE 350 0.900 0.094 1.794 82.863 
FTALLSH 0.861 0.082 1.844 81.623 
FTIT 0.795 -0.344 4.173 53.775 
* As table 3.1. 
** Results are reported for the optimal combination of FTSE-100 and FTSE-Mid 250 contract in terms 
of maximum risk reduction. The optimal combinations are 0.75:0.25, 0:1, 0.75:0.25, 0.75:0.25 and 
0.25:0.75 respectively. 
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Table 3.3, panel B shows the FTSE 100 contract greatly reduces risk for the FTSE 
100 (72.9%), FTSE 350 (69.8%) and FTALLSH (68.4%) spot portfolios for daily 
hedges. For the other portfolios risk reduction of only about 30% is achieved. The 
Mid 250 confract is less successfiil at reducing risk for the FTSE 100, FTSE 350 and 
FTALLSH spot portfolios, as expected, given that the FTSE 100 dominates these 
indexes by market capitalisation. However, for the other portfoUos the new confract 
is superior for hedging. Risk reduction of 52% and 36% is achieved for the Mid 250 
and FTIT spot portfolios. Thus, for portfoUos with smaller capitaUsation the new 
contract is a significant additional hedging facility. 
Results in relation to the constmction of a synthetic futures are very interesting (see 
panel D). In all cases, the optimal combination involves some use of the new 
contract, while for the Mid 250 spot portfolio the FTSE 100 contract should not be 
used. Thus, even for the FTSE 100 spot portfolio, the infroduction of the new 
confract adds to hedging effectiveness'I 
Again, hedge performance improves as hedge duration rises to a week. However, the 
main results are unchanged: for the FTSE 100, FTSE 350 and FTALLSH portfolios, 
the FTSE 100 contract provides higher risk reduction than the Mid 250 confract, with 
the new contract superior for other spot portfolios. Optimal combinations for the 
synthetic contract reported for weekly hedges are the same as for daily data. Thus, 
the new contract improves hedging effectiveness even when the spot portfolio is that 
underlying the FTSE 100 contract. 
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We now examine the hedging effectiveness of the two conti-acts when the spot 
portfolios are ITCs. Rather than report results for each of the thirty-two portfolios, 
we report average results for each category of ITCs. Results using tiaditional and 
beta hedge stiategies for daily and weekly hedge durations are presented in tables 3.5 
and 3.6 respectively. The format of the tables is similar to tables 3.1 and 3.2, with 
three panels in each table. However, in addition to showing the average risk 
reduction for each category of investment trust, the maximum and minimum standard 
deviations for each category are shown. Panel A in both tables 3.5 and 3.6 
demonstiates that the spot portfolios vary substantially in terms of mean and standard 
deviations of returns. Thus, the thirty-two portfolios under consideration cover a 
broad range of spot portfolios, providing an opportunity for a thorough assessment of 
true hedge effectiveness. 
Results for the daily cross hedges in table 3.5, panel B shows that the FTSE 100 
conti-act was not effective at hedging any of the categories of ITC's using the 
traditional hedge. In all cases the standard deviation of returns is higher and mean 
returns lower for the average hedged portfolio than for the average unhedged 
position. While the resuhs in panel C show that using the tiaditional stiategy in 
relation to the Mid 250 contiact resuhs in a small reduction of risk for three of the 
seven ITC categories, the overall extent of risk reduction is still very poor. Owing to 
the low CO variance relationship between the futures contracts and ITC's, the 
traditional strategy of assuming an hedge ratio equal to unity results in severe over-
hedging. 
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Table 3.5) 
Hedging Investment Trust Portfolios Using the F T S E 100 and F T S E Mid 250 Contracts: 
Daily data. 
Average Average Standard Deviation of Returns 
Hedge Ratio Mean Return Minimum Maximum Average Decrease 
A Unhedged portfolio 
General 5.905 8.652 13.975 10.676 
Capital Growth 3.362 8.260 12.525 9.556 
Income Growth 0.553 7.665 11.925 9.879 
High Income -5.079 8.927 13.897 10.681 
Small Company 1.880 6.744 12.409 9.743 
Venture / Development 11.535 6.708 9.603 8.111 
Property -7.579 13.497 13.884 13.691 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
Traditional hedge 
General 1.000 -I.9I0 9.621 12.290 11.417 -9.856 
Capital Growth 1.000 -4.453 12.022 14.635 13.514 -44.392 
Income Growth 1.000 -7.262 11.129 13.471 12.366 -29.466 
High Income 1.000 -12.894 13.091 15.443 13.865 -31.952 
Small Company 1.000 -5.935 13.122 14.429 13.736 -46.924 
Venture / Development 1.000 3.720 12.178 14.312 13.504 -69.996 
Property 1.000 -15.394 16.136 18.138 17.137 -25.093 
Beta Hedge 
General 0.597 1.241 7.828 11.559 8.954 15.660 
Capital Growth 0.322 0.849 8.060 11.766 9.044 5.143 
Income Growth 0.450 -2.962 7.298 10.891 8.838 9.968 
High Income 0.372 -7.985 8.576 13.131 10.113 5.267 
Small Company 0.313 -0.564 6.660 11.171 9.264 4.449 
Venture / Development 0.223 9.794 6.649 9.397 7.834 3.210 
Property 0.278 -9.748 13.107 13.848 13.477 1.578 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid 250 contract 
Traditional hedge 
General 1.000 1.529 7.649 10.848 8.552 19.168 
Capital Growth 1.000 -1.015 8.250 11.645 9.631 -1.867 
Income Growth 1.000 -3.823 7.905 10.819 8.891 8.047 
High Income 1.000 -9.456 9.327 12.597 10.320 2.591 
Small Company 1.000 -2.496 8.827 10.934 10.006 -5.275 
Venture / Development 1.000 7.159 8.697 10.299 9.386 -17.723 
Property 1.000 -11.956 13.089 14.351 13.720 -0.170 
Beta Hedge 
General 1.002 1.519 7.308 10.954 8.411 20.888 
Capital Growth 0.621 0.646 7.540 11.383 8.690 8.905 
Income Growth 0.815 -3.013 7.135 10.617 8.350 14.792 
High Income 0.692 -8.107 8.402 12.524 9.690 9.149 
Small Company 0.586 -0.682 6.478 10.899 8.968 7.532 
Venture / Development 0.425 9.674 6.502 9.113 7.655 5.340 
Property 0.649 -10.417 12.750 13.550 13.150 3.971 
* The decrease in the S.D. of returns relates to a comparison of the average S.D. of returns for the hedged position with that of 
the unhedged position 
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Table 3.6) 
Hedging Investment Trust Portfolios Using the F T S E 100 and F T S E Mid 250 Contracts: 
Weekly data. 
Average Average Standard Deviation of Returns 
Hedge Ratio Mean Return Minimum Maximum Average Decrease 
A) Unhedged portfolio 
General 5.919 10.870 13.604 11.816 
Capital Growth 3.370 10.403 13.546 11.568 
Income Growth 0.554 9.992 14.124 11.894 
High Income -5.091 10.764 15.406 12.785 
Small Company 1.885 8.890 14.456 11.990 
Venture / Development 11.561 7.961 10.857 9.347 
Property -7.596 16.393 17.599 16.996 
B) Hedging witli the 
FTSEIOO contract 
Traditional hedge 
General 1.000 -0.265 7.402 11.235 10.024 14.549 
Capital Growth 1.000 -0.619 11.485 14.496 13.069 -13.801 
Income Growth 1.000 -1.009 9.230 13.071 11.449 2.842 
High Income 1.000 -1.792 11.271 14.662 13.010 -2.673 
Small Company 1.000 -0.825 11.432 13.748 12.922 -10.566 
Venture / Development 1.000 0.517 11.486 14.265 12.740 -38.430 
Property 1.000 -10.373 16.161 17.661 16.911 0.216 
Beta Hedge 
General 0.721 0.038 6.883 9.955 8.868 24.710 
Capital Growth 0.455 -0.027 9.358 12.045 10.515 8.967 
Income Growth 0.617 -0.593 8.264 11.135 9.807 17.390 
High Income 0.575 -1.330 9.628 13.707 11.281 11.830 
Small Company 0.507 -0.289 8.599 12.674 10.680 10.511 
Venture / Development 0.307 1.270 7.507 9.961 8.705 6.574 
Property 0.594 -1.699 15.621 15.773 15.712 7.420 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE Mid 250 contract 
Traditional hedge 
General 1.000 0.212 6.928 9.971 8.389 28.970 
Capital Growth 1.000 -0.141 8.961 12.143 10.820 5.926 
Income Growth 1.000 -0.531 8.069 10.403 9.402 20.436 
High Income 1.000 -1.314 9.554 13.354 11.209 11.980 
Small Company 1.000 -0.347 9.053 12.366 10.653 9.788 
Venture / Development 1.000 0.995 9.794 11.404 10.432 -12.989 
Property 1.000 -8.411 15.174 15.604 15.389 9.293 
Beta Hedge 
General 0.894 0.277 6.921 9.962 8.251 30.204 
Capital Growth 0.631 0.084 8.770 11.768 9.952 13.806 
Income Growth 0.819 -0.421 7.864 10.076 9.059 23.575 
High Income 0.739 -1.155 9.218 13.231 10.752 15.986 
Small Company 0.721 -0.177 8.063 12.211 10.022 16.159 
Venture / Development 0.416 1.350 7.291 9.732 8.491 8.907 
Property 0.863 -1.578 15.179 15.211 15.195 10.480 
* As table 3.5. 
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With respect to the beta strategy, for all categories of ITC's, hedging with the FTSE 
100 and Mid 250 contracts results in hedge ratios which are less than unity and more 
effective than the traditional strategy. However, the risk reduction achieved is only a 
fraction of that achieved when the spot portfolios are broad based market indexes. 
While hedging effectiveness is greater for the Mid 250 contract than the FTSE 100 
contract in relation to all the ITC's, the differences are small. For instance, in 
relation to daily hedges, average risk reduction is below 10% for all but 1 of the 7 
categories of ITC's when cross hedges comprise the FTSE 100 contract, and below 
10% for all but 2 of the 7 categories when cross hedges comprising the Mid 250 
contract are used. 
Table 3.6 shows results for fraditional and beta weekly hedges with respect to the 
ITC's. While the results are very similar to those for daily data, all hedges are 
characterised by improvements in risk reduction as we move from a daily to a weekly 
basis. Thus, hedging effectiveness improves as hedge duration rises. The Mid 250 
confract also dominates the FTSE 100 contract in terms of risk reduction and mean 
returns in relation to every ITC category, with respect to both traditional and beta 
sfrategies. This result is interesting since it indicates that where the spot portfolio 
consists of lower capitalisation stocks the Mid 250 contract provides an 
unequivocally more effective hedge. 
Finally, tables 3.7 and 3.8 report the results for ITC's for daily and weekly MVHR's 
respectively. The format of the tables is similar to tables 3.3 and 3.4, with four panels 
in each table. However, as in tables 3.5 and 3.6, in addition to showing average risk 
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reduction for each category of ITC, maximum and minimum standard deviations for 
each category are also shown. As can be seen in table 3.7, panels B and C, in all 
cases average standard deviation of returns are lower and average mean returns are 
higher with a MVHR strategy, than is the case for either the traditional or beta 
strategy. Furthermore, the Mid 250 contract produces hedges that are associated with 
lower risk and higher mean returns than compared to using the FTSE 100 contract. 
The same is true for weekly hedges (see table 3.8), providing strong evidence in 
support of the usefulness of the Mid 250 contract for hedging actual spot portfolios. 
However, while the results show the superiority of the Mid 250 contract for hedging 
these spot portfolios, risk reduction is far less than when spot portfolios are broad 
based market indexes. For example, for daily hedges (table 3.7), in no case does 
average risk reduction exceed 22% for the ITC portfolios and even when using the 
Mid 250 contract, average reduction is below 10% for 5 categories. This compares 
with risk reduction for broad market indexes of 36% to 52%) when the Mid 250 
contract is used and up to 73% for the FTSE 100 contract. The results for Smaller 
Companies funds and Venture and Development Capital funds are particularly weak, 
suggesting that while the new contract relates to an index covering smaller 
companies, it is still not suitable for hedging portfolios comprising very low value 
stocks. Results for weekly hedges are markedly better. In only one case is average 
risk reduction below 10% when using the Mid 250 contract (three when using the 
FTSE 100 contract) and average risk reduction of ahnost one third is achieved for the 
General funds using the new contract. 
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Table 3.7) 
Hedging Investment Trust Portfolios Using the MVHR strategy: Daily Data. 
Average Average Standard Deviation of Returns 
Hedge Ratio Mean Return Minimmn Maximum Average Decrease 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged portfolio 
General 5.905 8.652 13.975 10.676 
Capital Growth 3.362 8.260 12.525 9.556 
Income Growth 0.553 7.665 11.925 9.879 
High Income -5.079 8.927 13.897 10.681 
Small Company 1.880 6.744 12.409 9.743 
Ventine / Development 11.535 6.708 9.603 8.111 
Property -7.579 13.497 13.884 13.691 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
General 0.459 2.319 7.726 11.299 8.771 17.342 
Capital Growth 0.237 1.512 7.988 11.688 8.966 5.961 
Income Growth 0.343 -2.131 7.254 10.802 8.721 11.101 
High Income 0.278 -7.252 8.537 13.014 10.036 5.972 
Small Company 0.211 0.233 6.645 10.995 9.222 4.789 
Venture / Development 0.159 10.293 6.614 9.350 7.785 3.789 
Property 0.186 -9.036 12.995 13.821 13.408 2.088 
C) Hedging with the 
F T S E Mid250 contract 
General 0.832 2.263 7.229 10.809 8.297 21.953 
Capital Growth 0.497 1.186 7.465 11.334 8.629 9.556 
Income Growth 0.658 -2.325 7.060 10.535 8.252 15.788 
High Income 0.571 -7.580 8.334 .12.465 9.639 9.643 
Small Company 0.478 -0.213 6.447 10.818 8.925 7.975 
Venture / Development 0.332 10.084 6.472 9.075 7.615 5.821 
Property 0.490 -9.725 12.660 13.511 13.086 4.445 
D) Composite hedges+ 
General 0.804 1.919 7.216 10.544 8.142 23.277 
Capital Growth 0.490 1.115 7.465 11.334 8.610 9.752 
Income Growth 0.625 -2.573 7.060 10.458 8.205 16.216 
High Income 0.562 -7.633 8.334 12.465 9.636 9.666 
Small Company 0.473 -0.315 6.429 10.689 8.896 8.233 
Venture / Development 0.328 10.118 6.469 . 9.075 7.614 5.830 
Property 0.507 -9.427 12.660 13.412 13.036 4.802 
* As table 3.5. 
+ The optimal combinations of the FTSE-100 and Mid 250 contract ranges from 0.25:0.75 to -0.5 to 
1.5. For no portfolio did the weight given to the Mid 250 contract fall below 0.75. 
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Table 3.8) 
Hedging Investment Trust Portfolios Using the MVHR Strategy: 
Weekly Data. 
Average Average Standard Deviation of Returns 
Hedge Ratio Mean Return Minimum Maximum Average Decrease 
Spot Portfolio 
A) Unhedged portfolio 
General 5.919 10.870 13.604 11.816 
Capital Growth 3.370 10.403 13.546 11.568 
Income Growth 0.554 9.992 14.124 11.894 
High Income -5.091 10.764 15.406 12.785 
Small Company 1.885 8.890 14.456 11.990 
Venture / Development 11.561 7.961 10.857 9.347 
Property -7.596 16.393 17.599 16.996 
B) Hedging with the 
FTSEIOO contract 
General 0.623 0.144 6.785 9.865 8.784 25.429 
Capital Growth 0.381 0.053 9.290 12.004 10.471 9.343 
Income Growth 0.532 -0.501 8.228 11.014 9.746 17.882 
High Income 0.486 -1.234 9.583 13.660 11.226 12.262 
Small Company 0.435 -0.211 8.591 12.633 10.640 10.837 
Venture / Development 0.259 1.322 7.485 9.930 8.684 6.794 
Property 0.509 -1.606 15.585 15.766 15.676 7.632 
C) Hedging with the 
FTSE-Mid 250 contract 
General 0.864 0.295 6.920 9.960 8.243 30.279 
Capital Growth 0.586 0.111 8.754 11.762 9.941 13.910 
Income Growth 0.785 -0.400 7.852 10.074 9.052 23.639 
High Income 0.705 -1.135 9.215 13.227 10.746 16.031 
Small Company 0.672 -0.147 8.060 12.205 10.009 16.263 
Venture / Development 0.391 1.365 7.290 9.725 8.486 8.953 
Property 0.776 -1.525 15.153 15.190 15.171 10.618 
D) Composite hedges+ 
General 0.853 0.216 6.268 9.617 8.036 31.974 
Capital Growth 0.588 0.120 8.596 11.706 9.868 14.525 
Income Growth 0.779 -0.439 7.750 10.055 8.960 24.431 
High Income 0.693 -1.179 9.215 13.205 10.728 16.182 
Small Company 0.673 -0.147 7.902 12.174 9.971 16.662 
Venture / Development 0.385 1.348 7.290 9.708 8.439 9.450 
Property 0.773 -1.538 15.110 15.136 15.123 10.905 
* As table 3.5. 
+ The optimal combinations of the FTSE-100 and FTSE-Mid 250 contract ranges from 0.5:0.5 to -0.75 to 1.75. For no 
portfolio did the weight given to the FTSE-Mid 250 contract fall below 0.5. 
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Resuhs for the optimal synthetic futures show minor improvement over results for 
the Mid 250 contract. In all cases the optimal combination involves using the Mid 
250 contract'^ again supporting the view that the new contract has an important role 
to play, especially in relation to hedging portfolios which are not broadly diversified. 
3.6) R E S U L T S : E X ANTE HEDGING E F F E C T I V E N E S S 
In this section the empirical results relating to the ex ante performance of both 
fiitures confracts are reported. A l l the tables are organised in the same fashion and 
consist of four panels of results. For each table, panel A reports the mean and 
standard deviation of return for each of the unhedged spot portfolios; panel B reports 
the MVHR ex post hedging effectiveness results, establishing a comparative 
benchmark; panel C reports the results for the ex ante hedge resulting from a window 
size of 13 weeks; panel D reports the results for the ex ante hedge resulting from a 
window size of 26 weeks. 
Firstly, hedging effectiveness is examined where the underlying spot portfolios are 
market indexes. In table 3.9, the results are reported for the FTSE 100 confract. The 
results show that the FTSE 100 contract achieves considerable levels of risk 
reduction (both in an ex post and ex ante context) when the imderlying spot 
portfolios consist of broad based stock indexes. With respect to panel B, the FTSE 
100 confract eliminates 81.1% of the risk associated with the underlying spot index. 
While the levels of risk reduction for the related cross hedges are not as great, they 
are still considerable: for the Mid 250, FTSE 350, FTALLSH and FTIT indices, the 
FTSE 100 confract reduces risk by 35.9%, 76.5%, 74.2% and 38% respectively. With 
respect to these cross hedging results it is evident that the FTSE 100 contract 
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produces the most effective hedges for those indexes which are dominated by large 
capitalisation stocks, and least effective hedges for those stocks dominated by 
smaller capitalisation stocks. Even so, in order to reduce this risk the hedger has to 
sacrifice considerable mean returns on all stock indexes. 
More importantly, panels C and D in table 3.9 demonstrate that the hedger can 
achieve similar levels of risk reduction by employing the dynamic ex ante hedging 
strategy based on the moving window procedure. For the ex ante strategy utilising a 
13 week window the hedger can achieve in excess of 95% of the risk reduction levels 
attained by the static ex post strategy for all five spot indexes. When the window size 
is extended to 26 weeks there is a marginal improvement, with risk reduction 
approaching the ex post benchmark for all reported stock indexes. These findings 
indicate that hedge ratio instability is not a serious problem for ex ante hedging 
effectiveness when both the spot and fixtures instruments are liquid instruments. 
Where both the instruments are relatively well traded, this would result in a strong 
and uniform covariance relationship between spot and futures returns (see equation 
3.9), leading to relative hedge ratio stability. This is confirmed by examining the 
hedge ratio stability statistics in panel C and D for the 13 and 26 week windows. 
These figures clearly show that there is a positive relationship between hedge ratio 
stability and the proportion of the ex post hedging effectiveness which the ex ante 
strategy manages to achieve. For instance, an ex ante hedging strategy which utilises 
a 26 week window produces more stable hedge ratios and a greater level of risk 
reduction than an ex ante hedging strategy which utilises a 13 week window. This 
point is demonstrated graphically in figures 3.4a which plots the stability of the direct 
and cross hedges associated with the FTSE 100 index future for a 13 and 26 week 
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Table 3.9) 
Ex Ante Hedging Effectiveness of the FTSE-100 Contract: 
Stock Market Indexes 
Average Average 
Hedge Ratio Mean Retum* 
S.D. of 
Retums* 
Decrease 
in S.D.** 
Stability of 
Hedge Ratio"*" 
A) Unhedged 
FTSEIOO 10.1972 9.9917 
FTSE250 7.0408 8.3699 
FTSE350 9.4796 9.3254 
FTALLSH 9.1728 8.9389 
FTIT 2.8652 8.3166 
B) Ex Post Hedging 
FTSEIOO 0.8854 1.2064 1.8886 81.0962 
FTSE250 0.5798 1.1544 5.3643 35.9099 
FTSE350 0.8179 1.1700 2.1943 76.4698 
FTALLSH 0.7793 1.2584 2.3068 74.1892 
FTIT 0.5889 -3.1148 5.1552 38.0142 
C) Ex Ante Hedging 
-13 Week Window 
FTSEIOO 0.8862 1.3364 1.9910 80.0715 0.3065 
FTSE250 0.5617 1.7160 5.5324 33.9026 0.7377 
FTSE350 0.8144 1.4040 2.2917 75.4255 0.3425 
FTALLSH 0.7744 1.4976 2.3999 73.1565 0.3519 
FTIT 0.5885 -3.1668 5.2562 36.7994 0.8343 
D) Ex Ante Hedging 
- 26 Week Window 
FTSEIOO 0.8826 1.2792 1.9391 80.5933 0.1687 
FTSE250 0.5780 1.0868 5.4350 35.0623 0.4060 
FTSE350 0.8150 1.2168 2.2398 75.9807 0.1853 
FTALLSH 0.7748 1.3156 2.3515 73.6954 0.1875 
FTIT 0.5965 -3.5828 5.2136 37.3128 0.4911 
* A l l mean and standard deviation statistics have been aimualised to improve their readability. 
** This measures the percentage of the standard deviation of retum of the imhedged position that is 
removed by hedging, and is calculated as: 
Risk reduction = CT. X 100 
+ This refers to the variability of the ex ante hedge ratio series measured in terms of the standard 
deviation of the series. 
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Figure 3.4 -Ex Ante Hedge Ratio Stability: Stock Indexes* 
a) FTSE-100 Index Futures Contract 
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* Each plot illutrates the stability of ex ante hedge ratios estimated on the basis of 13 and 26 week windows over 
the period September 1994 to December 1996. Where the lighter series refers to hedge ratios estimated on the 
basis of a 13 week window and the darker series refers to the hedge ratios estimated on the basis of a 26 week 
window. 
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window respectively. The ex ante hedge ratios which are estimated on the basis of a 
larger window size are all characterised by greater stability. As Hohnes (1995) 
argued this was to be expected, since when using a larger window the weight 
attached to outliers is reduced and a more representative hedge ratio is generated. 
In table 3.10 the ex post and ex ante hedging effectiveness of the Mid 250 contract is 
reported for the same five spot indexes. Once again the results show that when the 
underlying spot portfolios are market indexes, the risk reduction achieved on both an 
ex ante and ex post basis is substantial. With respect to the ex post strategy (panel 
B), the Mid 250 contract eliminates 72.5% of the risk associated with its underlying 
spot index. While this level of risk reduction is not as great as the direct FTSE 100 
hedge it is still considerable. For the cross hedges with the FTSE 100, FTSE 350, 
FTALLSH and FTIT indexes, the Mid 250 contract reduces risk by 42%, 50.9%, 
53%) and 46.4%) respectively. As was previously found, the FTSE 100 index futures 
contract is more effective at eliminating risk on indexes which are dominated by 
large capitalisation stocks, and the Mid 250 contract is more effective at eliminating 
risk on indexes which are dominated by low capitalisation stocks. Furthermore, the 
mean returns on these cross hedges were also greater than those associated with the 
FTSE 100 contract. 
The ex ante hedging effectiveness for the Mid 250 contract with respect to the market 
indexes is reported in panels C and D. Once again, ex ante hedging effectiveness was 
found to be a function of the window size employed, with the 26 week window 
resulting in hedge ratios that were more stable, and more effective in reducing risk 
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Table 3.10) 
Ex Ante Hedging Effectiveness of the Mid250 Contract: 
Stock Market Indexes 
Average Average S.D. of Decrease Stability of 
Hedge Ratio Mean Retum Retums in S.D. Hedge Ratio 
A) Unhedged 
FTSEIOO 10.1972 9.9917 
FTSE250 7.0408 8.3699 
FTSE350 9.4796 9.3254 
FTALLSH 9.1728 8.9389 
FTIT 2.8652 8.3166 
B) Ex Post Hedging 
FTSEIOO 0.9290 3.7180 5.7920 42.0287 
FTSE250 0.9182 0.6344 2.3032 72.4816 
FTSE350 0.9270 3.0108 4.5790 50.8988 
FTALLSH 0.9002 2.8964 4.2034 52.9739 
FTIT 0.8013 -2.7196 4.4550 46.4271 
C) Ex Ante Hedging 
-13 . Week Window 
FTSEIOO 1.0008 2.8288 6.1294 38.6549 1.6593 
FTSE250 0.9154 0.4108 2.3883 71.4658 0.4680 
FTSE350 0.9819 2.2568 4.8307 48.2017 1.3189 
FTALLSH 0.9481 2.2984 4.4182 50.5756 1.2331 
FTIT 0.8143 -1.6484 4.6966 43.5221 1.0896 
D) Ex Ante Hedging 
- 26 Week Window 
FTSEIOO 0.9320 4.6800 5.9340 40.6072 0.7110 
FTSE250 0.9100 0.5980 2.3386 72.0603 0.2315 
FTSE350 0.9273 3.7492 4.6908 49.6988 0.5524 
FTALLSH 0.8972 3.6140 4.2978 51.9237 0.4846 
FTIT 0.7938 -2.3244 4.5343 45.4757 0.5286 
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than those associated with a 13 week window. For instance, the standard deviation of 
the ex ante hedge ratio series relating to the Mid 250 direct hedge fell fi-om 0.468 for 
a 13 week hedge to 0.2315 for a 26 week hedge, with hedging effectiveness 
increasing from 71.5 % to 72.1%. Compared to the FTSE 100 conti-act, the Mid 250 
contiact does not achieve the same proportion of ex post risk reduction when 
employing an ex ante sfi-ategy. This discrepancy can be accounted for by the fact that 
hedges underpinned by the Mid 250 contract are characterised by greater inter-
temporal hedge ratio instability, reflecting the illiquid nature of this contract. The 
instability associated with the hedge ratio series relating to the Mid 250 contract is 
illustrated in figures 3.4b. Compared to the relevant hedges for the FTSE 100 
contract in figures 3.4a the Mid 250 contract is clearly characterised by greater hedge 
ratio instability. The instability is particularly acute for cross hedges, where the 
covariance relationship is weaker and characterised by greater variability. For 
instance, the ex ante hedge ratio series resulting from the cross-hedge between the 
FTSE 100 contract and the Mid 250 index is significantly more stable than that 
corresponding to the cross hedge between the Mid 250 contract and the FTSE 100 
index, both with respect to the 13 and 26 week window. Overall, the results in table 
4.9 and 4.10 suggest that when the underlying spot portfolio is a well diversified 
market index, with a composition similar to the index fixtures confract, the degree of 
risk reduction achieved by both the static ex post and dynamic ex ante hedging 
strategies are substantial and of a similar magnitude. 
Hitherto, both the ex iante hedging strategies have focused on specific cases where the 
spot portfolio consists of market indexes. However, Holmes and Amey (1995) have 
demonsfrated that by evaluating hedging effectiveness using spot portfolios that are 
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very similar in composition to the index fiitures contract, the potential for risk 
reduction was likely to be overstated. Likewise, the results from the first stage of this 
empirical analysis suggest that ex post hedging effectiveness for spot portfolios 
which differ significantly in composition from the associated index fiitures confract 
are significantly less than previous studies have suggested. In order to address these 
problems and provide a more representative evaluation of the risk reduction potential 
of these contracts, the ex ante hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
contracts is examined where the associated spot portfolios consist of investment trust 
companies. As in the earlier section, rather than reporting the results for each of the 
fiinds individually, the average results for each category are reported. The results for 
the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts are reported in tables 3.11 and 3.12 
respectively. 
In panels B, C and D of tables 3.11 and 3.12 the standard deviation of retums for the 
hedged spot portfolios are shown. The standard deviations are lower on both an ex 
post and ex ante basis in every fund category for the Mid 250 than for the FTSE 100 
contract, indicating that cross-hedges using the Mid 250 contract are associated with 
lower basis risk. This finding is hardly surprising, given that like the Mid 250 
contract these portfolios tend to be dominated by low capitalisation stocks. 
While the ex post results in tables 3.11 and 3.12 show that the Mid 250 contract 
dominates the FTSE 100 confract in terms of the risk reduction when ITC's are used, 
the degree of risk reduction is only a fraction of that achieved when the spot 
portfolios are market indexes. For instance, with respect to the Mid 250 contract only 
the general category of ITC's achieves risk reduction in excess of 25%, and the 
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majority of categories achieve risk reduction of less than 15%. These results reflect 
the relatively weak covariance relationship that exists been both confracts and the 
respective ITC's. Even so, ex ante hedging effectiveness can be regarded as quite 
effective, with a large proportion of the ex post reduction in risk being achieved 
using an ex ante strategy. This is despite the fact that the stability statistics indicate 
that the ex ante hedge ratio series associated with ITC's are several times larger than 
those associated with the cross-hedges based on market indexes, indicating greater 
hedge ratio instability. As Benet (1990) suggested, possible reasons for the difference 
in performance with regards to minor cross-hedges were, greater and more variable 
basis risk which is inherent in cross-hedges, and the weaker economic relationship 
between the futures contract and the vehicle to be hedged. These problems manifest 
themselves in a volatile covariance relationship. Given the low and unstable 
covariance relationship between the ITC's and the respective futures confract, the 
static fraditional strategy of adopting a hedge ratio equal to unity would result in 
serious mishedging. It is evident in figures 3.5 and 3.6 that for all ITC categories, the 
optimal ex ante hedge ratio rarely equates to unity, and indeed has the potential to 
deviate considerably from this value. 
As with the ex ante hedging results associated with the market indexes, the level of 
ex ante risk reduction associated with ITC's for both confracts can be seen to be a 
function of the window size employed. For instance, as the window size increases 
from 13 to 26 weeks, the ex ante hedge ratio series stabilises producing more 
effective hedges, which results in greater risk reduction. This point is illusfrated in 
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Table 3.11) 
Ex Ante Hedging Effectiveness of the FTSE-100 Contract: 
Investment Trust Categories 
Average Average S.D. of Decrease Stability 
Hedge Ratio Mean Retum Retums inS.D.* Hedge Ra 
A) Unhedged 
General 9.6616 11.0734 
Capital Growth 6.0580 11.0914 
Income Growth 1.8200 11.2219 
High Income -5.5744 12.7990 
Small Company 5.4964 11.0452 
Venture/Development 12.0172 9.2576 
Property -2.0228 16.1045 
B) Ex Post Hedging 
General 0.6290 3.2708 8.4983 23.1495 
Capital Growth 0.3788 2.2100 10.1561 8.2035 
Income Growth 0.5372 -3.6348 9.4473 15.5963 
High Income 0.4860 -10.5092 11.5637 9.8850 
Small Company 0.4098 1.3312 9.9859 9.2375 
Ventiu-e/Development 0.3227 8.7360 8.5120 7.9895 
Property 0.5022 -7.1240 14.9349 7.3903 
C) Ex Ante Hedging 
-13 Week Window 
General 0.6119 3.6816 8.7600 20.6421 1.6845 
Capital Growth 0.3750 2.1372 10.6530 3.8426 1.8576 
Income Growth 0.5146 -3.0576 9.7984 12.4972 1.8417 
High Income 0.4701 -10.3012 12.0324 6.1904 2.3299 
Small Company 0.4052 1.2012 10.5888 3.6743 1.9953 
Venture/Development 0.3034 8.1796 8.8646 4.2625 1.7386 
Property 0.4885 -8.5124 15.9870 0.8703 3.0489 
D) Ex Ante Hedging 
- 26 Week Window 
General 0.6234 3.1148 8.6476 21.8453 1.1668 
Capital Growth 0.3665 2.2932 10.3876 6.2005 1.1177 
Income Growth 0.5301 -3.7752 9.7249 13.0686 1.1704 
High Income 0.4714 -10.5664 11.7527 8.5331 1.5446 
Small Company 0.4160 0.9620 10.2672 6.6895 1.1430 
Venture/Development 0.3047 8.3824 8.6216 6.8470 1.2107 
Property 0.5001 -7.0252 15.2536 5.4195 1.8309 
* The decrease in the S.D. of retums relates to a comparison of the average S.D. of retinns for the 
hedged position with that of the unhedged position on a category by category basis. 
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Table 3.12) 
Ex Ante Hedging Effectiveness of the Mid 250 Contract: 
Investment Trust Categories 
Average Average S.D. of Decrease Stability of 
Hedge Ratio Mean Retnm Retums inS.D. Hedge Ratio 
A) Unhedged 
General 9.6616 11.0734 
Capital Growth 6.0580 11.0914 
Income Growth 1.8200 11.2219 
High Income -5.5744 12.7990 
Small Company 5.4964 11.0452 
Venture/Development 12.0172 9.2576 
Property -2.0228 16.1045 
B) Ex Post Hedging 
General 0.8629 3.6400 8.0454 27.5594 
Capital Growth 0.6022 1.8616 9.6218 13.0926 
Income Growth 0.7901 -3.6868 8.7954 21.3930 
High Income 0.7228 -10.6132 11.0791 13.7292 
Small Company 0.6571 0.9100 9.3643 14.9601 
Venture/Development 0.4729 8.7152 8.2654 10.7153 
Property 0.8581 -8.0080 14.0566 12.8864 
C) Ex Ante Hedging 
-13 Weeli Window 
General 0.8568 5.9332 8.3389 24.8036 2.4511 
Capital Growth 0.5964 1.9396 10.0970 9.1159 2.9825 
Income Growth 0.8027 -2.4804 9.1884 17.9125 2.5974 
High Income 0.7539 -8.6944 11.3517 11.6227 3.8327 
Small Company 0.6294 3.4112 10.1640 7.4545 2.6544 
Venture/Development 0.4383 9.2196 8.6028 7.1126 2.6046 
Property 0.8412 -5.7616 14.8354 8.0196 3.9726 
D) Ex Ante Hedging 
- 26 Weeli Window 
General 0.8269 4.6540 8.2106 26.1099 1.4170 
Capital Growth 0.5610 2.6676 9.9463 10.3073 1.7472 
Income Growth 0.7730 -2.0072 8.9706 19.8064 1.7408 
High Income 0.6985 -8.6112 11.1116 12.5943 2.3414 
Small Company 0.6597 1.2220 9.6045 12.7629 1.3643 
Venture/Development 0.4314 8.3460 8.3541 9.7994 1.5518 
Property 0.8446 -8.1952 14.3912 10.8138 2.4914 
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Figure 3.5)* 
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Figure 3.6)* 
Ex Ante Hedge Ratio Stability: Mid250 Contract and Investment Trust 
Companies 
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As Figure 3.4 
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figures 3.5 and 3.6 for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts". Each plot clearly 
shows that for all investment trust categories, as the window size increases the ex 
ante hedge ratios become smoother and converge towards the ex post hedge ratio, 
resulting in an improvement of the level of risk reduction. Even so, ex ante hedge 
ratios for the FTSE 100 contract in figure 3.5 are significantly less variable than 
those for the Mid 250 contract in figure 3.6 reinforcing the point made earlier that 
hedge ratio stability is also a positive fimction of futures market liquidity. 
3.7) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this chapter provides the first assessment of hedging performance of 
the Mid 250 fiitures contract. Given the low level of trading in this contract and the 
results from chapter three hedging effectiveness may be limited. The chapter also 
provides the first examination of hedging effectiveness of stock index fiitures when 
the spot portfolio to be hedged is an actual portfolio, rather than a broad market index 
or a portfolio specifically constructed for the purposes of research. 
Results demonstrate that in spite of low trading volume, the Mid 250 contract 
provides an important additional hedging instrument. The findings in relation to 
hedging broad market indexes show the superiority of the new contract over the 
FTSE 100 contract in relation to spot portfolios mirroring the Mid 250 and the FTIT 
indexes. When considering actual spot portfohos in the form of ITC's, the results 
clearly demonstrate the benefits to be gained from using the new confract. In all 
cases, the average standard deviation of returns is lower when the Mid 250 confract is 
used as compared to the use of the FTSE 100 contract. 
Page 151 
Results also show that previous studies of hedging effectiveness have greatly 
exaggerated the risk reduction which can be achieved. While previous studies for the 
UK have found risk reduction of 60% to 80%, the findings in this chapter show that 
for many portfolios, including those comprising smaller stocks, risk reduction of 
below 20% is achieved. Thus, while the new contract does significantly add to the 
ability to hedge risk, for many portfolios there is still no satisfactory means by which 
to achieve substantial risk reduction. 
For ex ante hedge ratios estimated by means of a moving window, it was found that 
where the underlying spot portfolios were broad based market indexes, the levels of 
risk reduction achieved were of a similar magnitude to those achieved using the ex 
post strategy. For these portfolios inter-temporal hedge ratio instability did not 
appear to strongly adversely affect hedging performance. Furthermore, it was found 
that the FTSE 100 contract provided the most effective hedge for portfolios 
dominated by large capitalisation stocks, and the Mid 250 contract provided the most 
effective hedge for stocks dominated by low capitalisation stocks. 
Where the spot portfolios to be hedged consisted of investment trust companies, ex 
ante hedging effectiveness was found to be poor, and the presence of significant 
hedge ratio instability resulted in levels lower than those achieved when using the ex 
post strategy. In these circumstances the degree of hedge ratio instability dictated the 
proportion of ex post risk reduction which could be attained on an ex ante basis. 
Even so, it was found that this problem could be alleviated by enlarging the window 
size used for estimating hedge ratios. When larger window sizes were employed ex 
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ante hedge ratios were found to stabilise, converging towards the ex post benchmark, 
and maximising risk reduction. 
It is evident that previous studies which have evaluated the hedging effectiveness of 
index fiitures contracts by employing an ex post strategy with spot portfolios that 
mirror the composition of the underlying confract have seriously exaggerated the risk 
reduction potential of these instruments. Hedging effectiveness can only be truly 
examined by using an ex ante sfrategy in conjunction with spot portfolios that do not 
replicate market portfolios. 
While the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the Mid 250 confract is an 
effective hedging vehicle, the Mid 250 confract is characterised by greater basis risk 
and produces a less effective hedge than the FTSE 100 confract when the spot 
portfolio to be hedged is the underlying index. The presence of greater basis risk 
indicates less effective tracking between the Mid 250 spot and futures market than 
compared with the FTSE 100 contract and is consistent with the findings in chapter 
one of the contract being very illiquid, with trading volume being sporadically 
concentrated around the rollover period. Furthermore, difficulties with frading the 
Mid 250 contract at times other than the rollover period, owing to high market 
impact costs, also call into question the feasibility of adopting a dynamic hedging 
strategy as a way of addressing the difficulties associated with hedge ratio instability. 
In adopting a dynamic hedging sfrategy account has to be taken of the additional 
transaction cost which are incurred from frequently adjusting the futures position. 
Thus the investor has to offset the benefits of improved risk reduction from using a 
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dynamic hedging strategy against the additional costs of adopting an imperfect static 
hedge. 
While the findings in chapter three demonstrate that in terms of risk reduction the 
MVHR generates the most effective hedges, this approach makes no attempt to 
differentiate between different categories of risk averse investors, with risk aversion 
assumed to be absolute. However, in chapter four, the hedging effectiveness of the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts is further investigated using hedge ratios estimated 
within an Extended Mean Gini fi-amework, where explicit account is taken of the 
impact that changes in risk aversion have on hedging decisions. This approach 
provides another perspective on hedging with the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts 
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Endnotes 
' Specific types of hedges initiated in futures markets are the inventory and anticipatory 
hedges. An inventory (or cash and carry) hedge refers to where an investor has possession of 
the spot instrument, and by hedging is attempting to guarantee a future price today. 
Alternatively, an anticipatory hedge (or selective hedge) is initiated by an investor who is 
not in possession of the spot instrument but is concerned with locking-in to a price today for 
some unanticipated future period. 
^ The outcomes suggested with regard to the choice of short and long positions in the 
futures markets assumes that the ex ante capital market line is positively sloping. 
^ Linter (1956) considered the historical pattem of dividends, and found that dividends were 
a function of eamings and past dividends. Linter demonstrated that although dividends were 
often a constant proportion of eamings, companies were reluctant to raise current dividends 
to levels which could not be sustained in the future, leading to stable dividend payments 
over time. 
" Figlewski (1984a) suggests that in the context of hedging with index futures, invariably all 
hedging will involve a cross hedge, with the composition of the spot portfolio being hedged 
differing from the portfolio underlying the futures contract. 
' Hedge ratios computed within an Extended Mean Gini (EMG) framework have also been 
widely used in relation to index futures markets. An examination of hedge ratios generated 
within the EMG fi-amework, together with the impact that risk aversion has on hedging 
behaviour is considered separately in chapter four. 
^ Traditionally, hedging strategies have focused on risk reduction, which while recognising 
the service a futures market provides in facilitating risk reduction, ignores the cost it often 
imposes measured in terms of expected retum. Although attempts have been made to 
incorporate expected retums into hedging decisions to develop risk-return measures of 
hedging effectiveness (see Howard and D' Antoniou (1984), Chang and Shanker (1987), 
Howard and D' Antoniou (1987), Lindahl (1991)), the addition of an additional 
effectiveness criterion requires the inclusion of subjective assessments in relation to 
investor preferences. For instance, the model developed by Howard and D' Antoniou (1984) 
only applies to investors who seek to maximise the ratio of excess retums to standard 
deviation, and its practical implementation is complicated by the ex ante estimation of five 
hedging parameters. 
' The definitions of these categories of ITC's are taken from the Association of Investment 
Trust Companies' monthly report. 
* In the remainder of the chapter the hedge ratio will be referred to as a positive number for 
convenience, even though in practice hedging an established spot position is likely to 
require selling futures. 
' The ex post MVHR's used in the second stage of this analysis use only a subset of the 
sample period used in the initial stage. Therefore, ex post MVHR's and measures of hedging 
effectiveness differ slightly from the earlier results. 
Page 155 
All mean and standard deviation figures reported in the tables and the text have been 
annualised to allow more convenient comparison between hedges of different durations. 
" The optimal combinations identified using daily and weekly hedges for each of the thirty-
seven spot portfolios are reported in full in appendices 1 and 2 respectively. 
This finding can, in part, be explained by the fact that the composition of the two cash 
indexes is revised on a regular basis reflecting changes in market capitalisation. When 
changes are made some stocks move out of the FTSE 100 index into the Mid 250 index and 
other make the move in the opposite direction. 
" In relation to the composition of the optimal 'synthetic' FTSE 350 contract which is used 
to hedge the ITC's, 84.4% (96.9%) of all weekly (daily) hedges consist of portfolios that 
comprise either entirely of the Mid 250 contract or portfolios formed from adjacent 
categories. See appendices 1 and 2. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 understate the true volatility of the ex ante hedge ratio series 
associated with investment trust portfolios because of the averaging process which takes 
place when calculating instability on a category by category basis. 
Page 156 
CHAPTER FOUR 
T H E HEDGING E F F E C T I V E N E S S OF THE FTSE 100 AND F T S E MID 250 
CONTRACTS: USING AN EXTENDED MEAN GINI FRAMEWORK 
4.1) INTRODUCTION 
It was previously established that hedging provides the main justification for the 
existence of futures frading. In chapter three the hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 
100 and Mid 250 confracts was investigated for a broad range of spot portfolios 
comprising of both market indexes and professionally managed portfolios. The 
results from that chapter indicate that where the underlying spot portfolios are broad 
based market indexes risk reduction is considerable for both confracts. Hence, despite 
being characterised by 'Very low frading volume, the Mid 250 confract has an 
important role to play as an hedging facility, especially in relation to UK portfolios 
comprising of medium or small sized stocks. 
Traditionally, the futures hedging literature has focused on the risk minimising 
minimum variance approach pioneered by Stein (1961) and Johnson (1960) as a 
means of generating the optimal hedge. However, it is now well recognised that 
mean variance analysis is based on rather restrictive assumptions and that the 
MVHR is only applicable to the infinitely risk averse investor. In response to these 
difficulties the extended mean Gini approach has been proposed as an alternative 
framework for analysing hedging decisions. The extended mean Gini approach offers 
greater flexibility in determining the optimal hedge ratio by allowing for 
differentiated risk aversion in the hedging model. Unlike the minimum variance 
approach the extended mean Gini framework is also consistent with the rules of 
Page 157 
stochastic dominance. This approach wil l be employed in this chapter to provide 
another perspective on hedging with the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 theoretical 
issues relating to the derivation of the mean Gini coefficient and extended mean Gini 
coefficient are presented, together with a discussion of the advantages which both of 
these approaches have over the established mean variance approach. In section 4.3 
the empirical investigation to be undertaken in relation to the application of the 
extended mean Gini framework and the hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and 
Mid 250 contracts is outlined. Research issues are also presented. In section 4.4 data 
and methodological issues are considered. In section 4.5 the main empirical findings 
are reported. Finally, in section 4.6 concluding remarks are made. 
4.2) T H E O R E T I C A L ISSUES 
Although mean variance analysis represents one of the most important developments 
in the evolution of modem financial theory, it is founded on specific assumptions 
including that retums are either normally distributed or that the mvestor's utility 
function is quadratic. Owing to these restrictive assumptions, the mean variance 
approach has the potential to arrive at a solution which is inconsistent with the 
investor's assumed objective of expected utility maximisation, and altemative 
approaches to modelling risk and retum have been espoused. The mean Gini (MG) 
approach was initially proposed as a measure of income inequality in the area of 
welfare economics, but owing to many of its desirable features it has recently been 
successfully applied to the theory of finance, with it being used as a more flexible 
framework for evaluating risk. While the Gini coefficient is similar to the variance in 
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that it selects portfolios that are efficient within risk and return space, unlike the 
mean variance approach, the MG approach succeeds in selecting portfolios that are 
consistent with rules of stochastic dominance, and can be viewed as constituting an 
index of the variability for a random variable. 
Given that the MG coefficient is consistent with risk averse behaviour for a wide 
range of probability distributions it has been found to be a more appropriate measure 
of dispersion than the variance. Shalit and Yitzhaki (1984) define the mean Gini 
coefficient (F) as follows: 
r = I" [\-FiR)]dR-^ [1 - FiR)]' dR "^'^^ 
or for finite values of a as: 
(* r 4 2) 
T = E{R)-a \\-F{R)\dR . ' 
Where F(R) represents the cumulative probability function of risky prospect R, E(R) 
is the expected value of the risky prospect R and it is assumed there exists values of a 
> - 0 0 and b < 0 0 , such that F(a) = 0 and F(b) = 1. However, in financial applications 
the most commonly applied version of the Gini coefficient is 
Y ^2Cov{R,F{R)) 4.3) 
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i.e. the MG coefficient is equal to twice the covariance between realisations of the 
variable R and its cumulative probabiUty distribution. As Shalit and Yitzhaki (1989) 
point out, this representation of the Gini mirrors the variance, apart fi-om the fact that 
the cumulative probability distribution is used rather than the retum itself. By 
employing the cumulative probability distribution the MG coefficient attaches 
greater weight to the least favourable retum realisations, and in doing so focuses on 
down side risk rather than risk in general. A graphical representation of equation 4.3 
is provided by the Lorenz Curve in figure 4.1. In constracting a Lorenz curve, the 
rettim realisations on the variable R are plotted against their cumulative value (F(R)). 
A l l the retum realisations are ranked in terms of their size, with the first realisation 
constituting the smallest retum and the final realisation constituting the largest retum 
- referred to as 'the parade of dwarfs'. 
In Figure 4.1 the Lorenz curve is applicable to a financial context, where the 
proportion of the total realisations are measured on the horizontal axis and the 
cumulative retum fi-om that proportion of the retum realisation being measured on 
the vertical axis. The line AB represents a line of complete equality (i.e. analogous to 
a risk fi-ee asset), and provides a visible "benchmark" measure of dispersion. As the 
Lorenz curve becomes more convex to the origin the degree of dispersion increases. 
The size of the Gini coefficient is calculated as a ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line of equality AB, to the area ABC. The standard Gini coefficient 
assumes values ranging between zero and one, with the degree of dispersion 
becoming greater as the size of the Gini coefficient approaches one. 
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Figure 4.1) 
Lorenz Curve in a Financial Context. 
Cumulative Returns 
B 
Gini Coefficient 
Proportion of Sample 
The use of the mean Gini approach has been advocated in preference to the mean 
variance approach as a measure of dispersion because it possesses a number of 
desirable statistical properties. Firstly, while the mean variance approach requires 
returns to be normally distributed for a consistent ranking of ahemative prospects, 
the mean Gini approach makes no such assumptions about normality of the 
underlying probability distribution of returns or the quadraticity of the utility 
function, and allows for the construction of efficient portfolios that are included in 
the first and second order stochastic dominance portfolios. Hence, the mean Gini 
coefficient provides a consistent ranking of risky alternatives whenever mean 
variance analysis fails. However, where returns are normally distributed the mean 
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Gini and mean variance efficient sets are identical to one another, indicating that the 
mean variance approach is a special case of the mean Gini approach. Secondly, while 
the variance cannot be observed, the Gini coefficient by definition of being expected 
absolute distance between two return realisations provides a more intuitive measure 
of investment risk, which can be gauged by the slope of the Lorenz curve. Thirdly, 
the Gini coefficient can also be extended into a wider family of statistics - the 
extended mean Gini (EMG) coefficients - which enable researchers to take account 
of the strength of the investor's degree of risk aversion and explicitly allow for the 
fact that risk averse investors are largely concerned only with 'down side' risk. As 
Hanoch and Levy (1969) argue: 
"The identification of riskiness with variance, or with any other 
single measure of dispersion, is clearly unsound. There are many 
obvious cases, where more dispersion is desirable, i f accompanied 
by an upward shift in the location of the distribution, or by an 
increasing positive asymmetry" (p. 344). 
The theory of stochastic dominance on which the MG approach is underpinned is the 
only theory of choice under uncertainty that provides a ranking of risky prospects 
that is consistent with risk averse behaviour for a broad range of probability 
distributions. Yitzhaki (1982) demonstrates that by using only the mean and Gini 
coefficient as summary statistics for a risky prospect it is possible to derive the 
necessary conditions for stochastic dominance, and thereby enable the investor to 
discard from their efficient set any prospect that is deemed stochastically inferior to 
the preferred prospect. 
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A risky investment prospect is said to stochastically dominate another risky 
investinent prospect i f an investor receives larger cash flows in every (ordered) state 
of the world. Yitzhaki (1983) shows that for the mean Gini approach to be consistent 
with the mles of stochastic dominance, the following two propositions which 
represent necessary and sufficient conditions must be satisfied. 
Proposition 1: Let R^ and Ry be risky prospects, with Fx and Fy representing the 
riskiness of each prospect measured in terms of the mean Gini coefficient. Where the 
conditions E(Rx) > E(Ry) and E(Rx) - Fx > E(Ry) - Fy are necessary conditions for 
Rx to dominate Ry according to the first and second order stochastic dominance 
rules. 
Proposition 2. Let Rx and Ry be two risky prospects with equal expected retum. 
Assume also that the cumulative distributions Fx(R) and FY(R) intersect at most once. 
Then E(Rx) - Fx > E(Ry) - Fy is a sufficient condition for Rx to dominate Ry 
according to the stochastic dominance mles. 
With respect to the propositions, the necessary conditions for second order stochastic 
dominance hold for any probability distribution. While the sufficient conditions only 
hold for families of cumulative probability distributions that intersect at most once, 
(e.g., the normal, lognormal, uniform and Gamma distiibutions). In relation to 
proposition one, the first necessary condition simply states that an essential 
requirement for prospect Rx to dominate Ry, is that the mean of the distribution Rx 
must be at least equal to the mean of the distribution of Ry. Additionally, the second 
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condition is related to the Gini coefficient, and states that i f Rx dominates Ry, the 
mean of distribution Rx minus the MG coefficient for Rx is not less than the mean 
of the distribution Ry minus the MG coefficient for Ry. In other words, the expected 
return on prospect X is not less than the expected return on prospect Y. On the basis 
of these two conditions, Shalit and Yitzhaki (1984) suggest that proposition one 
provides researchers 
"with a two-parameter instrument that can be used to discard 
from the efficient set the stochastically inferior alternatives" 
(p. 1453). 
While proposition one provides necessary conditions for stochastic dominance for 
any distribution, the sufficient conditions which are embodied in proposition two (the 
second efficiency criterion) are weaker, in that they relate only to cumulative 
probability distributions that intersect at most once. Under these circumstances, 
where the probability distribution is not normal, the mean variance approach fails to 
provide a consistent ranking of risky alternatives, but the efficient mean Gini set is 
identical to the efficient stochastic dominance set. However, owing to the difficulties 
in practically implementing the rules of stochastic dominance, Yitzhaki (1982) 
argues that the real appeal of the MG approach is that it captures the desnable feature 
of stochastic dominance, together with the implementative simplicity of mean 
variance analysis, without any of their adverse affects, and therefore the: 
"MG approach may thus be viewed as a compromise with some of 
the merits of the other two" (p. 178). 
Page 164 
While the mean Gini framework provides an alternative and more robust assessment 
of risk than the mean variance framework, an important weakness of this approach, is 
that like the mean variance approach it assumes that there is only one class of risk 
averse investors. However, in reality there are a multitude of risk averse investors 
and an framework which is capable of capturing this phenomenon while retaining the 
desirable properties of the MG approach is the extended mean Gini family of 
coefficients. 
The extended mean Gini coefficient was proposed by Yitzhaki (1983) as an 
alternative measure of dispersion to the simple mean Gini, in the analysis of 
investment risk. The extended mean Gini (EMG) is similar in structure and 
application to the mean Gini coefficient, except that it is capable of distinguishing 
between different classes of investors by explicitly incorporating a risk aversion 
parameter (v) which takes account of the impact that risk aversion has on portfolio 
evaluation decisions. The extended mean Gini is equivalent to equation 4.1 except 
that the risk aversion parameter v replaces two as the exponent of the fiinction: 
r ( v ) = (h-F{R)]dR- (\l-F(R)YdR ^"^^ 
and for finite values of a: 
r(v) = E{R) -a - f [1 - FiR) Y dR ^-^^ 
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Where v represents a parameter assuming a value between one and infinity. The 
parameter v which reflects the degree of risk aversion, provides the link between the 
extended mean Gini coefficient and the investor's attitude towards risk. As in the 
case of the standard Gini coefficient (equation 4.3), the extended mean Gini of a 
variable R is expressed in terms of the covariance between ranked returns on variable 
R and its cumulative probability distribution. For practical purposes the extended 
mean Gini coefficient (r(v)) takes the form of the following expression: 
r(v) = - vCov (R, ( 1 - F{R)y-') 4.6) 
As Shalit and Yitzhaki argue the: 
"extended Gini is simply a 'weighted' covariance between the 
variate and 1 minus its cumulative distribution raised to the power 
of v-1. The higher v becomes the more risk averse is the investor 
since he or she is attributing a larger weight to the worst 
realisations of the distribution" (1984, p. 1462) 
The importance of the extended mean Gini coefficient has been demonstrated by 
Yitzhaki (1983) who proved that the parameter v represents a relative index of risk 
aversion for the entire spectrum of investors, and r(v) denotes a risk premium that 
needs to be deducted from the expected value of the distribution. Yitzhaki (1983) 
shows that the certainty equivalent (C.E.) of a distribution is equal to the mean of the 
distribution minus the extended mean Gini (EMG) coefficient: 
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C.E.= EiR) -r{v) 4.7) 
Thus the certainty equivalent value of the distribution is determined by the risk 
aversion parameter v. As investor risk aversion increases (i.e. the parameter v rises) 
the higher is the risk premium required by investors, and the lower is the certainty 
equivalent of the risky prospect. Hence, investors who are strongly risk averse are 
willing to pay a larger premium to offset risk. While the simple mean Gini 
coefficient (where v=2) serves as a "benchmark measure" of risk aversion, it can 
easily be subsumed into the broader extended mean Gini framework. The extended 
mean Gini approach provides a mechanism for ranking investors into different 
categories in relation to risk averse behaviour For instance, where: 
V = 1: Risk neutial behaviour 
V= 2: Weakly risk averse behaviour 
V = 10: Moderate risk averse behaviour 
V > 25: Strongly risk averse behaviour 
V = oo: Maximin behaviour 
It can be seen in equation 4.6 that higher ranked returns will have lower complements 
of the cumulative probability distribution function, and raising them to a power 
greater than one wil l drive them towards zero. Therefore, as v increases in value 
more emphasis is placed on the lower end of the distribution and attention is focused 
on the worst return realisations. Kolb and Okunev (1993) suggest that this feature is: 
"intuitively appealing because one expects more risk averse 
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investors to give attention to the probability of suffering the worst 
outcomes. The mean variance approach by contrast weights all 
outcomes equally" (p. 601). 
By assuming different values of the extended mean Gini risk aversion parameter v, it 
is possible to construct a variety of efficient portfolio sets in mean Gini space. While 
these extended mean Gini portfolios are similar in construction to mean variance 
portfolios, they have substantial advantages over the variance, in that they are all 
encompassed in the second order stochastic dominance efficient set. In figure 4.2 this 
relationship between the mean Gini, extended mean Gini, second order stochastic 
dominance and mean variance efficient sets is illustiated in terms of a Venn diagram. 
The efficient set refers to the set of risky prospects within that set that are not 
dominated by the appropriate rule. As is clearly evident in figure 4.2, because the 
mean variance efficient set is not always consistent with the second order stochastic 
dominance set, there are some mean variance portfolios that would never be chosen 
by risk averse investors. 
Shalit (1995) suggests that the EMG approach provides a justified alternative to the 
minimum variance approach in developing hedge ratios for two fiirther reasons. 
Firstly, the EMG approach is superior to the minimum variance approach because it 
allows the development of capital market equilibrium that satisfies the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for second order stochastic dominance. Secondly, Shalit argues 
that the minimum variance approach of generating hedge ratios through OLS ignores 
the assumption of independence between the explanatory variable (i.e. fiitures series) 
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Figure 4.2) 
Composition of Extended Mean Gini Efficient Set 
Second order stochastic 
dominance efficient set 
Extended mean Gini 
efficient set for varying v 
IVIean Gini efficient set 
for V = 2 
iVIean variance efficient set 
Source: Hodgson and Okunev (1992), pp. 214. 
and the residual term. Shalit points out that owing to the possibility of 
misspecification in the regression model there are considerable reasons for inferring a 
dependency between the fixtures series and the residual series, and this has a tendency 
to result in biased parameter estimates. However, while the fiitures series and the 
residual series may be characterised by dependency, given that the EMG approach is 
based on the ranked return series, independence between the two series is more likely 
in the case of the EMG approach. 
4.3) E M P I R I C A L INVESTIGATION 
This chapter extends the work undertaken on hedging effectiveness in chapter three, 
by investigating the effectiveness of hedge ratios generated within an extended mean 
Gini framework with respect to both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. In relation 
to the literature review in chapter two there are a number of points worthy of 
restating in relation to the issues considered in this chapter. Firstly, the EMG 
approach is superior to the established minimum variance approach, in the sense that 
while the MVHR allows consideration of only one optimal hedge ratio which is 
appropriate only for infinitely risk averse investors, the EMG approach can be used 
to generate a range of hedge ratios which are applicable for different categories of 
risk averse investors. The EMG approach thereby captures the observed diversity in 
hedging behaviour. Secondly, while previous studies have applied the EMG 
approach to both traditional and financial fiitures confracts (including index fijtures), 
surprisingly to date no work has been undertaken examining the robustness of this 
approach in the presence of cross hedges. It is of interest to determine whether the 
'step function' which has been found to characterise the relationship between the 
optimal hedge ratio and the level of risk aversion for a direct hedge is also applicable 
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when the spot portfoUo differs in composition to the index underlying the fiitures 
contract. 
In this section some of the limitations of previous studies which employ the EMG 
approach to hedging are addressed in relation to UK index futures contracts. 
Specifically the following issues are addressed: 
• the hedging performance of hedge ratios generated within an EMG framework are 
examined for both the FTSE 100 contract and the Mid 250 confract. Consideration 
is given not only to direct hedges, but also to a range of cross hedges with spot 
portfolios comprising of related market indexes. This is an important issue 
because cross hedges have been found to be riskier than direct hedges, and it is 
reasonable to expect them to be more sensitive to changes in risk aversion. 
• the hedging effectiveness of the EMG hedge ratio is compared with the ex post 
MVHR. Since the minimum variance strategy is often freated as a universal 
benchmark in the literature, by comparing the two strategies for different levels of 
risk aversion, it should be possible to provides insights as to whether the minimum 
variance strategy truly warrants such a prominent position. 
5.4) DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 index fiitures confracts is 
investigated by comparing hedge ratios generated within the EMG framework with 
the respective ex post minimum variance hedge ratios. The spot portfolios to be 
hedged include the same range of stock market indexes employed in chapter three. 
Specifically, the five indexes are the FTSE 100 index, the FTSE Mid 250 index, the 
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FTSE 350 index, the FT Al l Share Index and the FT Inveshnent Trust index. Unlike 
previous studies using the EMG approach this is the first to take account of cross 
hedging risk. Hedging effectiveness is examined over the period 25 February 1994 
(the date of the infroduction of the Mid 250 contract) to 31 July 1995 using hedges of 
one week duration. The weekly return series for each spot index and fiitures contract 
is calculated as the logarithmic price change, and consists of 74 observations. Al l 
data is obtained from Datastream. 
Both the EMG approach and the MV approach to hedging seek to determine the 
hedge ratio which wil l minimise the risk associated with the hedge portfolio, with 
risk measured in terms of the extended Gini coefficient and variance respectively. 
The return on the hedged portfolio (R^) is expressed as: 
= + h • 4.8) 
Where R^ is the return on the spot portfolio, Rf is the return on the fiitures contract 
and h is the hedge ratio. 
By using the procedure employed by both Hodgson and Okunev (1992) and Kolb 
and Okunev (1992), the hedge ratio which minimises the EMG coefficient (h^'^°) can 
be determined. Firstly, the return on the hedged portfolio (equation 4.8) is substituted 
into the EMG coefficient (equation 4.6) to obtain: 
r(v) = -vCov(i?, + / !™'^i? , , ( l -F(i? , ))^- ' ) 4.9) 
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By expanding equation 4.9 with respect to the different elements of the hedged 
portfolio we achieve: 
r(v) = -vCov(R^,il-iF(R,)y-') - vh''^' C o v ( i ? ^ , ( l - F { R , ) y - ' ) 4.10) 
Further by differentiating equation 4.10 with respect to h^ *^ *^  we obtain: 
- - V Cov{Rf,{l-F{R^)) ) ^j-^ 
Finally, by setting the partial derivative in equation 4.11 to zero, the global minimum 
extended mean Gini hedge ratio becomes: 
^ - C o v ( i ? , , ( l - F ( i ? , ) ) - ) 4.12) 
'dCoviR^,il-FiR,)y-') 
EMG 
V 
It is clear from equation 4.12, that the hedge ratio which minimise the extended mean 
Gini coefficient is a direct function of the risk aversion parameter v. Hence, different 
categories of risk averse investors wil l have different optimal hedge ratios. However, 
for the risk neutral investor who is characterised by a risk aversion parameter equal to 
one, the extended mean Gini hedge ratio in equation 4.12 collapses to zero, eind the 
return on the hedged portfolio in equation 4.8 equates to the return on the spot asset 
only. 
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Empirically estimating equation 4.12 is rather complicated, owing to difficulties in 
evaluating the denominator of the expression. However, Hodgson and Okunev 
(1992) suggest a more simple approach which involves estimating the extended mean 
Gini hedge ratio through a process of iteration. The iterative procedure involves 
assigning some arbitiary value to h™° and calculating the returns on the hedged 
portfolio. Once the returns on the hedged portfolio have been determined using 
equation 4.8, they are ranked in ascending order from the lowest to the highest return 
realisation.The complement of the cumulative probability density fiinction (1 - F(RJ) 
is then proxied by the series: 
(1 - FiRjy-' = 
iT-Rank{R,)y-' 4.13) 
Where T refers to the number of sample observations and Rank (RJ refers to the 
ranked value of the hedged return. Equation 4.13 explicitly takes account of the 
different levels of investor risk aversion by weighing lower return realisations more 
heavily than higher return realisations. The EMG coefficient can then be calculated 
for different levels of v by using equation 4.6. The process of iterations continues by 
varying the value of h'^ '^ '^  until the minimum value of the extended mean Gini 
coefficient for a given level of risk aversion has been achieved. Usmg the iterative 
procedure outlined, the hedge ratios which minimise the size of the EMG coefficients 
are determined for each of the ten hedged portfolios, using risk aversion parameters 
ranging from two to eighty - at increments of one. By using values of the risk 
aversion parameter (v) which are greater than unity only risk averse investors are 
considered. Hence, it is possible to determine whether the optimal EMG hedges are a 
fiinction of risk aversion. 
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The ex post minimum variance hedge ratio is determined by employing the Johnson 
(1960) approach, where the minimum variance hedge ratio is estimated using OLS, 
by regressing spot returns (S, - Sn) against fiitures returns (F, - F,.,) as in equation 
4.14: 
(S. - S,,) = a + p (F. - F,,) + s, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. 4.14) 
Where the regression parameter p represents the MVHR, and the parameter s, 
represents the residual term. 
In relation to the minimum variance approach to hedging no attempt is made to 
explicitly accommodate risk aversion, rather risk aversion is deemed to be absolute 
with the hedger being prepared to forsake an infinite amount of return, in order to 
reduce risk over the sample period by an infinitely small amount. However, in the 
case of the EMG approach to hedging, risk aversion is relative, with the risk averse 
hedger increasingly concerned with downside risk, and limiting the portfolio's 
exposure only to the risk associated with the worst return reahsations (i.e. declines in 
the value of the hedged portfolio.). Hence, the optimal EMG hedge ratio is that which 
minimises the hedger's exposure to the least desirable subset of observations rather 
than all the observations contained within the sample. Greater volatility, insofar as it 
is associated with an increase in returns, is not thought to be undesirable by the 
hedger operating within an EMG framework. The impact that risk aversion has on 
the hedged return weightings in both the mean variance and EMG frameworks is 
indicated in table 4.1. 
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In relation to table 4.1, the cumulative percentage weights associated with different 
proportions of the worst return realisations within the sample are reported for 
different categories of risk averse investors. The sub-samples range from the worst 
1% of return realisations, to the worst 100% of return realisations (i.e. the whole 
sample). For instance, the hedger who employs the mean variance approach adopts a 
uniform weighting system, whereby all observations are weighted equally. Hence, 
the minimum variance hedging sfrategy attaches the same importance to the worst 
50% of observations as it does to the most favourable 50% of observations. Clearly 
such an approach would seem at odds with investment behaviour in practice. In 
confrast, the EMG approach attaches a greater weight to less favourable hedged 
returns than to more favourable hedged returns. For instance, the mean Gini approach 
(which assumes v=2) attaches 2.7% of the total portfoUo weight to the worst Wo of 
return realisation and 75.3% of the total portfolio weight to the worst 50% of return 
realisations. In comparison, a moderately risk averse investor (v= 5) attaches 6.6% of 
the total portfolio weight to the worst 1% of return realisations, and 97% of the total 
portfolio weight to the worst 50%. Finally, a strongly risk averse investor (v=80) 
attaches 99% of the total portfolio weight to the worse 5% of realisations. In other 
words, the sfrongly risk averse investor ignores 95% of all observations when 
making hedging decisions. This indicates that the EMG approach to hedging is 
exfremely sensitive to the presence of outliers. 
The figures relating to the return weightings reported in table 4.1 are illusfrated in 
terms of portfolio concentration fimctions in figure 4.3. While the mean variance 
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weights are illustrated by a diagonal linear fimction, it is clear that for the EMG 
weights as risk aversion increases the portfolio concenfration function becomes more 
concave indicating that the hedger is attaching an increasingly greater weight to an 
increasingly smaller sample of observations. At the lunit, as v -> cso the portfolio 
concentration fiinction wil l converge to the north-west comer of the plot, as the 
hedger attaches the total portfolio weight to the worst return reaUsation. In other 
words, the hedger becomes a maximin investor, and ranks the risky prospects 
according to the worst possible outcome, and then selects the least worst realisation. 
In assessing the hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 confract and Mid 250 
contract using the mean variance and EMG approaches, consideration wil l be given 
to both mean returns and degree of risk reduction associated with the hedged 
portfolio. Where the percentage risk reduction achieved from hedging each of the 
spot indexes within the EMG and mean variance frameworks respectively is 
calculated as: 
Risk Reduction {%RR) 
^ EMG {or S.D.) of hedged returns ^ 4.15) 
V EMG {or S.D.) of unhedged returns) X 100 
5.5) E M P I R I C A L R E S U L T S 
Owing to the fact that as risk aversion increases, the EMG approach focuses more 
strongly on a specific sub-sample of returns, the way in which the returns on the 
individual spot and fiitures series are dispersed would seem to have an important 
bearing on the relationship between risk aversion and hedge ratio stability. For this 
reason table 4.2 reports statistics relating to the distribution of weekly returns on both 
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futures contracts and all five stock indexes. There are a number of worthwhile points 
to make. Firstly, while there is considerable variation between the risk and return 
profiles for each of the series, all spot and futures series appear to be normally 
distributed. Secondly, the returns on both futures contract are more volatile, and 
associated with a more extreme range, than compared to those for the individual 
stock indexes. Of the individual stock indexes, the Mid 250 index has the least 
number of negative returns, and its returns are dispersed within the narrowest range. 
The hedging effectiveness of using the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts in relation 
to the various cross hedges, within both the EMG and minimum variance 
fi-ameworks is reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively, and depicted in figure 4.4. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present hedge ratios statistics for a selection of risk aversion 
parameters, together with hedged portfolio returns and the degree of risk reduction 
associated with the FTSE 100 contract and Mid 250 contracts. Consistent with 
previous studies there are a number of important findings which can be reported with 
respect to the relationship between the optimal hedge ratio and the investor's degree 
of risk aversion. 
Firstly, hedge ratios for low levels of risk aversion (v = 2 to 3) are very close to the 
risk minimising MVHR. This relationship exists for all the hedges associated with 
both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. For instance, the MVHR associated with 
the direct hedges for the FTSE 100 contract and Mid 250 contract is 0.84 and 0.90 
respectively, while when v = 3 the respective EMG hedge ratios are 0.86 and 0.90 
respectively. This pattern is also consistent across all the cross hedged portfolios. 
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Figure 4.4) 
Plots of the E M G and MV Hedge Ratios For the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 
Contracts 
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However, the hedge ratios for very high levels of risk aversion are quite different 
from the MVHR. In figure 4.4, all the EMG plots begin with v =2, which is 
equivalent to the standard mean Gini coefficient, but differ considerably from the 
MVHR at high levels of risk aversion. This is because the highly risk averse investor 
determines their optimal hedge ratio in relation to only the worst return realisations, 
while the mean variance investor generates an hedge ratio which is appropriate for all 
return realisations, and therefore some discrepancy between the two approaches is 
inevitable. Even so, in absolute magnitude the differences are often less than 20%. 
Secondly, the step fiinction associated with the EMG hedge ratios which was 
identified by Hodgson and Okunev (1992) is also evident in figure 4.4. Al l the 
hedged portfolios in figure 4.4 are characterised by several distinct ratios. As 
Hodgson and Okunev (1992) point out, the practical implication of this feature is that 
it is not always necessary to precisely measure an investor's degree of risk aversion 
to determine which hedge ratio most appropriately meets their preferences. Rather 
the investor has only to choose between the several different risk categories. 
Therefore, unlike the minimum variance approach, the EMG approach offers a range 
of hedge ratios which suit the requirements of different categories of risk averse 
investors. Even so, a degree of caution is still required because there is still the 
potential for investors' with preferred adjacent values of v to have significantly 
different optimal fixtures positions. 
Thirdly, changes in EMG hedge ratios for the two direct FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
hedges are found to be a monotonic fiinction of the risk aversion parameter, with 
both hedge ratios increasing continuously with risk aversion. However, for some of 
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the cross hedges where the composition of the futures contract and spot portfolio are 
significantly different, reversals in the hedge ratio path are clearly evident. For 
instance, hedge ratios wil l initially follow a downward (or upward) path and then 
suddenly change direction. In the case of the FTSE 100 contract only the cross hedge 
with the Mid 250 index is characterised by a significant reversal, while for the Mid 
250 contract all the cross hedges are characterised by significant reversals. It seems 
sensible to hypothesise that unhedgeable cross hedging risk may contribute to this 
phenomenon. This argument would seem reasonable considering that the FTSE 100 
and Mid 250 contracts mirror the performance of specific sectors of the market, and 
are likely to be less responsive to shocks which occur in areas of the market which 
are not specific to their imderlying index. In the case of the Mid 250 contract this 
problem is likely to be exacerbated by the problem of thin trading. In relation to the 
spot portfolios only the FTSE 100 index and the Mid 250 index have completely 
mutually exclusive market compositions, and these are the two cross hedges which 
are associated with the most significant reversals. However, as the composition of the 
spot index associated with cross hedge approaches that of the index underlying the 
futures contract, the reversals diminish in size. For instance, the reversal associated 
with the cross hedge between the Mid 250 contract and the FT Al l Share index is 
only a fi-action of the reversal associated with the cross hedge between the Mid 250 
contract and the FTSE 100 index. 
Fourthly, while EMG hedge ratios for high levels of risk aversion differ widely from 
the MVHR, they also have a tendency to become less volatile. In fact Lien and Luo's 
(1993) observation that the size of changes in the hedge ratio decrease as v increases, 
such that the optimal hedge ratio remains constant at high levels of v, are strongly 
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supported by the results in figure 4.4. However this finding of hedge ratio 
stabilisation at high levels of risk aversion is entirely consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings of the EMG coefficient, in the sense that as risk aversion increases, the 
hedge ratio determined within the EMG framework is being calculated with respect 
to an increasingly smaller subset of observations. Therefore, the potential for the 
hedge ratio to change is severely constrained. 
Fifthly, tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that changes in the optimal hedge ratio result in 
significant variations in the levels of expected returns and risk reduction associated 
with the hedged portfolio. Changes in the mean returns on the hedged portfolios 
associated with the MVHR sfrategy are compared to those associated with the EMG 
strategy, where v=80. In relation to the FTSE 100 index, the FTSE 250 index, the 
FTSE 350 index, FT A l l Share index and the FTIT index, hedging using the FTSE 
100 confract results in changes in mean returns of 154%, -22%, 45%, 29.3% and 
12% respectively, while the Mid 250 contract results in changes of 13%i, -18%, -3%, 
-2% and -11% respectively. It is clear that for all hedged portfolios comprising the 
FTSE 100 contract mean returns improve as risk aversion increases, with the 
exception of the cross hedge consisting of the Mid 250 index. In the case of hedged 
portfolios comprising of the Mid 250 contract, mean returns are a decreasing fimction 
of risk aversion in all cases. 
While the risk reduction potential of the minimum variance and EMG approaches are 
not strictly comparable, given that the reduction in the dispersion of returns is 
measured by changes in the standard deviation within the minimum variance 
approach, and by changes in the extended mean Gini coefficient within the EMG 
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framework, nonetheless considering the differences may provide some useful 
insights into differences in hedging behaviour. It is clear from tables 4.3 and 4.4 that 
the degree of risk reduction achieved by both confracts in relation to all spot 
portfolios is substantial, for all levels of risk aversion. Even so, while the MVHR and 
the standard mean Gini hedge ratio (i.e. v=2) reduce very similar quantities of risk, as 
would be expected given the similarities in their portfolio concenfration functions 
(see figure 4.3), there are significant differences in terms of the degree of risk 
reduction achieved from using the EMG approach at both low and high levels of risk 
aversion. Even more interesting, when comparing the percentage risk reduction 
achieved from using the EMG approach at both low and high levels of risk aversion, 
important differences exist regarding the effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
contracts with respect to the five spot portfolios. At low levels of risk aversion the 
pattern identified in chapter three is evident, whereby the FTSE 100 contract 
provides the most effective hedge for spot indexes comprising of high capitalisation 
stocks and the Mid 250 confract provides the most effective hedge for spot indexes 
comprising of medium or low capitalisation stocks. However, at high levels of risk 
aversion (v=80) the Mid 250 contract is a more effective hedge for all the spot 
portfolios. For example, in relation to the FTSE 100 index. Mid 250 index, FTSE 
350 index, FT Al l Share index and FT Investment Trust Index, where v=80, the 
FTSE 100 contract achieves risk reduction levels of 66.4%, 39.4%, 61.1%, 60.9% 
and 56.1%) respectively, while the Mid 250 contract achieves risk reduction of 
67.6%), 74.1%, 74%, 75.9% and 64.8% respectively. This is a very important result 
since it indicates that even in the case where the portfolio to be hedged is the FTSE 
100 index, strongly risk averse investors who are only concerned with reducing their 
exposure to the worst return realisations, would be better hedged using the Mid 250 
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contract than the FTSE 100 confract. This finding demonsfrates that the new contract 
has a very important role to play as a UK hedging vehicle. 
4.6) CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the hedging and cross hedging effectiveness of both the FTSE 100 
contract and the Mid 250 confract have been examined within the extended mean 
Gini framework. Unlike the minimum variance approach, the extended mean Gini 
approach is consistent with the rules of stochastic dominance and offers greater 
flexibility in determining the optimal hedge ratio by allowing for differentiated risk 
aversion in the hedging model. While the application of Gini coefficients to financial 
theory has been a relatively recent development, they have provided usefiil tools for 
investors by ensuring that portfolio prospects are ranked according to the expected 
utility maximisation criterion. 
Consistent with the findings from previous studies the results contained in this 
chapter show that in spite of significant differences in the risk-return profiles of the 
spot and futures series, all appear to be normally distributed. This finding is 
reinforced by the fact that for the majority of the hedged portfolios the mean variance 
approach and mean Gini approach produce almost identical results. However, once 
account is taken for the extended mean Gini approach, the hedge ratio at high levels 
of risk aversion are very different from those at low levels of risk aversion. Hence, 
the mean variance and mean Gini approaches generate hedge ratios that are 
inappropriate for the highly risk averse investor. Comparing the behaviour of direct 
and cross hedges, while direct hedges were found to be a monotonic fiinction of risk 
aversion, the relationship between the behaviour of cross hedges and risk aversion 
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was found to be characterised by reversals. The reversals are most significant where 
the market composition of the futures contract and the spot portfolio to be hedged are 
exclusive. Examples of such cases include cross hedges between the FTSE 100 
contract and Mid 250 index, and the Mid 250 confract and the FTSE 100 index. The 
results indicate that cross hedges may be more sensitive to changes in risk aversion 
than direct hedges. 
The degree of risk reduction achieved by both contracts is considerable at all levels 
of risk aversion. At low levels of risk aversion the pattern identified in chapter three 
is also evident, where the FTSE 100 contract provides the most effective hedge for 
stock indexes comprising of large capitalisation stocks and the Mid 250 contract 
provides the most effective hedge for stock indexes comprising of medium and low 
capitalisation stocks. However, at the highest levels of risk aversion, although the 
hedger does have to sacrifice greater mean returns than would be the case when using 
the FTSE 100 contract, the Mid 250 contract provides the most effective hedge for all 
the spot indexes considered. Hence, the results from this chapter support the view 
that the Mid 250 contract has an important role to perform as an additional hedging 
instrument. 
The evidence presented in relation to the hedging effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and 
Mid 250 confracts in chapters three and four raises important questions regarding the 
pricing efficiency of both contract. The results show that the Mid 250 contract does 
not generally track its underlying spot market as effectively as the FTSE 100 contract 
and this might indicate that deviations from fair value are likely to be more prevalent 
for the Mid 250 contract than for the FTSE 100 contract. Therefore, the pricing 
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efficiency of both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts is an important issue, 
especially when considering that greater arbiti-age is likely to result in improved 
tracking and convergence between the spot and fixtures markets, and in doing so it 
raises the risk bearing capacity of these markets. The pricing efficiency of both these 
confracts and the potential for index arbifrage is examined in chapter five. This work 
is extended in chapter six with an investigation into the profitability of intramarket 
and intermarket spread trading. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
S T O C K INDEX FUTURES PRICING: EVIDENCE R E L A T I N G TO THE 
F T S E 100 AND F T S E MID 250 STOCK INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS 
5.1) INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two it was argued that an investigation into the pricing efficiency of index 
fiitures confracts is an integral part of any stiidy investigating the economics of stock 
index futures trading. In this respect, the pricing efficiency of these contiacts is 
sfrongly related to the work conducted into hedging effectiveness in chapters three 
and four. For example, increased arbitrage activity serves to improve the fracking 
between spot and fiitures markets, and in doing so improves hedging effectiveness. In 
this chapter pricing efficiency is considered in relation to both the FTSE 100 and Mid 
250 contracts. 
Concern has long been expressed about the wide price anomalies that have existed 
between stock index fiitures prices and their underlying spot market price, and the 
obvious implications for market efficiency. The pricing of index fiitures confracts is 
an empirical issue which is of interest to academics, market practitioners and 
regulators alike. Arbitrage occurs whenever a security sells for two different prices in 
two different markets. An arbitrage fransaction involves the purchase of the security 
in the market where the lower price exists and the near simultaneous sale of the same 
security in the market with the higher price. Two consequences of the arbifrage 
transaction are the near riskless earnings of abnormal profit and the rapid elimination 
of any price discrepancies between the two markets. Hence the absence of any 
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arbifrage opportunities is a necessary condition for market efficiency. 
An important benefit of stock index arbitrage is that it ensures more accurate fracking 
between the stock and futures markets than might otherwise be the case. This in turn 
can lead to improved hedging effectiveness. Lien (1992) demonstrates how arbitrage 
behaviour and hedging behaviour within a portfolio framework mutually 
complement each other: 
"imposition of the no-arbifrage conditions improves the correlation 
between spot and fiitures prices, which increases hedging 
effectiveness. Thus, the no-arbitrage conditions and the risk 
minimising approach to hedging can be viewed as an integrated 
system of analysis." (1992, p. 587). 
While the pricing of index futures confracts has been thoroughly researched for both 
US and Asian markets, this issue has been less well investigated in the UK 
(exceptions include Yadav and Pope (1990) and Strickland and Xu (1992)). This is 
surprising, because although the regulatory and institutional framework of UK 
markets have a tendency to complicate arbifrage activity, index arbifrage constitutes 
a significant portion of UK index futures open interest (De Santos (1995)). 
Furthermore, while index arbitrage has been discouraged in US markets, this is not 
the case for the UK: 
"the existence of wide pricing anomalies between the cash and 
derivative markets demonsfrates the need for the London markets to 
Page 193 
encourage techniques, such as index arbitiage which help to provide 
convergence in these markets so that an efficient means of risk 
transfer can be achieved" (fritemational Stock Exchange(1987), p. 44) 
While research into the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 confract has been 
forthcoming, to date no work has been published on the pricing efficiency of the Mid 
250 confract. The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the pricing efficiency 
of the Mid 250 index fiitures contract, and additionally to ascertain whether the 
introduction of this contract has had any discernible impact on the pricing efficiency 
of the FTSE 100 confract. However, consistent with the established literature, other 
related empirical issues wil l also be examined. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, theoretical issues such as the 
pricing of index fiitures contracts and the derivation of the no-arbifrage condition wil l 
be considered. Additionally, consideration wil l be given to the issue of transaction 
costs and the determinants of the size of the arbitrage window, within which 
profitable arbitrage is precluded. In section 5.3, the empirical investigation will be 
outlined. In section 5.4, data and methodological issues wil l be presented. In section 
5.5, the empirical findings wil l be reported. Finally, in section 5.6 concluding 
remarks wil l be made. 
5.2) T H E O R E T I C A L ISSUES 
In a perfect capital market stock index fiitiires confracts can be replicated through 
positions in the underlying stock market index and the riskless asset. The "fair price" 
of the index fiitures contract can be shown to be equal to the price of the underlying 
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basket of stocks plus the cost of carrying the spot index between the current date 
(time t) and the contract expiration date (time T) of the index futures contract. 
Generally, for futures contracts, the "carrying costs" of the underlying asset are 
comprised of interest payments and storage costs minus the convenience yield from 
holding the spot asset. In the context of index futures, storage costs are zero and the 
convenience yield equates to the dividend payments on the underlying stocks which 
the holder of the index futures contract is forced to give up. Therefore: 
"the futures price equals the deferred value of the current stock 
price minus the deferred value of the dividends that wil l be paid 
over the contract period" (Cornell and French (1983a), p. 4). 
The theoretical or fair price of a stock index futures confract is determined on the 
assumption that spot markets are frictionless, where there are no taxes or transaction 
costs, where all participants have equal access to the risk free rate of interest and 
trade at mid-prices, and can be expressed as: 
5=1 
Where is the theoretical or fair price of the index futures confract at time t with 
expiration date of T; I , is the price of the underlying stock index at time t; r is the 
risk free rate of interest; Y)^^^ is the daily dividends (measured in terms of index units) 
payable on the underlying stock index at time t+s; T-t is the number of days 
remaining until contract expiration. 
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Where the actual futures price (F^T) deviates from the theoretical fair price (FP^T) the 
potential for stock index arbifrage exists and there is the possibility for the 
arbitrageur to generate risk free profits by simuUaneously taking positions in both the 
spot and fiitures markets. The arbitrage opportunity is eliminated, and equality 
between the stock and futures market is restored by increasing the demand for the 
underpriced asset and increasing the supply of the overpriced asset. Where the 
futures contract is overpriced, the arbifrageur initiates the following arbitrage 
transactions. At time t, the arbitrageur sells one futures contract and simultaneously 
borrows an amount equivalent to one unit of the stock index I, at the riskless rate of 
interest over the time t to maturity T to purchase the underlying basket of shares. For 
the index constituents going ex dividend over this period, all dividends (which are 
known with certainty and received at time period t + s, where t + s < T) are invested 
T-t 
at the riskless rate of interest and generate a cash flow ^-D,+j e'^ ^ ' by T. At 
maturity, the arbitrageur sells the stock index, and closes out his futures position, 
resulting in a cash flow of 1^  - It and Fj.- respectively. Using the sum of the 
proceeds from these fransactions, together with funds arising from dividend related 
investments, the arbitrageur repays the loan e'^^''^ taken out at time t. This 
strategy generates arbitrage profits because the current value of the futures confract is 
greater than the deferred value of the stock index minus the cost of carrying the index 
over the period until maturity. 
Alternatively, if the futures contract is underpriced, the arbifrageur initiates the 
following arbitrage sfrategy. At time t, the arbifrageur buys one futures confract and 
simultaneously sells the underlying basket of stocks short, lending the proceeds from 
Page 196 
the sale, an amount I„ at the riskless rate of interest over the period to maturity. For 
the index constituents going ex dividend over this period the arbitrageur pays the 
broker from whom the stock has been borrowed all the dividends accruing on the 
respective dividend payment date, using further funds borrowed at the riskless rate of 
interest. This results in an outstanding debt at maturity of the amount 
T-t 
Y^D^^s ^'^^ ' • At maturity, the arbitrageur receives an amount / , e'^ '^  as 
repayment for the loan made at time t, which he uses to repurchase the stock index, 
and closes out his futures position, resuhing in two further cash flow of - I, and 
Fj - Fj j respectively. Finally, the arbitrageur completes the transaction by returning 
the stock to the broker from whom it was borrowed at time t, together with an 
T-t 
amount ^-D(+, e'^ ^^  ' in repayment for the dividend related liability created at 
time t. This strategy generates arbifrage profits because the current value of the 
futures contract is less than the deferred value of the stock index minus the cost of 
carrying the index over the period until maturity. 
In practice the futures price has the potential to deviate from the theoretical fair price 
without inducing any arbifrage activity because of fransactions costs. Brenner, 
Subrahmanyan and Uno (1989a) identify six components to the round-trip 
transactions costs associated with an index arbitrage transaction. These are i) an 
equity market commission associated with frading the underlying basket of stocks; ii) 
a securities fransfer tax paid when the stocks are sold (i.e. stamp duty); iii) a market 
impact cost from trading the stocks; iv) a futures market commission for frading 
futures contracts; v) a market impact cost from trading futures contracts; vi) the cost 
of borrowing the stocks when the stock in the spot index are sold short. Once 
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transaction costs are taken into account, the relationship between the futures confract 
and the underlying stock index is characterised not by a fair price but rather a fair 
range of prices that lie within an arbitrage window (or band) around the fair price, 
within which arbitrage is not profitable. Hence, the futures price can move freely 
within these limits without inducing arbifrage trades. The upper and lower limits of 
the arbitrage window are represented by equations 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
T-t 
-t-s) 5.2) 
T-l 5.3) 
s=l 
Where refers to the upper transactions cost limit of the arbifrage window, and C" 
refers to the lower fransactions cost limit of the arbifrage window. Both and C" are 
expressed as a proportion of the spot index for consistency with the other 
determinants of the arbifrage window. 
The no-arbitrage condition relevant to the pricing of index futures confracts is 
illustrated in figure 5.1. The upper fransaction cost limit in figure 5.1 illustrates that 
only where the futures price exceeds the fair price (equation 5.1) by more than the 
amount implied by will it be profitable to initiate an overpricing sfrategy, by 
buying stock and selling futures confracts. The lower fransaction cost limit in figure 
5.1 also illustrates that only where the fair price exceeds the futures price by more 
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than the amount implied by C" will it be profitable to initiate an underpricing sfrategy 
by selling stock and buying futures confracts. 
Index arbitrage operates slightly differently within each exchange, due to the 
different institutional and regulatory frameworks that underpin each financial cenfre. 
However, within each exchange several distinct categories of arbifrageur can be 
identified, each of whom is exposed to different degrees of arbifrage risk. This results 
in an arbitrage window of varying size. According to Mackinlay and Ramaswamy 
(1988) "the width of the band would be dictated by the most favourably situated 
arbifrageurs" (p. 138). The most favourably placed group of arbifrageurs are the 
member firms, who conduct index arbitrage in-house with their own market makers, 
frading index stocks most cost effectively. Less well favoured arbifrageurs such as 
institutional investors are exposed to a broader arbifrage window. 
Although fransaction costs are the most important determinant of the size of the 
arbitrage window, there are also various other factors which interfere with the pricing 
mechanism underpinning the relationship between the stock index and futures 
contract, and have the potential to alter the width of the arbifrage window. Factors 
which lead to a widening of the arbifrage window are now discussed: 
i) unanticipated changes in dividend payments are a potential source of arbifrage risk. 
While the fair value formula assumes that dividends are known with certainty, actual 
dividend flows do in fact fluctuate over the life of the confract, which can have the 
effect of increasing the width of the arbifrage window. However, by employing the 
contract which is closest to maturity any misspecification of dividend payments can 
be minimised: 
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ii) the forward pricing model (equation 5.1) strictly applies only to the pricing of 
forward contracts, and it is only applicable to futures confracts where the interest rate 
is non stochastic. The differences between forward and futures confracts are 
discussed by Cox, frigersoU and Ross (1981). The imphcation of this result is that 
unanticipated interest rate earnings or charges which arise from tail risk are ignored, 
leading to differences between the forward and futures price (Klemkosky and Lee 
(1991)). 
iii) a lack of arbitrage capital results in futures prices deviating from thefr fair value 
beyond the limits imposed by transactions costs for sustained periods of time without 
triggering an arbitrage response. Sofianos (1991) argues that when faced with capital 
consfraints the arbitrageur has to selectively decide whether a profitable arbifrage 
opportunity is worth pursuing: 
"When capital constraints bind, the opportimity cost of an 
arbitrage trade is the subsequent profitable mispricing that cannot 
be exploited because of the lack of arbifrage capital" (p. 205). 
Sofianos (1991) argues that in the presence of capital consfraints arbitrage becomes 
"an art rather than a science" (p. 205). 
iv) regulatory constraints which limit the arbitrageur's ability to sell stocks short 
have tended to extend the lower bound of the no arbifrage condition leading to an 
asymmetrical arbitrage window. The practice of short selling is outlawed on many 
exchanges, but where it is permitted its use is restiicted by strict regulatory 
requirements (e.g. Uptick rule in the US). 
v) differences in the taxable status of investors holding positions in the stock and 
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fiitures market have been suggested as possible explanations for futures confracts 
trading at a discount. Cornell and French (1983a) show that the relationship between 
the price of an index futures confract and its underlying stock index is complicated 
by the tax timing option which has impUcations for the size of the arbifrage window. 
Cornell and French demonstrate that stock holders, unlike the holders of futures 
contracts are able to reduce their tax exposure by realising capital losses and 
deferring capital gains: 
"A trader who is long in the stock receives not only the cash flows 
from the equivalent futures portfolio, but also the opportunity to 
defer any capital gains taxes" (1983a, p. 9) 
The relative attractiveness associated with holding stock for taxable purposes has a 
tendency to extend the lower limit of the arbifrage window. 
vi) when initiating the stock side of the arbifrage fransaction, trading the entire basket 
of stocks comprising the stock portfolio can be expensive and difficult to 
simuhaneously execute, where the number of market constituents is large. To counter 
this problem traders have often undertaken a "near" arbitrage transaction where they 
frade a surrogate basket of stocks which consists of a subset of the stocks in the stock 
index. While attempts to replicate the stock index using a liquid basket of stocks 
minimises the market impact costs of the fransaction, such a procedure also 
introduces tracking risk, which arises from an imperfect relationship between the 
stock index and the surrogate basket of stocks. 
vii) Buhler and Kempf (1995) argue that since index arbifrage is a risky activity, an 
arbitrage response is not triggered as soon as the limits of the no-arbifrage are 
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violated, but rather arbifrageurs require an additional premium to compensate for the 
risk they incur. This results in the arbifrage window being wider than that which 
fransaction costs alone would imply. 
Alternatively, the are also factors which lead to a narrowing of the arbifrage window 
and encourage an arbitrage response while prices remain within transaction cost 
limits. For instance: 
i) Gould (1988) argues that specific circumstances may enable fraders to initiate 
arbitrage frades at very low transaction costs. Where institutional investors have 
already decided to undertake a tactical asset allocation decision and aher their 
exposure to equities, these changes are often implemented through futures trading, 
rather than trading in the underlying stock. 
ii) arbitrage trading is often a dynamic rather than a static process, where arbifrageurs 
may decide to close out their positions before maturity, *or roll-over their positions 
until a later expiration date. As Merrick (1989) argues, the options to early imwind 
and roll-over positions explain why arbitrage activity can be active even while prices 
are still within transaction cost limits. 
iii) other derivative assets such as put and call options on the market index, provide 
new arbitrage possibilities. Gould (1988) demonstrates that a long futures position 
can be synthesised by a long call and a short put position. Such financial engineering 
reduces transaction costs and results in a narrowing of the arbitrage window. 
iv) Yadav and Pope (1990) point out that specific exemption clauses also exist for 
certain categories of arbifrageurs. For instance, in the U K only equity market makers 
are exempt from stamp duty levied at 0.5% on stock sales. 
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Consistent with Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) and Yadav and Pope (1990), 
deviations from the theoretical fair value derived in equation 6.1 are examined by 
testing for the presence of any mispricing. The mispricing series (MJ measures the 
difference between the actual futures price (F^^) and its theoretical fair price at time t. 
5.4) 
M, = 
The mispricing series is normalised by dividing any futures mispricing by the value 
of the spot index {!{) underlying the futures confract, because all the major 
determinants of the limits of the arbitrage window should be proportional to the 
index. The mispricing series represents the potential profit from stock index 
arbifrage. 
As previously outlined, the simple buy and hold fransaction involves initiating an 
arbitrage position and holding the position to confract maturity at which point they 
are reversed. A simple arbitrage strategy is feasible whenever the absolute size of any 
mispricing is sufficient to exceed the fransaction cost limits (i.e. M, > C) of the 
arbifrage window. Where the mispricing is positive the futures confract is deemed 
overpriced, and providing the extent of mispricing exceeds the upper fransaction 
costs (i.e. Ff^j > F P \ j ) then there is the potential for profitable arbifrage, by 
undertaking a short futures arbitrage position. Alternatively, where the mispricing is 
negative the futures contract is deemed underpriced, and providing the extent of 
mispricing exceeds lower fransaction costs limit (i.e. < FP",j) of the arbitrage 
window then there is the potential for profitable arbifrage, by undertaking a long 
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futures arbitrage position. By definition, since at maturity both the deferred interest 
accruing on the stock index and the cost of carrying the stock index are equal to zero, 
the price of the futures contract and the price of the index are identical, and the 
mispricing series (M) must converge to zero. 
While the simple buy and hold sfrategy assumes that arbifrage positions are held until 
maturity, changes in the behaviour of the mispricing series over the life of the 
contract, together with the possibility of mispricing reversals have given arbifrageurs 
the option to unwind position early or roll over positions to the next confract. A 
mispricing reversal occurs where the initial mispricing is reversed and a mispricing 
occurs in the opposite direction. For instance, the futures confract switches from 
being overpriced (or underpriced) to being underpriced (or overpriced). Merrick 
(1989) considers the desirability of early and delayed unwinding index arbifrage 
sfrategies. 
The option to unwind an arbitrage frade early enables the arbitrageur to liquidate his 
position at some point before maturity and capture spot-futures mispricings arising at 
opposite ends of the arbitrage window. Since arbitrage returns are accumulated at the 
point when the trade is both initiated and liquidated arbifrage profits exceed those 
associated with the basic buy and hold strategy, and result in arbifrage capital being 
used more effectively. Encouraging the use of the early unwinding option also 
reduces the concenfration of arbifrage transactions at maturity, which are thought to 
sfrongly contribute to an increase in market volatility at expiration (Stoll and Whaley 
(1987)). Furthermore, arbitrageurs who have previously established an arbitrage 
position in response to an initial mispricing also have the opportunity to exploit any 
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subsequent mispricing reversal at substantially lower fransaction costs than an 
arbitrageur who is venturing into the market for the first time. As Merrick (1989) 
argues: 
"the transaction cost discounts implicit in early unwindings helps 
explain why arbifrage activity can be heavy even when market 
prices are within transaction cost bounds" (p. 109). 
The opportunity for the arbitrageur to unwind early may result in any mispricing 
reversal being eliminated before the opposite limit of the arbifrage window is 
violated. 
Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) argue that this tendency for arbifrageurs to 
unwind positions early following a profitable mispricing reversal, introduces path 
dependence into the mispricing series. With path dependence the behaviour of the 
mispricing series in the future will be influenced by the behaviour of this series in the 
past. For instance, where mispricing has been sufficient to exceed the limits of the 
arbitrage window in the past and induce an arbifrage response, the early unwinding 
option should be sufficient to preclude any significant reverse mispricing in the 
opposite direction. In other words, once the upper (lower) limit of the arbitrage 
window has been broken, it is unlikely that the lower (upper) limit of the arbitrage 
window will be violated. Path dependence in the mispricing series is illustrated in 
figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 shows that the fuUires confract is initially sfrongly underpriced 
but over the life of the contract mispricing is reversed at times, and the contract 
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becomes overpriced. However, once the mispricing is reversed some of the arbifrage 
position taken while the confract was underpriced are unwound prematurely, 
inducing a second mispricing reversal and forcing mispricing back to being 
overpriced. The key point being that mispricing in the past will have an important 
bearing on the direction of mispricing in the future. Therefore, once the mispricing 
series has violated one of the limits of the arbifrage window, it is less likely to violate 
the other limit of the arbifrage window. 
The delayed unwinding (or roll over) strategy involves replacing the original futures 
position with a position in the next nearest to maturity confract at the initial confract 
maturity date, while leaving the stock side of the original arbitrage transaction intact. 
Merrick (1989) demonsfrates that the delayed unwinding option exists where the 
direction of the mispricing in the next nearest to maturity contract is the same as the 
initial mispricing. This option is profitable where the magnitude of mispricing in the 
next nearest to maturity contract is sufficiently greater than the initial mispricing to 
offset the additional fransaction costs which arise in the futures markets. Merrick also 
discusses the possibility of combining the early unwinding and rollover options. 
Where the original mispricing has been reversed, but mispricing in the next nearest to 
maturity confract remains in the same direction as the original mispricing, combining 
an early unwinding and roll over strategy will be profitable providing the difference 
in mispricing is in excess of the additional fransaction costs. The rolling over option 
is concerned with the relative prices between two futures confracts, and this 
relationship is examined in greater detail by considering the issue of inframarket 
spread frading in chapter six. 
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It is clear that the behaviour of the mispricing series as confract maturity approaches 
has important implications for the success of the early unwindmg and roll over 
sfrategies. Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) argue that the mispricing series is 
systematically related to the length of time remaining before the contract expiration 
date. It is reasonable to assume that because interest rate and dividend uncertainty 
decline as the contract approaches expiration, the mispricing series will do likewise. 
This is a directly testable hypothesis and will be considered as part of an empirical 
investigation into the pricing efficiency of the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 confracts in 
section 5.3. 
5.3) EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Stock index arbitrage in the U K is considerably more difficuh to implement than in 
other markets owing to specific technical and structural differences which impede 
trading in equity and futures markets. In the U K index arbifrage has been positively 
encouraged owing to concern over the wide pricing differences which have been 
found to exist between spot and futures markets. The presence of greater arbitrage 
activity is likely to results in improved tracking and convergence between these 
markets, and so provides a more efficient means of risk fransfer. 
The major constraint on the level of arbitrage activity in the U K is fransactions costs. 
Transactions costs include expUcit commissions paid to take positions and market 
impact, which results in adverse price changes when buying or selling institutional 
size positions. The market impact effects are typically much larger. Table 1.3 (page 
14) shows the breakdown of round trip transaction costs facing arbifrageurs who 
wish to execute index arbifrage strategies in relation to the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 
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contracts. Transaction costs consist of the size of the bid-offer spreads in stock and 
futures markets, stamp duty and stock and futures markets commissions. The 
differences in the size of the bid-offer spread in stock and futures markets are far 
larger for the Mid 250 than the F T S E 100, and are attributable to lower liquidity in 
both the Mid 250 stock and futures markets, hi the U K , different categories of 
arbifrageurs can be identified, each characterised by a different level of fransactions 
costs. The transaction costs of the most favourably placed arbifrageur determines the 
width of the arbifrage window and the degree to which the futures price can deviate 
from its theoretical value before triggering a profitable arbitrage opportunity. Equity 
market makers who are responsible for ensuring effective frading in each of the index 
constituents are exempt from stamp duty and equity commissions and are able to 
frade at the bid or offer price, and are therefore better placed to execute arbitrage 
transactions than institutional investors. Estimates of fransactions costs in table 1.3 
indicate that market makers typically operate with transactions costs of 0.75% and 
1.41% for the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 markets respectively, while instiUitional 
investors typically operate with transactions costs of 1.59% and 2.31% respectively. 
However, these estimates are still likely to imderstate true fransaction costs, 
especially for the Mid 250 market, owing to the difficulties in assessing the actual 
market impact cost of the fransaction. As Lovell and Amott (1989) argue: 
"Transaction costs take on the character of an iceberg. 
Commissions rise above the surface, visible to all. The submerged 
leviathan encompasses the market impact of trades and the 
imponderable cost of the trades that never happened" (p. 1) 
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Additionally, an examination of transaction costs alone overlooks the more serious 
technical and structural difficulties which inhibit index arbitrage in tiie UK. Specific 
technical problems which impede arbitrage trading in the U K are those of execution 
risk, tracking risk and convergence risk. While all of these problem are not unique to 
the U K , these difficulties often manifest themselves more acutely than on other 
exchanges. Execution risk arises because profitable mispricings last for only very 
short periods of time and without an automatic execution facility such as Super DOT, 
as in the US, the equity side of an arbifrage fransaction has to be broken down into 
numerous orders for individual stocks. Assembling the equity side of the arbifrage 
transaction manually is both cumbersome and time consuming and severely 
consfrains the arbitrageur's ability to respond to a mispricing opportunity, given that 
favourable price differentials are often rapidly reversed. The problem of execution 
risk is most serious for large broad based indexes such as the Mid 250 which are 
characterised by a large number of illiquid constituents and where rapid frading in 
these stocks as part of a basket is extremely difficult. 
To alleviate the problem of execution risk index arbifrageurs frequently employ only 
a liquid subset of the total number of individual stocks. Sofianos (1993) found for the 
US , that on average arbifrageurs completed the equity side of the fransaction using a 
surrogate basket comprising of just over half of the underlying index constituents. 
While the practice of using a subset of stocks minimises market impact effects and 
speeds up execution, it results in greater tracking risk given that the arbifrageur's 
equity and futures positions no longer move in "lockstep". 
In the U K uncertainty surrounding both the final settiement price of the index futiires 
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contract (i.e. EDSP) and the corresponding index value at expiration gives rise to 
convergence risk. In the US arbitrageurs are able to close out positions at expiration 
by issuing market-on-open or market-on-close orders and so guarantee complete 
convergence between the price of their equity and futures positions at expiration. 
However, in the UK the futures settlement price at expiration is an average of the 
median values in the last minutes before expiration. In addition, the UK's equity 
market is a quote-driven market' whereby the index value at maturity is based on the 
weighted average of the mid-touch prices of the market constituents, a price at which 
arbitrageurs are unable to trade. Furthermore, due to the quote-driven nature of the 
market, the price of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 indexes can change when market 
makers adjust their views, even though no trading has taken place. As a consequence 
of these distinct institutional features, arbitrageurs in the UK are unable to unwind 
their positions at expiration with complete certainty. 
While for simplicity it is often assumed that both boundaries of the arbitrage window 
are of equal width, in actual fact the upper boundary is smaller in size than the lower 
boundary giving rise to an asymmetric arbitrage window. The asymmetry arises 
because of the restrictions which prohibit non-market makers from short selling 
stocks. For instance, when the futures contract is trading below its theoretical values 
arbitrageurs are required to go long in futures and short in stock. In order to go short 
in stock institutional investors who do not possess the stock in their portfolio are 
required to incur the costs of borrowing the stock, with the resulting widening of the 
lower arbitrage window. Finally, compared to markets in the US, UK markets are 
subject to more severe capital constraints given that the range of market participants 
is rather limited. 
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Owing to the unique institutional structure of the UK's equity and index futures 
markets, it seems reasonable to expect that equity market makers are likely to be the 
only effective arbitrageurs. Of the two UK index futures contracts it seems likely that 
mispricing may well be larger for the Mid 250 contract than the FTSE 100 contract, 
owing to the illiquid nature of the Mid 250 stocks, but after allowing for the larger 
transaction costs in this market it is not clear whether any mispricing will translate 
into profitable arbitrage opportunities. Whether index arbitrage in the UK is 
profitable is an empirical question which wil l subsequently be investigated. 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate the pricing efficiency of and 
the potential for profitable index arbitrage in the context of UK index futures 
markets. Specifically, the following issues will be examined: 
• this chapter provides the first empirical evaluation of the pricing efficiency of the 
Mid 250 index futures contract. Additionally, a comparison wil l be made with the 
pricing efficiency of the well established FTSE 100 contract. It is important that 
both contracts be efficiently priced to enable investors to gain effective exposure 
to the UK equity market. 
• for the FTSE 100 contract only, mispricing is compared across different maturity 
contracts to test for any significant differences. It is not possible to consider this 
issue with respect to the Mid 250 contract, since trading volume is non-existent 
over much of the trading life of the next nearest to maturity contract. However, 
with respect to the FTSE 100 contract it is reasonable to expect that mispricing 
wi l l be greater in the next nearest to maturity contract owing to the greater 
Page 213 
arbitrage risk associated with a contract further from maturity. 
• the ex post profitability of index arbitrage for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
contracts is examined by testing for transaction costs violations associated with 
different categories of arbitrageurs. 
• the behaviour of the mispricing series for both confracts is investigated to 
determine whether mispricing is systematically related to the length of time to 
contract expiration. Such a finding would have important implications for the 
profitabiUty of the early and delayed unwinding strategies. 
• the issue of persistence in mispricing is considered for both the FTSE 100 and 
Mid 250 contracts, with evidence of persistence indicating that current mispricing 
is strongly related to past mispricing. 
• by employing ARMA modelling techniques, the autoregressive processes 
imderlying the mispricing time series of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts are 
identified and estimated. 
5.4) DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The stock index and index futures data relates to the daily closing and settlement 
prices respectively. While it has been the practice in recent studies to use infra-daily 
transactions data to test for index futures pricing inefficiencies, the very low levels of 
trading volume on the Mid 250 contract preclude the use of infra-daily data. 
Although the use of daily data wil l fail to detect any mispricing which occurs during 
the course of the day and can only be suggestive of actual arbifrage opportunities, 
nonetheless the findings should provide a meaningful comparison of the pricing 
efficiency of the two contracts, together with an indication of the width of the 
arbitrage window. The sample covers the ten confracts over the period March 1994 
Page 214 
(following the introduction of the Mid 250 contract)^ to September 1996, which 
consists of 634 observations. For both index futures contract the analysis 
concentrates on the contract nearest to maturity, which is the most heavily traded, 
and is rolled over to the next contract on the expiration day. However, when 
comparing mispricing between contracts of different maturity, attention is also given 
to the next nearest to maturity contract. 
In computing the mispricing series, estimates are required for the daily interest rate 
and dividend payments associated with the underlying spot index. The UK treasury 
bill is chosen as an appropriate proxy for the interest rate. However, given that the 
maturity date associated with the treasury bill does not correspond with the maturity 
date on the respective futures contracts, the interest rate series is estimated through 
linear interpolation by combining a weighted average of both the one and three 
month rates. 
Actual daily dividend payments^ are used to calculate the theoretical futures price. In 
the UK, because companies make dividend payments more than once a year and as 
much as four times a year, there is less lumpiness in dividend flows compared to 
other European index futures contracts such as the DAX or MIB-30, where dividend 
payment are found to be characterised by a strong seasonal component (Bengali and 
Rattray (1996)). Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate dividend payments for the FTSE 100 
and Mid 250 indexes respectively. They confirm that UK companies pay dividends 
throughout the year, although dividend payments are larger than average during the 
months of March and August. 
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5.5) E M P I R I C A L R E S U L T S 
Consistent with Yadav and Pope (1990) and Strickland and Xu (1992) mispricing 
was examined by employing equation 5.4 and testing for deviations from the 
theoretical fair price. Significant deviations are suggestive of arbitrage opportunities 
and the triggering of an index arbitrage response. I f arbitrageurs are active in markets 
then their presence wil l serve to tie spot and futures markets together, and providing 
that both interest rates and dividends are non-stochastic, return variability wil l be the 
same in both markets, resulting in a variance ratio of unity. However, owing to 
differences in transaction costs between spot and futures markets, it is possible that 
information wil l be impounded more rapidly into the futures market than the spot 
market, and these changes are likely to manifest themselves in differences in retum 
variability. 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics relating to daily log returns for both the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 spot and futures markets. There are two interesting points to 
note. Firstly, over the whole sample period the standard deviation of returns in the 
futures market is greater than the standard deviation of returns in the spot market, 
with respect to both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250. The variance ratio statistic is 1.445 
for the FTSE 100 and 1.347 for the Mid 250, with both statistics being significant at 
the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the variance ratio statistic equals 
unity is rejected. This finding is consistent with Yadav and Pope (1990). Secondly, 
both on a contract by contract basis, and for the whole sample period, the standard 
deviation of returns associated with both the FTSE 100 spot and futures market are 
greater than those associated with the Mid 250 spot and futures market. For the 
Page 21S 
Table 5.1) 
Relative Volatility: 
Daily Returns on the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 Spot and Futures Markets* 
F T S E 100 Index Mid 250 Index 
Contract Spot Futures Spot Futures Obs. 
June 94 Mean -0,118 -0.119 -0.156 -0.161 61 
Max 1.654 2.042 0.853 1.051 
Min: -2.239 -2.568 -1.694 -1.926 
Stdev: 0.797 1.035 0.474 0.589 
VR 1.684 (0.046) 1.545 (0.095) 
Sept 94 Mean 0.042 0.041 0.050 0.040 64 
Max 1.922 2.384 1.025 1.281 
Min; -2.262 -2.449 -1.841 -1.717 
Stdev: 0.825 1.024 0.555 0.612 
VR 1.539 (0.089) 1.217 (0.438) 
Dec 94 Mean -0.070 -0.076 -0.102 -0.110 65 
Max 1.773 1.921 1.019 1.997 
Min: -1.677 -2.167 -1.606 -1.819 
Stdev: 0.892 1.075 0.538 0.730 
VR 1.452 (0.139) 1.842 (0.016) 
March 95 Mean 0.064 0.051 -0.022 -0.040 62 
Max 1.534 1.616 0.747 1.168 
Min: -1.372 -1.615 -1.987 -1.473 
Stdev: 0.694 0.848 0.462 0.549 
VR 1.492 (0.121) 1.409 (0.183) 
June 95 Mean 0.140 0.137 0.137 0.131 61 
Max 1.422 1.669 0.773 0.952 
Min: -1.283 -1.634 -0.632 -0.653 
Stdev: 0.549 0.648 0.297 0.348 
VR 1.394 (0.201) 1.373 (0.222) 
Sept 95 Mean 0.088 0.074 0.120 0.110 64 
Max 2.178 2.143 1.577 1.204 
Min: -2.099 -2.330 -1.037 -1.642 
Stdev: 0.642 0.762 0.380 0.453 
VR 1.407 (0.178) 1.418 (0.168) 
Dec 95 Mean 0.045 0.038 0.002 -0.014 65 
Max 1.415 1.946 0.979 1.013 
Min : -1.440 -1.891 -1.270 -1.264 
Stdev: 0.582 0.711 0.383 0.403 
VR 1.492 (0.103) 1.105 (0.692) 
March 96 Mean 0.004 -0.014 0.107 0.093 62 
Max 1.299 1.308 0.713 0.722 
Min : -1.285 -1.795 -0.962 -1.525 
Stdev: 0.617 0.699 0.342 0.387 
VR 1.281 (0.336) 1.282 (0.335) 
June 96 Mean 0.019 0.024 0.076 0.068 66 
Max 0.955 1.138 0.942 1.036 
Min: -1.433 -1.472 -0.780 -1.030 
Stdev: 0.542 0.611 0.321 0.352 
VR 1.269 (0.339) 1.199 (0.467) 
Sept 96 Mean 0.100 0.109 -0.008 -0.014 64 
Max 1.244 1.899 0.585 0.590 
Min: -1.801 -1.666 -2.134 -1.980 
Stdev: 0.586 0.640 0.479 0.475 
VR 1.193 (0.485) 0.981 (0.940) 
Total Mean 0.031 0.026 0.021 0.010 634 
Max 2.178 2.384 1.577 1.997 
Min: -2.262 -2.568 -2.134 -1.980 
Stdev: 0.682 0.820 0.439 0.509 
VR 1.445 (0.000) 1.347 (0.000) 
* The values in parentheses refer to the significance level of the F statistic calculated to test the equality of the variance in the 
spot and futures markets. Where the variance ratio statistic equates to the variance of the change in the log of futures price to 
the variance of the change in the log of the spot price. 
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whole sample, the standard deviation of returns are 0.682 and 0.439 respectively for 
the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 spot indexes and 0.820 and 0.509 respectively for the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 index futures contracts. The greater retum variability 
associated with the FTSE 100 in both spot and fiitures markets is consistent with the 
fact that the transactions costs associated with these market are substantially lower 
than those for the Mid 250 market, suggesting that information is more rapidly 
impounded into the prices of the FTSE 100 spot and futures markets. This findings is 
consistent with more efficient pricing in the FTSE 100 contract than the Mid 250 
contract. 
The daily mispricing series for both the near FTSE 100 and Mid 250 futures 
contracts over the period March 1994 to September 1996 are illustrated in figures 
5.5 and 5.6, and summarised in tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively". There are a number 
of important results to discuss. Firstly, while there are many deviations from fair 
value, both contracts appear to be quite efficiently priced, with mispricing for both 
contracts being generally constrained within the arbitrage limits of 0.5% and -1.0%. 
These results suggest that arbitrage opportunities are likely to be rare even for the 
most favourably placed arbitrageurs. Secondly, over the whole sample period neither 
contract frades at a chronic discount or premium. The FTSE 100 confract is 
overpriced on 290 (45.7%)) occasions and underpriced on 344 (54.3%)) occasions. The 
Mid 250 contract is overpriced on 305 (48.1%) occasions and underpriced on 329 
(51.9%o) occasions. However, in common with other newly introduced index futures 
contracts, the Mid 250 contract is priced at a rather severe discount to fair value in 
the period following its infroduction. This finding would seem to support Figlewski's 
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(1984b) argument that traders are reluctant to use an index futures confract while 
trading is still in its infancy. Thirdly, over the whole sample, the mean deviation for 
the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts is significantly negative, with values of-0.0302 
and -0.0505 respectively. Considering mean deviations on a confract by confract 
basis, the FTSE 100 is associated with four confracts that frade at a premium, and six 
contracts which trade at a discount, although only four confracts are significantly 
mispriced. While the Mid 250 is associated with six confracts which frade at a 
premium and four contracts which trade at a discount, of which all ten are 
significantly mispriced. These findings strongly suggest that the Mid 250 contract is 
the less efficiently priced than the FTSE 100 confract. Comparing the average 
absolute deviation for both futures provides further evidence of the greater pricing 
efficiency of the FTSE 100 confract. The average absolute deviation for the FTSE 
100 contract is 0.2007 compared with a value of 0.2619 for the Mid 250 confract. 
Interestingly, for the FTSE 100 confract both the average absolute deviation and 
standard deviation of mispricing have declined in magnitude over the sample period. 
These changes indicate that the extent to which prices on the FTSE 100 confract 
deviate from their equilibrium values has declined since the infroduction of the Mid 
250 confract. It seems reasonable to suggest, that equipping equity market makers 
and institutional investors with a valuable instrument through which they can achieve 
more efficient management of lower capitalisation stocks has freed capital and 
resources which have been employed to achieve more effective fracking on the FTSE 
100 contract. This would appear likely considering that one of the important 
functions of the Mid 250 contract in conjunction with the FTSE 100 confract is that 
of FT A l l Share Index replication. 
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Finally, both index futures confracts are characterised by frequent mispricing 
reversals. The mispricing series for the FTSE 100 confract is associated with 190 
reversals (19 reversals per confract), while the mispricing series for the Mid 250 
contract is associated with 145 reversal (14.5 reversals per contract). However, given 
the significance of mispricing reversals with respect to the early unwinding and 
rollover strategies, the extent to which the series oscillates is also important. 
Therefore, the final column in tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the number of reversals which 
occur where the respective mispricing series switch from being underpriced 
(overpriced) by an amount exceeding at least half of the cost of an arbifrage 
transaction, to being overpriced (underpriced) by an amount exceeding at least half of 
the cost the arbifrage transaction. This provides a more meaningful indicator of the 
potential for risky index arbifrage, which is undertaken when the mispricing series 
lies within fransaction cost limits. For the FTSE 100, the mispricing series violates 
both the ± 0.25% limits on only 25 occasions. While the Mid 250 mispricing series 
fails to violate ± 0.7% limits on any occasion. These findings indicate mispricing is 
quite strongly path dependent in both markets, and suggests that the risky arbifrage 
strategy is imlikely to be particularly valuable. 
We shall now consider whether there are any significant differences in mispricing 
between the near and deferred FTSE 100 confracts. The majority of the frading 
volume for the FTSE 100 contract is concenfrated in the nearest to maturity confract 
and it only begins to build up in the next nearest to maturity confract in the month 
before maturity. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that index futures pricing 
wi l l be more efficient in the nearest to maturity confract than the next nearest to 
maturity contract (henceforth the deferred contract). The daily mispricing series for 
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the deferred FTSE 100 is represented in figure 5.7 and table 5.4. Comparing the 
results in table 5.4 to those of the near contract in table 5.2 several interesting points 
can be identified. Firstly, considering the direction of mispricing, over the entire 
sample period the next nearest to maturity is overpriced on 419 (66.1%o) occasions 
and underpriced on 215 (33.9%) occasions, indicating that the next nearest to 
maturity contract trades at a premium to the nearest to maturity confract. In fact in 
every contract month, the number of positive observations is greater for the deferred 
confract than for the nearest to maturity contract. This finding suggests that research 
is required into the profitability of intramarket spread sfrategies using the near and 
deferred FTSE 100 contracts. Secondly, deviations from fair value are greater for the 
deferred contract than for the near confract over the sample period. The mean 
deviation over the entire sample is 0.0985, which is significant at the 1% level. On a 
contract by contract basis, eight contracts trade at a premium and two confracts trade 
at a discount, of which seven are significantly mispriced. Also the average absolute 
deviation of 0.2194 for the deferred confract is greater than that for the near confract. 
A l l of these findings suggest that the deferred contract is less efficiently priced than 
the near futures confract, and is consistent with less liquidity, and greater interest rate 
and dividend uncertainty for the confract further from maturity. Thirdly, over the 
entire sample period the frequency of mispricing reversals for the deferred contract 
are almost identical to the near contract, with 189 reversals. However, on a confract 
by contract basis the frequency of mispricing reversals varies widely between the 
near and deferred contract, indicating the possibility of profitable inframarket spread 
trading. 
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The implementation of an effective arbitrage strategy in relation to both the FTSE 
100 and Mid 250 contracts requires taking into account the costs of initiating the 
transaction for different categories of arbitrageurs. It is assumed that when the 
mispricing series violates a specific transaction cost threshold the arbitrageur takes 
the appropriate action in the spot and futures markets to exploit this perceived 
opportunity. However, the maximum and minimum mispricing levels reported m 
tables 5.2 and 5.3 for the nearest to maturity FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts 
respectively, suggest that arbitrage opportunities are likely to be rare and available 
only to favourably placed arbitrageurs. As was discussed earlier, the transactions 
costs associated with executing an arbitrage strategy involving the Mid 250 will be 
greatly in excess of those associated with executing a similar strategy involving the 
FTSE 100 (see table 1.3). However, to categorise mispricing with respect to different 
transaction cost limits, tables 5.5 and 5.6 report mispricing violations for transaction 
cost thresholds of 0.5%, 1.0% and 1.5% for the near FTSE 100 contract and Mid 250 
contract respectively. 
In relation to the transaction costs violations in both markets, the 0.5% transaction 
costs threshold is violated on 5.2% of occasions for FTSE 100 contract, and 14.2% of 
occasions for the Mid 250 contract, while the 1% transaction costs threshold is 
violated on just one occasion for the FTSE 100 contract and on 1% of occasions for 
the Mid 250 contract. In neither market is mispricing found to exceed 1.5%. By 
comparison, Yadav and Pope (1990) found that for the FTSE 100 contract the 0.5%, 
1% and 1.5% transaction cost limits were violated on 56%, 22% and 8% of occasions 
respectively. Given that the transactions cost limit for the Mid 250 contract is 
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estimated at 1.4%, it can be concluded that arbitrage opportunities are not found to 
exist for this contract. Additionally, at the 0.5% transactions cost threshold, for the 
FTSE 100 contract the majority of transactions cost violations are found to occur in 
the early part of the sample period and relate to the futures contract being 
underpriced. Such a mispricing would require a long arbitrage position involving 
selling stock and buying futures. Hov^ e^ver, owing to the restrictions associated with 
the short selling of stock in the UK, these opportunities would only be available to 
equity market makers or pension fund managers who are in possession of the full 
basket of stocks. 
Time Series Properties 
Previous studies have been interested in whether the mispricing series is 
systematically related to the length of time to the contract maturity date. Mackinlay 
and Ramaswamy (1988) argue that since arbitrage risk arismg from interest rate, 
dividend and tracking uncertainty falls as maturity approaches, mispricing is likely to 
be a positive function of the length of time to maturity. The length of time to 
expiration hypothesis is tested for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts on a contract 
by contract basis for fifteen weeks prior to maturity. In relation to equation 5.5, the 
absolute magnitude of mispricing is regressed against the number of days to contract 
maturity. 
M J = a + p(r-0 + 8 , 5.5) 
Where | Mt | denotes the absolute value of the mispricing series, T-t refers to the 
number of days remaining until the contract maturity date, and a, |3 are regression 
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parameters and 8t is a residual error term. 
The results reported in table 5.7 largely support the hypothesis that mispricing is 
positively related to the length of time remaining to contract maturity. For the FTSE 
100 contract, seven contracts are associated with a positive coefficient which are 
significant at the 5% level, and for the Mid 250 contract, eight contracts are 
associated with a positive coefficient which is significant at the 5% level. These 
results indicate that mispricing converges towards zero as maturity approaches, and 
are similar to those of Yadav and Pope (1990) in the post-Big Bang period. The time 
to expiration effect was further investigated by stratifying the sample into subsets on 
the basis of the number of days to maturity and calculating the mean absolute 
deviation per group for all contracts. In table 5.8 the results relating to the behaviour 
of the mean absolute deviation reinforces the results in table 5.7, showing that 
mispricing for both contracts declines as maturity approaches, although the decline 
was not monotonic. 
An interesting feature of mispricing series observed in US and Asian markets was 
that of persistence, whereby once the series became mispriced in one direction, 
mispricing persisted in that direction for several days (see Brenner, Subrahmanyan 
and Uno (1989a)). An inspection of the mispricing plots in figures 5.5 and 5.6 
indicates that persistence in mispricing may well be a phenomenon which is present 
in the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. The issue of persistence in mispricing can be 
investigated by simply measuring the average fi-equency of mispricing reversals, or 
by using parametric approaches such as testing for serial correlation in the mispricing 
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Table 5.7) 
Is Mispricing Random? 
M, | = a + p( r -0 + s, 
FTSE 100 Contract FTSE Mid 250 Contract 
Contract P t-stat * 
* 
P t-stat R^ 
June 1994 -0.00028 -0.150 0.00037 * 0.00305 1.447 0.03373 
September 1994 0.00265 1.934 0.05602 * 0.00456 3.794 0.18603 
December 1994 0.00091 0.933 0.01341 * 0.00333 2.523 0.09047 
March 1995 0.00266 2.935 0.12375 * 0.00411 2.028 0.06413 
June 1995 0.00667 6.158 0.38724 * 0.00156 1.387 0.03106 
September 1995 0.00200 2.472 0.08840 * 0.00264 2.270 0.07560 
December 1995 0.00278 3.036 0.12591 * 0.00374 4.824 0.26660 
March 1996 0.00051 0.634 0.00634 * 0.00273 3.051 0.13238 
June 1996 0.00165 2.041 0.06021 * 0.00199 2.211 0.07098 
September 1996 0.00243 3.762 0.18347 * 0.00719 6.946 0.43366 
Table 5.8) 
Absolute Deviation Versus Time to Expiration 
Days to Expiration 
Ave. Abs. Deviation (%) 
FTSE 100 FTSE Mid 250 
Over 60 
50-51 
50-41 
40-31 
30-21 
20-11 
10- 1 
0.2635 
0.2773 
0.2274 
0.1863 
0.1480 
0.1870 
0.1676 
0.3111 
0.3853 
0.3728 
0.3472 
0.2471 
0.2699 
0.2117 
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series. In relation to the FTSE 100 mispricing series, mispricing reversals are foimd 
to occur on average every 3.2 days, with a maximum run of 31 days and a minimum 
run of 1 day, and where 10% of all runs persist for over a week. By comparison, for 
the Mid 250 mispricing series, mispricing reversals are found to occur every 4.2 
days, with a maximum run of 41 days and a minimum run of 1 day, and where 18% 
of all runs persist for over a week. Therefore, there is clear evidence that mispricing 
tends to be more persistent for the Mid 250 contract than the FTSE 100 contract. This 
finding of greater persistence is consistent with the fact that the Mid 250 contract is 
less effectively arbitraged than the FTSE 100 contract, and that when the Mid 250 
futures price deviates fi-om fair value the arbitraging forces pulling prices back 
towards equilibrium are not as strong as in the case of the FTSE 100 contract. 
According to Brenner et al (1989a) this is because when mispricing develops in a 
particular direction, transaction costs are likely to restrain arbitrage activity within no 
arbitrage limits. 
The autocorrelation coefficients reported in table 5.9 confirm the view that 
mispricing is more persistent for the Mid 250 contract than for the FTSE 100 
conti-act. For 8 of the 10 contracts, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the 
Mid 250 series are greater than those for the FTSE 100 series. Furthermore, when 
consideration is given to the entire sample, all 6 autocorrelation coefficients 
associated with lagged values of the mispricing series for the Mid 250 contract are 
larger than those for the FTSE 100 conti-act, providing clear evidence of greater 
persistence in the mispricing series of the new contiact. 
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Table 5.9) 
Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Coefficients Associated with the 
Mispricing Series for the F T S E 100 and Mid 250 Contracts. 
Contract 
Contract 
A) Autocorrelation Coefficients (Lags) 
F T S E 100 Contract F T S E Mid 250 Contract 
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 * 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Jun 1994 61 0.256 0.069 0.114 -0.078 0.073 -0.082 * 0.534 0.236 -0.014 -0.195 -0.145 -0.214 
Sep 1994 64 0.449 0.389 0.351 0.185 0.253 0.055 * 0.470 0.337 0.340 0.209 0.280 0.054 
Dec 1994 65 0.379 0.284 0.294 0.038 0.077 0.015 * 0.279 0.243 0.102 0.007 0.010 -0.222 
Mar 1995 62 0.287 0.159 -0.008 0.156 -0.016 0.007 * 0.396 0.143 0.131 0.060 0.168 0.040 
Jun 1995 61 0.656 0.477 0.437 0.402 0.307 0.261 * 0.478 0.117 0.058 0.042 0.051 -0.103 
Sep 1995 64 0.445 0.358 0.189 0.036 -0.102 -0.245 * 0.703 0.616 0.409 0.298 0.199 0.095 
Dec 1995 65 0.232 0.123 0.046 0.023 0.012 -0.192 * 0.639 0.476 0.371 0.309 0.301 0.263 
Mar 1996 62 0.519 0.297 0.312 0.192 0.028 0.102 * 0.523 0.259 0.207 0.174 0.053 0.013 
Jun 1996 66 0.460 0.152 -0.022 -0.087 0.028 0.059 * 0.466 0.004 -0.251 -0.267 -0.184 -0.077 
Sep 1996 64 0.482 0.351 0.336 0.190 0.239 0.065 * 0.722 0.637 0.634 0.590 0.535 0.438 
Total 634 0.548 0.452 0:423 0.333 0.350 0.272 * 0.727 0.617 0.561 0.505 0.508 0.443 
B) Partial Autocorrelation Coefficients (Lags) 
F T S E 100 Contract F T S E Mid 250 Contract 
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 * 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Jun 1994 61 0.256 0.004 0.102 0.142 0.137 -0.164 * 0.534 -0.069 -0.157 -0.156 0.087 -0.19 
Sep 1994 64 0.449 0.235 0.148 -0.084 0.128 -0.170 * 0.47 0.148 0.178 -0.038 0.171 -0.239 
Dec 1994 65 0.379 0.163 0.171 -0.177 0.039 -0.051 * 0.279 0.179 -0.004 -0.066 0.005 -0.238 
Mar 1995 62 0.287 0.084 -0.081 0.183 -0.104 -0.005 * 0.396 -0.017 0.095 -0.027 0.175 -0.118 
Jun 1995 61 0.656 0.081 0.169 0.079 -0.050 0.031 * 0.478 -0.144 0.083 -0.011 0.045 -0.195 
Sep 1995 64 0.445 0.199 -0.035 -0.120 -0.144 -0.187 * 0.703 0.24 -0.186 -0.038 0.026 -0.088 
Dec 1995 65 0.232 0.073 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.210 * 0.639 0.115 0.049 0.05 0.097 0.011 
Mar 1996 62 0.519 0.037 0.197 -0.065 -0.118 0.129 * 0.513 -0.007 0.104 0.04 -0.092 0.004 
Jun 1996 66 0.460 -0.075 -0.081 -0.043 0.126 -0.001 * 0.466 -0.272 -0.174 -0.069 -0.077 -0.046 
Sep 1996 64 0.482 0,154 0.158 -0.062 0.135 -0.175 * 0.722 0.246 0.241 0.082 0.015 -0.133 
Total 634 0.548 0.218 0.165 0.016 0.121 -0.027 
* 
* 0.727 0.188 0.131 0.054 0.014 -0.046 
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Finally, ARMA modelling techniques are employed to identify and estimate the 
autoregressive processes underlying both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 mispricing 
series. Plots of the autocorrelation fimctions for both of the mispricing series 
associated with the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts rapidly converge to zero 
implying stationarity. Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics are generated and found to 
be equal to -9 .2902 and -7.889 respectively, providing formal evidence of 
stationarity. From the results presented in table 5.9, it is evident that for the entire 
time series an AR(3) process is applicable for both series. In relation to the partial 
autocorrelation coefficients in panel B, the first three coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level for both series, and an examination of the significance of partial 
autocorrelation coefficients on a contract by contract basis shows that an AR(3) 
process is the most fi-equently occurring in both series. A further argument in favour 
of this model is that over-fitting the process did not improve the explanatory 
significance of the model. This finding differs fi-om that of Yadav and Pope (1990) , 
who find that the mispricing series for the FTSE 100 contract is characterised by an 
A R ( 1 ) process. However, interestingly the value of the first-order partial auto 
correlation coefficient for the FTSE 100 mispricing series reported in table 5.9 panel 
b is identical to that reported by Yadav and Pope for the post Big Bang period. The 
estimated AR(3) processes for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 series are presented in 
equations 5.6 and 5.7 respectively. 
M ; ° ° = - 0 . 0 0 1 + 0.392 M ; " " + 0.150 M ; ° ° + 0.164 M ; ° ° + 8 , 5.6) 
( - 0 . 9 3 9 ) (9 .955) (3 .587) (4 .184) 
i ? ' = 0 . 3 5 3 , S.E. = 0.210 
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M^'' = -0.001 + 0.565^ ,^1'," + 0.109M/i° + 0.133 M,"° + s, 5.7) 
(-0.933) (14.266) (2.504) (3.353) 
i?'=0.554, 5.^.=0.229 
Comparing the values for equations 5.6 and 5.7 suggests that lagged values of 
mispricing for the Mid 250 contract account for more of the variation in the current 
value, than lagged values of mispricing for the FTSE 100 contract. This is consistent 
with the earlier finding that mispricing for the Mid 250 contract tends to persist 
longer in a specific direction. 
5.6) CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this study compares the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 and Mid 
250 index futures contiacts traded in the UK. Specifically the following conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, while there are many deviations fi-om fair value, these are 
generally quite small in actual magnitude, suggesting that both contiacts are 
efficiently priced. Although mispricings are larger and more frequent for the Mid 250 
contract than for the FTSE 100 contract, this is consistent with the larger transactions 
costs and difficulties associated with trading the illiquid constituents of the Mid 250 
index. Secondly, consistent with the intioduction of other index futures contiacts, 
the Mid 250 contract traded at a discount to fair value for much of the initial period 
which supports Figlewski's argument that tiaders are usually reluctant to tiade a 
contract during its infancy. Thirdly, the onset of trading in the Mid 250 contiact has 
been associated with an improvement in the pricing of the FTSE 100 contiact. It 
appears reasonable to assume that equipping equity market makers and institutional 
investors with a vehicle through which they can achieve more efficient management 
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of lovi^ er capitalisation portfolios, has freed capital and resources which can be 
employed to achieve more effective tracking of the FTSE 100 contract. Fourthly, 
mispricing in the deferred FTSE 100 confract was found to be of both a larger 
magnitude and more persistent than that in the near contract. This is an important 
result since it suggests that intramarket spread trading may be a profitable strategy. 
Furthermore, using the Mid 250 contract in conjunction with the FTSE 100 contract 
provides a imique opportunity to examine the potential for intermarket spread trading 
in the UK. Fifthly, the profitability of ex post arbitrage is found to be considerably 
less than has been implied by previous studies. In fact in the case of the Mid 250 
contract the arbitrage window is never violated. However, given the reliance on daily 
data, the results reported are likely to underestimate real arbitrage opportunities. 
Sixthly, both the Mid 250 and FTSE 100 mispricing series are found to be 
systematically related to the length of time to expiration, with mispricing falling as 
the expiration date approaches. Seventhly, mispricing is found to be more persistent 
for the Mid 250 contract than the FTSE 100 contract, suggesting that in the case of 
the Mid 250 contract the larger transaction costs and difficulties in rapidly executing 
stocks discourages arbitrage activity and exert minimal pressure on the mispricing 
series to deviate from its current projectory. Finally, mispricing in both contracts is 
foimd to be underpinned by an AR(3) process. 
While the Mid 250 contract was associated with limited trading volume it is found to 
be priced well within its transaction cost limits, supporting the hypothesis of market 
efficiency and its use as an effective hedging vehicle. While mispricing for the Mid 
250 confract is greater than that on the related FTSE 100, the larger transaction costs 
and institutional difficulties preclude the profitable exploitation of any mispricing. In 
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fact the evidence would suggest that in both markets the only effective arbitrageurs 
are equity market makers. Only when the tiading volume on the Mid 250 increases 
sufficiently to justify the use of intra-daily data can more reliable ex ante tests of the 
profitability of Mid 250 index arbitiage be conducted. 
The findings presented in this chapter stiongly support the resuhs reported in the 
earlier chapters relating to hedging effectiveness. While both contiacts are generally 
found to tiade within their no-arbitrage limits, of the two contracts the Mid 250 
contract is the more mispriced. Although the larger tiansactions costs associated with 
using this contiact account for this phenomena, this finding is also consistent with 
the finding that information is impounded into spot prices less rapidly following the 
onset of futures tiading, and with information having a more persistent effect. 
Furthermore, given that index futures contracts are principally employed for short 
term tiading purposes such as hedging, the extent to which futures contiacts are 
mispriced has important implications for these stiategies. For instance, while the cash 
settlement feature of index futures contracts guarantees that all hedges held to 
maturity are riskless, hedgers wishing to adopt a dynamic strategy and unwind 
positions before maturity rely on arbitiage activity to ensure that the futures price 
accurately tracks its fair value. The finding that the Mid 250 contiact is less 
efficiently priced than the FTSE 100 contiact corroborates the result in chapter three 
showing that the Mid 250 contiact is not as effective as the FTSE 100 contiact when 
used as a direct hedge. 
The degree of mispricing is also an important issue when considering the cost of a 
hedging strategy, with the direction of the initial mispricing intioducing a specific 
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mispricing element into the returns of the hedged portfolio. For instance, where the 
futures contract is initially overpriced (underpriced) and the hedger initiates a short 
futures hedge, then (s)he wil l earn returns which are higher (lower) than those 
associated with a futures contract which is priced according to fair value. Given that 
deviations from fair value are larger and more sustained for the Mid 250 contract 
than for the FTSE 100 confract it is reasonable to suppose that the returns associated 
with mispricing have greater relevance for the trader using the Mid 250 confract than 
the FTSE 100 confract. 
Finally, the evidence relating to the mispricing of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
contracts suggests that spread trading opportunities may exist in relation to UK index 
futures confracts. In the case of the FTSE 100 confract, the deferred confract is priced 
at a chronic premium to the near confract with this indicating that an intramarket bull 
spread may be potentially profitable. Furthermore, using the Mid 250 confract in 
conjunction with the FTSE 100 confract provides an unique opportunity to examine 
the potential for intermarket spread trading. These issues wil l be investigated in 
chapter six. 
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Endnotes 
' On the 20 October 1997 the UK stock market switched from a quote-diven system to an 
order-driven trading system of share trading. The decision was taken following widespread 
market consultation. Initially the order-book was introduced to cover only the FTSE 100 
index and its reserve list, but has proved so successful that it will shortly be extended to all 
Mid 250 constituents. This change has resulted in tighter equity prices and is expected to 
simplify index arbitrage in the UK. 
^ Although the Mid 250 index futures contract was introduced on 25 February 1994 the data 
relating to the March 1994 contract was excluded owing to the limited number of 
observations. 
' Many studies investigating index arbitrage in the US suffer from a serious dividend 
misspecification problem (e.g. Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Brennan and Schwartz 
(1990), Klemkosy and Lee (1991)). Since ex post dividend data for the S&P 500 index is 
not publicly available in the US, researchers have tended to use dividend data supplied by 
the Centre for Research into Security Prices (CRSP) which relates to the NYSE/AMEX 
indexes. Given that these indexes comprise of a large number of smaller capitalisation 
stocks, this series is unlikely to perfectly match the dividend series corresponding to the 
S&P 500 index. 
Mispricing plots for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts illustrated on a contract by 
contract basis are shown in appendices 3 and 4 respectively. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRICING OF INTRAMARKET AND INTERMARKET SPREADS: 
E V I D E N C E R E L A T I N G TO THE FTSE 100 AND FTSE MID 250 
CONTRACTS 
6.1) INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two it was argued that spread trading provides an ahemative mechanism to 
index arbitrage for investigating fixtures market efficiency, in the sense that the level 
of spread mispricing has important implications for the effectiveness of a spread 
trading strategy in much the same way that index fiitures mispricing has important 
implications for the effectiveness of a hedging strategy. The notion of spreading and 
its economic significance was introduced by Working (1949). He examined the inter-
temporal price relationships which result from the cost of storage, and noted that 
fiitures traders may use spreads as a means of reducing their losses from price 
fluctuations. Spreads involve taking simultaneous short and long positions in 
different but economically related fiitures confracts, and they are initiated to profit 
from unusual pricing relationships that are believed to be temporary. 
Although traditionally spread trading has been used to speculate on the cost of carry 
between different fiitures contracts (Working (1949)), spreading also serves the 
functions of arbitrage and hedging, together with providing an important source of 
market liquidity. It is surprising that while there has been considerable interest in the 
pricing of index fiitures contracts relative to their underlying spot indexes, only 
minimal interest has been given to the relative pricing of index fiitures confracts on 
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either an intramarket or intermarket basis (Billingsley and Chance (1988), Brenner, 
Subrahmanyan and Uno (1989b), Yadav and Pope (1992b) and Board and Sutcliffe 
(1996)). 
An analysis of spread trading provides an alternative mechanism to index arbitrage 
for testing for futures market efficiency, and spread trading significantly contributes 
to the economics of arbitrage. The limited interest in spread trading is rather difficult 
to comprehend because spread trading strategies can be more easily and cheaply 
implemented with significantly less risk than index arbitrage transactions. Given that 
spreads are associated with lower margin requirements and thus greater leverage than 
net long or short fixtures positions, together with lower transaction costs, the net costs 
of financing a spread position are very low, which results in tighter limits around the 
fair price of the spread. Therefore, deviations from fair price which are often too 
small to be exploited by index arbitrage can be profitably exploited by spread 
trading. 
In addition, spread trading serves as an important risk transfer mechanism, which 
enables fixtures traders to allocate risk amongst themselves. Since the spread trader 
will be frequently offsetting and reinstating fixtures positions against their overall 
inventory position, spread trading provides a means of transferring risk from one 
trader to another. In the absence of spreading only the less risk averse fraders with a 
balanced inventory position would be prepared to provide the price insurance 
services required by hedgers. Thus the ability to spread trade resuhs in a lower cost 
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of insurance and allows risk averse fixtiu-es traders to provide market liquidity to 
hedgers in the cash market (Billingsley and Chance (1988)). 
Furthermore, in trading as a group spreaders provide the illiquid distant contracts 
with its main source of liquidity. Therefore, without the presence of spreaders whose 
activities ensure that the price differentials between different contracts are held 
within close limits, hedges in the far contract could not be placed effectively. Thus 
spreaders are essential for providing "market thickness" and price stability, and it is 
debatable whether any fixtures market could effectively fimction without a "large 
pool" of active spread traders. As Meland (1981) argues: 
"It is difficult to adequately explain the importance of spread 
traders in this fimction. It is a role no one else can assxxme 
effectively, upon it depends the essence of futures markets as a 
risk transfer mechanism for the commercial world" (p. 409). 
Although spreading provides an effective risk transfer mechanism, it is not a riskless 
strategy as is often assumed. While spreads are often characterised by less risk than 
naked long or short futures positions, in order to allocate risk effectively and provide 
market liquidity, the spreads must be correctly priced. Therefore, the degree of 
spread mispricing has important implications for the effectiveness of spreading, in 
the same way as spot-fixtures mispricing has important implications for hedging 
effectiveness (Merrick (1988b)). 
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Finally, an alternative rationale for spreading is as a risk reduction sfrategy within the 
context of hedging. For instance, the expected utility approach used for testing 
hedging effectiveness has been extended to spreading, with the holding of fiitures 
positions being examined within a mean variance framework (Schroch (1971), 
Peterson (1977) and Francis and Wolf (1991)). Schrock (1971) established that 
spread trading was an important risk management strategy, and demonstrated that 
holding a particular futures confract with a negative return was a rational activity 
where the specific leg significantly reduced the risk associated with the investor's 
overall market position. Furthermore, Peterson showed that because of the reduced 
margin requirements that arise from holding spreads, investors may be able to: 
"increase their total portfolio return for a given level of risk, or 
reduce risk in obtaining a given portfolio return, by substituting 
commodity futures sfraddles and interest bearing cash assets for 
outright long or short fiitures positions" (1977, p. 105). 
Therefore, by initiating spreads the investor may be able to increase their overall total 
expected portfolio return without incurring any more risk, or alternatively reduce 
portfolio risk without reducing their expected portfolio return. In doing so spread 
trading sfrategies are important because they broaden the feasible set of investment 
opportunities beyond that achieved by simply undertaking offsetting spot and fiitures 
positions, thus enhancing the investor's risk-return profiles. 
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This chapter will be structured as follows. In section 6.2 the pricing of spreads is 
considered within a theoretical framework underpiimed by the theoretical or fair 
price formula. Attention will be given to the pricing of inframarket and intermarket 
spreads, together with the necessary adjustments made for the inclusion of spread 
ratios. In section 6.3 the research issues to be investigated will be presented. In 
section 6.4 the data and methodology used will be outlined. In section 6.5 the results 
and findings will be reported. Finally, in section 6.6 concluding remarks will be 
made. 
6.2) THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Spreads are designed to exploit predicted changes in the relative prices between two 
fixtixres contracts, referred to more generally as simply the spread basis. When pricing 
spreads, Jones (1981) notes that it is conventional for financial fixtures, for the spread 
price to be equal to the price of the nearby contract minus the price of the next 
nearest to maturity (henceforth deferred) confract. Therefore, an inframarket spread 
(St) between a near and a deferred confract, with the respective matixrity dates of T^ 
and T2 can be expressed as: 
5,=^,, 6.1) 
The pricing of spreads represent estimates of differences in the cost of carrying the 
various contracts to their respective maturity date, and therefore the price stiixcture 
between expiration months is of interest to the spread frader. A normal market exists 
where the current price of a deferred contract is greater than that of a nearby contract. 
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reflecting the greater costs of carrying the confract to maturity. By conti-ast the 
market is referred to as inverted, when the opposite occurs and the price of the 
different contracts is a decreasing fimction of the time to maturity. 
Spreads of all types are undertaken to profit from distortions which arise in the 
normal or equilibrium relationship between two related fiitures confracts. In the 
context of index futures contracts, spread trading, like index arbifrage provides a 
mechanism for exploiting any relative mispricing, and thus provides an additional 
means of testing how efficiently index fiitures contracts are priced. As was 
demonstrated in chapter five, the equilibrium pricing relationship between the index 
fiitures contract and its associated basket of stocks can be determined by the 
theoretical or fair forward pricing model. For convenience, equation 5.1 is restated 
below as equation 6.2: 
61\ 
Where FPt^^ equates to the theoretical fair price of an index fiitures confract at time t 
with expiration date of T, 1^  equates to the price of the underlying stock index at time 
t, r refers to the risk free rate of interest, T>^+^ refers to the daily dividends payable 
(measured in terms of index units) on the underlying stock index at time t+s, T-t is 
equal to the number of days to confract expiration and T-t-s refers to the number of 
days between the date the dividend is paid on index stocks and the contract maturity 
date. The extent to which the futures price deviates from its fair value estimate 
(equation 6.2) determines the degree of mispricing, and it is the relative mispricing 
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between the respective legs of the spread position which create spread frading 
opportunities. 
Regarding the actual implementation of the spread trading sfrategy. Board and 
Sutcliffe (1996) demonstrate that spread trading requires fewer restiictive 
assumptions than is the case for index arbifrage. Specifically, while the problem of 
short selling stock creates asymmetric fransaction cost limits in the context of index 
arbitrage, this difficulty is not relevant to the spread trader where short positions can 
be initiated with the same ease as long positions. Therefore it is likely that 
fransaction cost limits will be symmetrical for spread trading. Additionally while 
marking to market creates tail risk in the context of index arbifrage, given that both 
legs of the spread are marked to market and that the positions are of equal but 
opposite value, the margin payments associated with the spread should generally 
cancel out leading to zero tail risk. Furthermore, dividend and interest rate 
imcertainty, tracking risk, execution risk and non-synchronous trading are all less of 
a problem for spread trading sfrategies than for index arbifrage sfrategies. However, 
one assumption underlying spread frading activity which is more restrictive than for 
index arbitrage trading is that of perfect divisibility. It is more difficult to achieve 
equality in the value of the two legs of the transaction for a spread than for index 
arbitrage because the large values associated with futures contracts makes them 
rather cumbersome. Even so, given that spread trading does not involve any stock 
side transaction, the transaction costs incurred by the spreader are only a fraction of 
the transaction costs incurred by the index arbitrageur, and therefore the spreader is 
capable of exploiting mispricing opportixnities, where the arbifrageur is not. This 
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results in tighter no-arbitrage limits existing around the fair value of the spread, than 
around the fair value of the index futures confract. 
Intramarket Spread Pricing 
The pricing of an intramarket spread involves taking both a long and a short position 
in the same futures contract but for different delivery dates'. Since no effort is made 
to buy or sell stocks or bonds the profits from these transactions are associated with 
less risk than is the case with index arbitrage. Assuming that the nearby futures 
contract matures at time T, and the deferred contract matures at T 2 , the theoretical or 
fair price estimates of the nearby and deferred confracts can be expressed as 
equations 6.3 and 6.4 respectively: 
r,- r 6.3) 
T,-t 6.4) 
The profitability of the intramarket spread can be examined by determining whether 
the actual price of the near and deferred confracts are correctly priced with respect to 
their fair price estimate. Should either (or both) of the legs of the spread be 
significantly mispriced then a viable spread trading strategy may be possible. The 
extent to which either of the legs of the spread may be mispriced can be determined 
by examining the degree to which the fiitures price deviates from its fair price. The 
mispricing series measures the difference between the actual fiitures price and its 
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theoretical fair price at time t. Equations 6.5 and 6.6 represent the mispricing series 
for the near and deferred contracts respectively. 
M!' = 
6.5) 
T,-l 6.6) 
As stated in chapter five, the mispricing series is normalised by dividing any 
mispricing by the value of the spot index (1^ ) underlying the futures contract, because 
all the major determinants of the limits of the arbifrage window should be 
proportional to the index, with mispricing being expressed in percentage terms. 
By comparing the degree of mispricing associated with the near confract with respect 
to the degree of mispricing associated with the deferred contract, the relative spread 
mispricing associated with the intramarket spread can be expressed in terms of the 
spread mispricing differential (SM )^ which is measured as: 
SM, = - 6.7) 
In order to profit from a spread transaction the trader must determine whether the 
spread mispricing will increase or decrease over the life of the spread. Where SM^ is 
equal to zero, mispricing in each leg of the spread exactly offsets one another, in 
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which case the spread is correctly priced and spread trading opportunities are not 
present. A spread transaction is profitable whenever the absolute size of the spread 
mispricing differential is in excess of the transaction costs of initiating the frade, and 
the future direction of the differential has been correctly determined. Where SM^ is 
negative the near futures contract is underpriced relative to the deferred fiitures 
confract and the frader should initiate a bull spread by buying the near contract and 
simultaneously selling the far contract. Alternatively, where SM^ is positive the near 
contract is overpriced relative to the deferred confract and the frader should initiate a 
bear spread by selling the nearby contract and simultaneously buying the deferred 
contract. 
I f it is assumed that both of the legs of the spread are closed out when the near 
contract reaches maturity at time T j , the cash flows accruing from this fransaction 
are i ^ j . - a n d F,j^ - j ^ . Thus the spread is profitable i f the relative gain 
generated on one leg of the spread is large enough to offset the relative loss generated 
on the other leg of the spread. 
Intermarket Spread Pricing 
Intermarket spreads consist of positions in two different but economically related 
fiitures contracts either for the same or different maturity dates. Compared to 
inframarket spreads, frading intermarket spreads is inherently more risky because the 
relative price movements between the legs of an intermarket spread are likely to be 
less well correlated. Therefore, intermarket spreads are associated with both larger 
margin requirements and transactions costs. These facts have an important bearing on 
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the relationship between the actual price of an intermarket spread and its fair price. 
This relationship will be further considered by employing the theoretical no-arbifrage 
conditions. 
For an intermarket spread consisting of two different flxtxires confracts with a 
common expiry date of time T, such as that between the near FTSE 100 confract 
(F,j°) and the near FTSE Mid 250 confract (Fij") the theoretical or fair price 
estimates are expressed as equations 6.8 and 6.9 respectively: 
T-t 
- I S ) 6.8) 
T-t 
-t-s) 6.9) 
Where the 100 and 250 superscripts refer to the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 respectively. 
Once again the extent to which either of the legs of the spread are mispriced can only 
be determined by examining the degree to which the flxtvxres price deviates from its 
fair price. Therefore, equations 6.10 and 6.11 represent the mispricing series for both 
the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts respectively. 
6 \0) 
F;^ - (/;°°e^(^-')-Y^D]Ze'^'-'-'') • 
100 _ j=l 
/ rlOO 
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M!'° = — 
' 1-250 
By comparing the degree of mispricing associated with each leg of the intermarket 
spread, the relative spread differential can be calculated and the profitability of the 
relationship evaluated. Thus spread mispricing for the intermarket spread comprises 
of positions in the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts respectively, and is equal to 
equation 6.10 minus equation 6.11 and is expressed as the spread mispricing 
differential (SMt). 
SM, = Mr - 6.12) 
In order to profit from a spread fransaction the trader must determine whether the 
spread mispricing differential will increase or decrease over the life of the spread. 
Given that both legs of the intermarket spread have a common expiry date of T, when 
the spread differential is non-zero its actual value will contain predictive power with 
respect to changes in the relative mispricing between the two legs of the intermarket 
spread by time T, the contract maturity date. Although the relationship between the 
two legs of the spread may be characterised by variability over the life of the 
contract, at contract expiration mispricing on both contracts converges to zero, as 
does spread mispricing. Therefore, for positions which are held to maturity, the 
future direction of the spread mispricing series is known with certainty. 
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Intermarket spread frading should prove profitable whenever the absolute size of the 
spread differential exceeds the costs of initiating the fransaction. Where SM^ is 
negative the spread is undervalued, and the frader needs to initiate a long spread 
transaction, buying the FTSE 100 confract and simuhaneously selling the Mid 250 
confract. In contrast, where SM^ is positive the spread is overpriced, the frader needs 
to initiate a short spread transaction, which involves selling the FTSE 100 confract 
and buying the Mid 250 confract. For spread positions held xmtil matixrity, the cash 
flows accruing from this spread fransaction are F,]°° - r^°° and - 1^^°. 
Providing the relative profits generated on the long leg of the fransaction are 
sufficient to compensate for the relative losses generated on the short leg of the 
fransaction the overall spread will be profitable. Although the FTSE 100 and Mid 
250 confracts are technically good substitutes, the findings in chapter six prove that 
the Mid 250 contract is not as efficiently priced as the FTSE 100 confract owing to 
differences in transactions costs and trading volume. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to assume that intermarket pricing inefficiencies will exist, and that they will 
manifest themselves in terms of spread frading opportixnities. This issue will be 
empirically investigated. 
Spread Ratio Adjustments 
Unlike the pricing of an inframarket spread, the pricing of an intermarket spread is 
complicated by the fact that different flxtixres contracts are associated with different 
contract multipliers and different index values. For instance, the confract muUipliers 
associated with the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts are £25 and £10 per index point 
respectively. Due to differences in both the value of the index and underlying 
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confract multiplier, frading the same number of confracts in both legs of the 
intermarket spread can lead to a seriously unbalanced spread position. However, this 
problem can be remedied by making an adjustment for differences in the market 
value of the two confracts by computing a spread ratio, which ensures that both legs 
of the spread have an equal monetary value. The spread ratio relevant to the spread 
between the FTSE 100 and the Mid 250 contracts is equal to the ratio of their 
respective contract multipliers (CM) multiplied by the value in index points of the 
index futures contract. Thus the spread ratio relevant to the intermarket spread 
comprising of positions in the FTSE 100 confract and Mid 250 contract is calculated 
as: 
CM'"" X P'"" 6.13) 
Spread Ratio (R,) = TTX 4^ 
For instance, if at time period t both the price of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts 
stand at 4000 points each, then the value of the confracts is £100,000 and £40,000 
respectively. Thus to ensure that the spread is balanced the Mid 250 leg of the spread 
should consist of two and a half times as many confracts as the FTSE 100 leg of the 
spread. In the case where the two contract have different index values - e.g. the FTSE 
100 contract is valued at 4500 index points and the Mid 250 is valued at 4000 index 
points - the Mid 250 leg of the spread consists of 2.8125 as many contracts as the 
FTSE 100 leg of the spread. Therefore, given that the spread ratio has the potential to 
vary considerably before the confract maturity date, spread ratio variability 
constitutes an important source of risk which is not relevant in the pricing of the 
intramarket spread. In order to circumvent this problem, the spreader is required to 
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forecast the spread ratio at matixrity, and only initiate positions once they are sure that 
the magnitude of the initial spread mispricing more than compensates for this 
additional source of risk. 
6.3) EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate the pricing efficiency and 
examine some of the time series properties of inframarket and intermarket spreads 
relating to the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. Specifically, the following issues 
will be investigated: 
• the pricing efficiency of both intramarket and intermarket spreads is considered. 
The intramarket spread consists of positions in both the near and middle FTSE 
100 contracts^  and the intermarket spread consists of positions in both the near 
FTSE 100 and near Mid 250 contracts. The pricing efficiency of these spreads 
has important implications for the hedging effectiveness of the respective futures 
contracts. 
• after allowing for adequate fransaction costs the ex post profitability of frading 
intramarket and intermarket spreads is examined. Allowance is also given to the 
impact that spread ratio variability has on the profitability of frading intermarket 
spreads. 
• the behaviour of the spread mispricing series for both spreads is examined to 
determine whether or not spread mispricing is systematically related to the length 
of time to the contract maturity date. It seems reasonable to assume that because 
frading volume increases on both the deferred FTSE 100 and near Mid 250 
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confracts as the maturity date approaches, mispricing on each specific leg will fall 
and spread mispricing will do likewise. Evidence of a matiirity effect has 
important implications for the early unwinding sfrategy. 
• the persistence hypothesis is investigated for both spreads to determine whether 
or not spread mispricing is path dependent. It seems reasonable to expect that 
since the near and deferred FTSE 100 contracts are likely to be more closely 
integrated and better arbifraged than the near FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts, 
the intramarket spread is more likely to be characterised by persistence than the 
intermarket spread. 
6.4) DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Daily closing and settlement prices are used for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 indexes 
and confracts respectively over the period 18 March 1994 (following the infroduction 
of the Mid 250 contract)^  to 19 September 1996 and consists of 634 observations. For 
the FTSE 100 confract, data on both the nearest to maturity and deferred contracts is 
employed. For the Mid 250 contract only the nearest to maturity confract is used. The 
contracts are rolled over on the expiration date, with the deferred contract becoming 
the near contract. In order to compute the mispricing series which underpms the 
spread pricing relationships the fair value model which was introduced in chapter 
five and shown earlier as equation 6.2 is used to determine the appropriate spread 
entry and exit triggers. The spread mispricing series for the inframarket spread is 
calculated on the basis of equation 6.7, and the spread mispricing series for the 
intermarket spread is calculated on the basis of equation 6.12. In calculating this 
mispricing series estimates are required for the daily interest rate and dividend 
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payments associated with the market constituents which go ex dividend on that date. 
The UK treasury bill was chosen as an appropriate proxy for the interest rate. 
However, given that the maturity date associated with the treasury bill does not 
correspond with the maturity date on the respective futures contracts, the interest rate 
series is estimated through a process of linear interpolation by combining a weighted 
average of both the one and three month bills. The ex dividend adjustment for each 
constituent is calculated by multiplying the number of shares going ex dividend on 
that date by the dividend and aggregating over all constituents paying dividends. This 
figure is then divided by the total market capitalisation of the index to convert ex 
dividend adjustments into index points. A l l data was obtained from Datastream. 
The round trip transaction costs associated with establishing spread trades are 
considerably lower than those associated with initiating an index arbitrage 
transaction because no stocks or bonds are bought or sold, and the trades are not 
subject to stamp duty. The transaction costs faced by traders wishing to execute 
spreads consist of the futures market commission, the futures market bid-offer spread 
and the market impact cost of the transaction. In the UK round-trip commissions can 
be negotiated to very low levels, with typical commissions of £25 and £10 per 
contract for the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 respectively, representing approximately 
0.025% of the underlying value of the respective indexes. An examination of LIFFE 
time and sales data over this period suggests that bid-offer spreads on the futures 
transactions for the near and deferred FTSE 100 contracts and the near Mid 250 
contract are often less than 0.1%, 0.2% and 0.3% respectively. Finally, it is assumed 
that because each leg of the spread transaction consists of only one or two contracts. 
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the associated market impact of the trade would be minimal. Thus, the no arbitrage 
limits are set at 0.3% for the intramarket spread and 0.4% for the intermarket spread. 
Spread transactions are assumed to be initiated on a daily basis whenever either of 
the no-arbitrage triggers outlined above are violated. Where the spread is found to be 
underpriced (SMt < 0), the spreader trading the intramarket spreads buys the near 
FTSE 100 contract and sells the deferred FTSE 100 contract, while the spreader 
trading the intermarket spread buys the near FTSE 100 contract and sells the near 
Mid 250 contract. Alternatively, where the spread was found to be overpriced (SMt > 
0), the spreader trading the intramarket spread sells the near FTSE 100 contract and 
buys the deferred FTSE 100 contract, while the spreader trading the intermarket 
spread sells the near FTSE 100 contract and buys the near Mid 250 contract. These 
positions are then held until either the spread mispricing series is characterised by a 
mispricing reversal or the contract expiration date associated with the near leg of the 
contract is reached, at which point the trade is unwound. The trading rules adopted 
are deliberately simple because any profits which are generated by this straight 
forward trading rule which is based on a modicum of information serves as a more 
valid test of market inefficiency than profits generated by a sophisticated trading rule 
which is reliant on vast amounts of detailed information. 
6.5) E M P I R I C A L R E S U L T S 
The daily intramarket and intermarket spread mispricing series represented by 
equations 6.7 and 6.12 are illustrated as figures 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. While the 
intramarket spread appears to be very efficiently priced, trading well within its no-
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arbitrage limits on the vast majority of occasions, the series is also chronically 
underpriced. These findings suggest that while both markets are very closely 
integrated, the deferred contract is priced at a relative premium to the near contract. 
This finding is consistent with Bhatt and Cakici (1990), who suggest that mispricing 
may represent a risk adjusted return to arbitrageurs. Overall, the mispricing plot 
indicates that intramarket spread mispricing opportunities wil l be rare even for the 
most favourably placed spread traders. In contrast, the intermarket spread often 
appears to suggest very inefficient pricing, frequently violating its no-arbifrage limits 
to a large degree. The mispricing plot indicates that this relationship is likely to 
trigger numerous spread mispricing opportimities, and the frequent mispricing 
reversals are likely to offer traders the opportunity to unwind their positions rapidly, 
thereby limiting the problem of spread ratio variability. 
The intramarket and intermarket spread mispricing series are summarised in tables 
6.1 and 6.2 respectively. There are a number of important points to discuss. Firstly, 
over the entire sample period the intramarket spread was underpriced on 540 (85.2%) 
occasions and overpriced on 94 (14.8%) occasions. While the intermarket spread was 
underpriced on 305 (48.1%) occasions and overpriced on 329 (51.9%) occasions. The 
fact that mispricing for the intramarket spread is strongly consfrained in one 
direction, while mispricing on the intermarket spread displays a tendency to fluctuate 
rapidly, suggests that the intramarket spread relationship is much more actively 
arbitraged than the intermarket spread relationship, with the actions of spread traders 
holding inframarket spread mispricing within very tight limits. In addition, on a 
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confract by confract basis the standard deviation associated with intermarket spread 
mispricing series is often three to four times larger than that associated with the 
inframarket spread mispricing series, reinforcing the view that the intermarket spread 
is associated with less arbifrage activity. Secondly, with respect to the size and 
significance of the percentage mean spread deviations, 9 out of the 10 confracts are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for both the intramarket spread and 8 out of 
the 10 confracts are significantly significant at the 5% level for the intermarket 
spread. For the inframarket spread all 9 contracts are significantly negatively priced, 
while for the intermarket spread, 4 of the confracts are significantly positively priced 
and 4 of the contracts are significantly negatively priced. Furthermore, the percentage 
mean absolute deviation over all ten contracts is larger for the intermarket spread 
than the inframarket spread, and for the entire sample, it is over twice as large with 
values of 0.2856 and 0.1420 respectively. These results are consistent with the view 
that compared to the intramarket spread, the intermarket spread is less intensively 
arbitraged. Finally, the intermarket spread mispricing series dominates the 
intramarket spread mispricing series in terms of the number of mispricing reversals 
both on a confract by confract basis and over the entire sample period. The 
mispricing series for the inframarket spread is associated with 38 mispricing reversals 
(3.8 reversals a contract), while the intramarket spread is associated with 168 
mispricing reversals (16.8 reversal a confract). The implication of this result is that 
spread trader wi l l be able to liquidate intermarket frades with greater frequency and 
often at more favourable prices than the spreader trading inframarket spreads. 
However, in the final column of tables 6.1 and 6.2 mispricing reversals are limited to 
cases of where the mispricing series reverses by an amount of more (in both 
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directions) than half the transactions cost of executing the spread, providing a more 
meaningfiil indicator of the potential for spread trading within transaction costs 
limits. These specific types of reversals are found to be ahnost ten times more 
common for the intermarket spread than the intramarket spread, suggesting that the 
practice of initiating risky spread trades is likely to be more successful for 
intermarket than intramarket spread transactions. 
Consideration is now given to the profitability of trading intramarket and intermarket 
spreads employing the simple filter rules previously outlined. Each of the tables of 
results are organised on a contract by contract basis and each details the number of 
trades initiated, the type of trade, the profitability of trading both before and after 
transaction costs and the average duration of each trade. The results relating to 
intramarket spread transactions triggered by violations of the 0.3% limit of the 
arbitrage window are presented in table 6.3. In relation to this strategy a number of 
important points can be made. First, although intramarket spread trades are initiated 
on 63 (9.9%) occasions, over half of all trades are accounted for solely by the 
December 1995 contract, and 5 contracts are characterised by no spread trading at all. 
Second, all the initiated ti-ades are bull trades which reflects the fact that the deferred 
conh-act is generally priced at a premium to the near contract. Third, on a pre-
transaction cost basis the spread trader generates a profit of £15, 975, an average of 
£253.57 per trade. However, once allowances are made for transaction costs the 
spread ti-ader incurs an overall loss of £211.71, an average of -£3.36 per ti-ade. This 
finding supports the view that the no-arbitrage model employed to determine the 
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entiy and exit triggers is reasonably well specified. This overall loss is partly 
accounted for by the fact that many of the frades were initiated at mispricing levels 
which only marginally exceeded the transaction costs threshold, and together with 
the lack of mispricing reversals the spread frader was forced to hold these position till 
the maturity of the near confract, at which point the frades were unwound at 
unfavourable levels. The average duration for each frade of 33.43 days supports the 
view that traders had difficulty in unwinding their positions at profitable levels. 
This problem of marginal arbitrage triggers is addressed by raising the mispricing 
level at which frades are initiated from 0.3% to 0.35% while retaining the fransaction 
cost threshold of 0.3%. The effect of this adjustment is that the spread frader 
becomes more selective, and concentrates only on the more profitable spread 
mispricing opportunities. The effects of these changes are reported in table 6.4. First, 
the effect of raising the arbitrage trigger is that the number of frades initiated has 
fallen from 63 to 28 trades, with the average duration over which these positions are 
held narrowing from 33.43 to 24.5 days. Second, regarding the profitability of the 
strategy, on a pre-fransaction cost basis total profits have fallen by over 30%, 
while average profits have risen by over 40%, to £10,037.50 and £358.48 
respectively. While on a post transaction cost basis both total and average profits 
have risen, to £1,351.10 and £48.50 respectively. Therefore, while intramarket spread 
trading opportunities are rare, a finding which is consistent with both the near and 
deferred FTSE 100 confracts being closely integrated, profitable spread frading 
opportunities do nonetheless exist. 
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We now consider the profitability of intermarket spread trading, involving positions 
in the near FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. The trading of mtermarket spreads is 
both riskier and more complicated than is the case for intramarket spreads because of 
the problem of spread ratio variability, which arises from differences in the 
underlying values of the respective futures contracts. The behaviour of the 
intermarket spread ratio (equation 6.13) over the entire sample period is illustrated in 
figure 6.3, and statistics relating to its behaviour are reported on a contract by 
contract basis in table 6.5. The spread ratio fluctuates between the extremes of 2.326 
and 2.043, with a mean value of 2.1979, indicating that spread ratio risk is present. 
Even so, on a contract by contract basis the spread ratio fluctuates within rather 
narrow limits, and over short periods the relationship is characterised by a degree of 
stability, as the low standard deviation statistics indicate. Therefore, it would seem 
reasonable to argue that the problem of spread ratio instability can be alleviated by 
unwinding intermarket spread trades at the earliest opportunity and thereby keeping 
the duration of the intermarket spread ti-ades typically short. 
The impact of spread ratio variability on the profitability of intermarket spreads 
between the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts is examined for the two specific cases 
where the spread is balanced and unbalanced. In the case of the balanced spread it is 
assumed that fractions of the Mid 250 futures confract can be bought and sold to 
guarantee equivalency in the values of both legs. In all cases profits are calculated on 
the basis of the closing spread ratio. For instance, i f the spread ratio is found to be 
equal to 2.145, it is assumed that a spread fransaction can be implemented consisting 
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Table 6.5) 
Spread Ratio Statistics 
Contract Obs. Mean S.D. Max. Min. 
Jun 1994 61 2.0816 0.0210 2.1374 2.0339 
Sep 1994 64 2.1388 0.0195 2.1768 2.0913 
Dec 1994 65 2.1756 0.0234 2.2100 2.1061 
Mar 1995 62 2.2240 0.0274 2.3013 2.1853 
Jun 1995 61 2.2864 0.0142 2.3171 2.2541 
Sep 1995 64 2.2641 0.0284 2.3299 2.2178 
Dec 1995 65 2.2663 0.0340 2.3256 2.1991 
Mar 1996 62 2.2541 0.0417 2.3113 2.1438 
Jun 1996 66 2.1062 0.0283 2.1593 2.0492 
Sep 1995 64 2.1851 0.0397 2.2508 2.0809 
Total 634 2.1979 0.0741 2.3299 2.0339 
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of 1 FTSE 100 contract and 2.145 Mid 250 conti-acts. While this assumption is 
clearly unrealistic it serves as a useful benchmark for assessing the potential for 
spread frading. Secondly, for the more realistic case of the unbalanced spread only 
whole contracts are traded. The unbalanced intermarket spread frading strategy is 
determined on the basis of a spread ratio which is simply equal to the ratio of the 
contract multipliers underlying the two futures contracts. Given that the contract 
multiplier underlying the FTSE 100 confract is two and a half times as large as that 
underlying the Mid 250 confract it is assumed that 5 Mid 250 contracts are fraded for 
every 2 FTSE 100 contracts. 
The transaction costs violations and spread frading profits for the balanced and 
unbalanced inter market spreads are reported in tables 6.6 and 6.7 respectively. With 
respect to the balanced spread trading relationship there are a number of interesting 
points to be made. First, frades are triggered much more often than for the 
intramarket spread, with intermarket spread trades being triggered on 166 (26.2%) of 
occasions. Of these trades, 44% are long spread trades and 56% are short spread 
trades. Second, intermarket frades were unwound with much greater frequency than 
intramarket spread trades, and with an average duration of 11.76 days were held only 
approximately a third as long. Third, regarding the profitability of this strategy, over 
the entire sample the intermarket spread frading strategy generated a pre-fransaction 
cost profit of £81,052, an average of £488 per trade, and a post-transaction cost profit 
of £25,016, an average of £151 per frade. Therefore, before any allowance is made 
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for the issue of spread ratio variability, the intermarket spread between the FTSE 100 
and Mid 250 contracts appears a desirable trading strategy. 
In table 6.7 the results are reported for the unbalanced intermarket spread trading 
strategy. Compared with results for the balanced intermarket spread, the most 
striking difference is that the profitability of the trading strategy based on the 
unbalanced intermarket spread has been reduced significantly. While on a pre-
transaction cost basis the strategy generated a total profit of £108,025, an average of 
650.75, once allowances are made for transaction costs this is transformed into a total 
loss of £15,983, an average of -£96.28 per trade. These losses can be largely 
accounted for by the problem of spread ratio variability and the difficulties which the 
spread trader experiences in liquidating trades early. For instance, it was the large 
losses incurred fi-om trades involving the March 1995 and September 1996 contracts 
which the spreader held on average for over one month that so adversely affected the 
profitability of the strategy. These two contracts alone contributed to a loss of over 
£80, 000. Such large losses are mcurred because both contracts are dominated by 
short trades in a market where the relative prices of the two contracts are moving 
against the spread trader, who has difficulty in unwinding his market positions. 
Finally, since the spread pricing relationships outlined are founded on the same laws 
of arbitrage that underpin spot-futures pricing relationships (see chapter five), it 
seems reasonable to assume that some of the time series properties which 
characterise the spot-fiitures pricing relationship will also be present in the spread 
pricing relationship. First, studies investigating index arbitrage (Mackinlay and 
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Ramaswamy (1988), Yadav and Pope (1990)) have found that the spot-futures 
mispricing series are characterised by a maturity effect whereby mispricing 
converges towards zero as the contract maturity date approaches. This issue is 
investigated for both the intramarket and intermarket spread relationships by 
regressing the absolute value of spread mispricing against the number of days to 
contract maturity. The results in table 6.8 show that both the intramarket and 
intermarket spread mispricing series are a function of the length of time to maturity. 
For the intramarket spread 9 of the 10 contracts are characterised by a significant 
relationship, of which 8 are associated with a positive coefficient and 1 is associated 
with a negative coefficient. While for the intermarket spread 9 of the 10 contracts are 
also characterised by a significant relationship, of which all are associated with a 
positive coefficient. Presumably the fall in arbitrage risk associated with declining 
dividend and interest rate imcertainty, together with the increase in trading volume in 
the less liquid deferred contract as maturity approaches, have led to more effective 
tracking between the two markets and greater pricing efficiency. With respect to the 
length of time to maturity variable, the intramarket spread mispricing is associated 
with more explanatory power than the intermarket spread mispricing. The fact that 
the results in table 6.9 show intramarket spread mispricing to be a monotonic 
function of the days to maturity corroborates this view. 
The spot-futures mispricing relationship is also found to be characterised by 
significant persistence, whereby once significant positive or negative mispricing 
develops, mispricing remains positive or negative for many days (see Brenner, 
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Table 6.8) 
Is Spread Mispricing Random? 
\SM, = a + p(r-0 + s t 
Intra Market Spread Mispricing Inter Market Spread Mispricing 
Near Contract P T-stat * P T-stat 
June 1994 0.0026 10.894 0.6679 * 0.0034 2.642 0.1058 
September 1994 0.0020 8.800 0.5554 * 0.0042 2.806 0.1127 
December 1994 0.0056 13.454 0.7418 * 0.0028 2.476 0.0887 
March 1995 0.0052 20.371 0.8737 * 0.0075 4.193 0.2266 
June 1995 0.0019 6.878 0.4409 * 0.0023 2.041 0.0659 
September 1995 0.0022 8.739 0.5519 * -0.0003 -0.278 0.0012 
December 1995 0.0040 7.214 0.4524 0.0071 5.297 0.3081 
March 1996 -0.0009 -3.122 0.1398 * 0.0039 3.625 0.1796 
June 1996 0.0027 4.496 0.2401 * 0.0032 2.436 0.0848 
September 1996 -0.0001 -0.181 0.0005 * 0.0043 3.099 0.1341 
Table 6.9) 
Absolute Deviations Versus Time to Maturity 
Days to Expiration 
Over 60 
60-51 
50-41 
40-31 
30-21 
20-11 
10- 1 
Ave. Abs. Deviation (%) 
Intra market Inter market 
0.2339 
0.2113 
0.1713 
0.1575 
0.1099 
0.0891 
0.0859 
0.3059 
0.3698 
0.3227 
0.3676 
0.2482 
0.1861 
0.1930 
Page 280 
Subrahmanyam and Uno (1989a)). An inspection of the mispricing plots in figures 
6.1 and 6.2 indicate that persistence in mispricing is a phenomenon which is very 
strongly evident in the mispricing series of the intramarket spread, and is to a lesser 
extent evident for the intermarket spread. The issue of persistence in mispricing can 
be considered by simply measuring the average frequency of mispricing reversals, or 
by using parametric approaches such as testing for serial correlation in the mispricing 
series. In relation to the entire intramarket spread mispricing series, mispricing 
reversals occur on average every 16.5 days, with a maximum run of 164 days and a 
minimum run of 1 day, and where 23% of all runs persist for over three weeks. By 
comparison, for the intermarket spread mispricing series, mispricing reversals occur 
on average every 3.8 days, with a maximum run of 47 days and a minimum run of 1 
day, and where 2.5% of all runs persist for over three weeks. This provides clear 
evidence that mispricing tends to be more persistent for the intramarket spread than 
the intermarket spread and is consistent with the fact that the intermarket spread is 
less effectively arbitraged than the intramarket spread. Hence, when the price of the 
intermarket spread deviates from its fair price, the arbitraging forces pulling prices 
back towards equilibrium are not as strong as in the case of the inframarket spread. 
The autocorrelation coefficients reported in table 6.10 confirm the view that 
mispricing is more persistent for the inframarket spread than for the intermarket 
spread. For all 10 contracts, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the 
mispricing series associated with the intramarket series are greater than those for the 
mispricing series associated with the intermarket spread. Furthermore, when 
consideration is given to the entire sample, all 6 autocorrelation coefficients 
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associated with lagged values of the mispricing series for the intramarket spread are 
larger than those for the FTSE 100 contract, providing clear evidence of greater 
persistence in the mispricing series of the intramarket spread. 
Finally, ARMA modelling techniques are employed to identify and estimate the 
autoregressive processes underlying both the intramarket and intermarket spread 
mispricing series. Plots of the autocorrelation functions for both of the mispricing 
series associated with the intramarket and intermarket spreads rapidly converge to 
zero implying stationarity. Furthermore, Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics are 
generated and found to be equal to -6.798 and -8.2086 respectively, providing formal 
evidence of stationarity. From the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
coefficients reported in panels A and B of table 6.10, it was decided that for the 
entire time series an AR(1) process is most applicable for the mtramarket spread 
mispricing series, and an AR(2) process is most applicable for the intermarket spread 
mispricing series. In relation to the partial autocorrelation coefficients in panel B, 
only the first coefficient is significant at the 5% level for intramarket spread 
mispricing, and only the first 2 coefficients are significant at the 5% level for 
intermarket spread mispricing. A further argument in favour of both these models is 
that overfitting the processes does not improve the explanatory significance of either 
model. The estimated AR(1) process for the intramarket spread mispricing series, and 
the estimated AR(2) process for the intermarket spread mispricing series are 
presented in equations 6.14 and 6.15 receptively. 
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Table 6.10) 
Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Coefficients 
For the Intra and Inter Market Spreads 
Contract 
Contract 
A) Autocorrelation Coefficients (Lags) 
Intra Market Spread Inter Marliet Spread 
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 * 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Jun 1994 61 0.809 0.686 0.625 0.595 0.536 0.451 * 0.306 0.041 0.023 -0.106 0.016 -0.055 
Sep 1994 64 0.808 0.691 0.550 0.467 0.419 0.354 * 0.438 0.375 0.331 0.158 0.266 -0.035 
Dec 1994 65 0.950 0.921 0.881 0.842 0.802 0.748 * 0.175 0.096 -0.062 -0.201 -0.075 -0.09 
Mar 1995 62 0.917 0.883 0.853 0.804 0.754 0.721 * 0.434 0.269 0.234 0.268 0.122 0.149 
Jun 1995 61 0.860 0.752 0.711 0.663 0.599 0.553 * 0.526 0.373 0.242 0.191 0.068 0.02 
Sep 1995 64 0.884 0.798 0.726 0.726 0.567 0.496 * 0.447 0.505 0.292 0.277 0.278 0.172 
Dec 1995 65 0.448 -0.096 -0.164 -0.103 -0.012 0.007 * 0.533 0.428 0.329 0.258 0.315 0.128 
Mar 1996 62 0.715 0.623 0.523 0.441 0.464 0.422 * 0.682 0.401 0.312 0.228 0.128 0.041 
Jun 1996 66 0.831 0.742 0.660 0.563 0.484 0.398 * 0.324 -0.067 -0.279 -0.342 -0.165 -0.017 
Sep 1996 64 0.814 0.669 0.537 0.386 0.237 0.143 * 
. 1 . 
0.635 0.46 0.417 0.273 0.249 0.138 
Total 634 0.851 0.727 0.681 0.676 0.667 0.630 * 0.654 0.552 0.497 0.432 0.444 0.387 
B) Partial Autocorrelation Coefficients (Lags) 
: Spread Inter Market Spread 
Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 * 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Jun 1994 61 0.809 0.091 0.139 0.115 -0.030 -0.030 * 0.306 -0.058 0.03 -0.133 0.102 -0.108 
Sep 1994 64 0.808 0.108 -0.103 0.065 0.093 -0.060 * 0.438 0.226 0.137 -0.095 0.173 -0.296 
Dec 1994 65 0.950 0.188 -0.089 -0.050 -0.015 -0.181 * 0.175 0.067 -0.093 -0.191 0.001 -0.048 
Mar 1995 62 0.917 0.263 0.105 -0.100 -0.100 0.051 * 0.434 0.099 0.107 0.147 -0.083 0.084 
Jun 1995 61 0.860 0.047 0.207 0.006 -0.032 -0.032 * 0.526 0.133 0.002 0.043 -0.093 -0.025 
Sep 1995 64 0.884 0.077 0.030 -0.110 0.035 0.035 * 0.447 0.382 -0.027 0.013 0.142 -0.058 
Dec 1995 65 0.448 -0.372 0.090 -0.114 0.067 -0.073 * 0.533 0.201 0.058 0.022 0.173 -0.181 
Mar 1996 62 0.715 0.230 0.034 0.003 0.201 0.018 * 0.682 -0.119 0.167 -0.061 -0.031 -0.059 
Jun 1996 66 0.831 0.164 0.027 -0.078 -0.014 -0.059 * 0.324 -0.192 -0.221 -0.222 -0.05 -0.074 
Sep 1996 64 0.814 0.018 -0.035 -0.137 -0.112 0.044 * 0.635 0.097 0.155 -0.107 0.101 -0.144 
Total 634 0.851 0.012 0.216 0.168 0.091 -0.004 * 0.654 0.218 0.131 0.043 0.144 -0.004 
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SM, = -0.019 + 0 . 8 5 1 + s, 6.14) 
{-A.922) (40.813) 
i?' = 0.725, 5. £ . = 0.069 
SM, = -0.006 + 0.5118W,_, + 0.2\8SM,_^ + s, 6.15) 
(-0.578) (13.136) (5.592) 
=0.455, S.E.=0.266 
6.6) CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, spreading is an essential futures trading stiategy which seeks to profit 
from temporary distortions in the relative pricing relationship between two related 
futures contracts. Spread trading provides an alternative mechanism for testing for 
the market efficiency of stock index futures contracts. This mechanism is essential 
for tying the prices of different contracts together, and by increasing the correlation 
between the different markets serves to add liquidity and risk bearing capacity, while 
simultaneously increasing the hedging effectiveness of the markets. 
In this chapter the profitability of intramarket and intermarket spreads comprising of 
UK stock index futures contracts has been examined. Important points can be noted. 
First, while the intramarket spread is found to be very efficiently priced, trading well 
within its no arbitrage limits, the intermarket spread is less efficiently priced, 
Page 284 
fi-equently violating its no-arbitrage limits. Second, the intramarket spread is priced 
at a chronic discount to fair value, while the direction of mispricing is evenly divided 
between overpricing and underpricing for the intermarket spread. Third, the average 
absolute deviation for the intramarket spread is only half the size of the intermarket 
spread. Fourth, with respect to the profitability of intramarket spread ti-ading, spread 
trading opportunities are rare with profits often being eliminated once allowance is 
made for transaction costs. This problem was alleviated by selecting only the more 
profitable mispricing opportimities. Fifth, intermarket spreads were found to be both 
riskier and more complicated than intramarket spreads, because of the problem of 
spread ratio variability. However, the spread ratio is found to be quite stable over 
very short periods of time, hence this difficulty could be mitigated by unwinding the 
intermarket spread trades as soon as it was profitable to do so. Sixth, compared to 
intramarket spread trades, intermarket spread trades are initiated more often and 
unwound with greater frequency. Seventh, while there appeared the potential for 
profitable intermarket spread trading, this strategy generated losses once account had 
been taken for spread ratio variability. Finally, in relation to the time series properties 
of the mispricing series, both spreads are found to be characterised by a time to 
maturity effect, and there is strong evidence of persistence in mispricing, especially 
for the intramarket spread. 
Comparing the findings in chapter five which relate to the pricing of the individual 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 conti-acts with the findings in this chapter which relate to the 
pricing of the intramarket and intermarket spreads comprising of the FTSE 100 and 
Mid 250 contracts, a number of important points can be made in relation to their 
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observed pricing characteristics. It is evident from the results that the mispricing 
series which comprise the Mid 250 confract are less efficiently priced and more 
volatile than the mispricing series which comprise of only the FTSE 100 contract. 
This finding suggests that these relationships are not as effectively arbifraged as 
those comprising only the FTSE 100 contract. Even so, owing to thin frading and the 
larger transaction costs associated with the new contract, the evidence of greater 
mispricing does not always translate into greater opportunities for profitable 
arbitrage. In fact in the case of the Mid 250 confract no arbifrage fransactions are 
triggered. However, in the case of the intermarket spread, many arbitrage fransactions 
are triggered and where the duration is typically short the sfrategy is generally 
profitable. Therefore, the onset of trading in the Mid 250 confract has provided 
arbitrageurs with a range of exciting new frading opportunities. 
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Endnotes 
' Intramarket spreads are also referred to as calendar spreads, intracommodity spreads, 
horizontal spreads or time spreads. 
^ Given that trading volume in the deferred Mid 250 contract is almost non-existent on 
many days it was not feasible to examine intramarket spread relationships for the Mid 250 
contract. 
^ Although the FTSE Mid 250 contract was introduced on the 25th February 1994, the data 
relating to the March 1994 contract was excluded owing to the limited number of 
observations. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Previously it was argued that while stock index futures trading has been an area 
where leading US academics have been very active, the research conducted into the 
behaviour of UK index futures contracts was rather limited. The main purpose of this 
thesis is to address this issue by empirically investigating the role and function of the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. Although work into the usefuhiess of the 
established FTSE 100 contract has been forthcoming, no detailed examination had 
been conducted for the recently introduced Mid 250 contract. Academic research into 
the role and function of these contracts has been motivated by the following 
considerations. Firstly, index futures markets were established as a mechanism for 
facilitating the transfer of price risk, by extending the range of portfolio opportunities 
which are available to investors and portfolio managers. Thus the main justification 
for index futures is that of hedging. Secondly, in order to perform their risk reduction 
role effectively index futures need to be correctly priced with respect to the 
underlying spot markets. Where they are found to be mispriced relative to their fair 
value estimates, hedging effectiveness wil l be impaired and arbitrage opportunities 
may present themselves. 
While the issues investigated are not exhaustive in coverage, they address what are 
perceived to be the most important aspects of index futures trading and the empirical 
findings are of particular interest to market participants, regulators and academics in 
the UK. The introduction of the Mid 250 contract provided market practitioners with 
the opportunity to take advantage of their knowledge and their views on the prospects 
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of the two different areas of the market. The UK index futures market also provides 
an example of how an additional instrument could be infroduced to support and 
complement an existing contract. 
Owing to the short life of stock index futures frading in the UK, research into the 
effectiveness of these confracts has been limited in scope, and the literature remains 
in its infancy. The aim of this thesis is to explore some of the gaps in the literature, 
by providing a detailed empirical investigation of the role and function of stock index 
fiitures contracts in the UK. The thesis concenfrates on important aspects relating to 
the infroduction of the Mid 250 confract, and what additional benefits it has made to 
stock index futures trading in the UK. Specifically, it focuses on two related issues 
which are cenfral to evaluating the value of index futures frading in a UK context. 
Hence, the specific research objectives of the thesis are to investigate the hedging 
effectiveness of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confract, and the pricing efficiency of the 
FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts. 
After outlining the justification for the thesis in chapter one, and reviewing the 
relevant literature in chapter two, chapter three investigated the hedging effectiveness 
of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts to determine whether the Mid 250 confract 
provided any additional benefits. While the Mid 250 contract was introduced to 
enable investors to acquire market wide exposure to medium size capitalisation 
stocks, it was possible that the hedging effectiveness of this new confract may be 
seriously impaired by the low levels of frading volume. Hedging effectiveness was 
examined in both an ex post and an ex ante context in relation to a diverse range of 
spot portfolios. The FTSE 100 contract is found to provide a more effective hedge for 
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spot portfolios dominated by large capitalisation stocks, while the Mid 250 contract 
is found to provide a more effective hedge for portfolios dominated by lower 
capitalisation stocks. In addition when consideration was given to professionally 
managed portfolios, hedging effectiveness was greater for the new contract in all 
cases. 
For ex ante hedge ratios estimated by means of a dynamic moving window, it is 
found that where the underlying spot portfolios are broad based market indexes, the 
levels of risk reduction are of a similar magnitude to those achieved using the ex post 
strategy. For these portfolios inter-temporal hedge ratio instability did not appear to 
strongly adversely affect hedging performance. However, where the spot portfolios to 
be hedged consisted of professionally managed portfolios, ex ante hedging 
effectiveness is found to be poor, and the presence of significant hedge ratio 
instability resulted in levels of risk reduction lower than those achieved when using 
the ex post strategy. In these circumstances the degree of hedge ratio instability 
dictated the proportion of ex post risk reduction which could be attained on an ex 
ante basis. Even so, it was found that the size of the estimating period is an important 
determinant of hedge ratio instability, and that the degree of hedge ratio instability 
could be alleviated by enlarging the window size used for estimating hedge ratios. 
When larger window sizes are employed ex ante hedge ratios are found to stabilise, 
converging towards the ex post benchmark, and maximising risk reduction. It is 
evident that previous studies which have evaluated the hedging effectiveness of index 
futures contracts by employing an ex post strategy with spot portfolios that mirror the 
composition of the underlying contract have seriously exaggerated the risk reduction 
potential of these instruments. Hedging effectiveness can only be truly examined by 
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using an ex ante strategy in conjunction with a spot portfolios that do not replicate 
market portfolios. 
In chapter four the work conducted into hedging effectiveness is extended by 
investigating the performance of hedge ratios estimated within an extended mean 
Gini (EMG) framework. The EMG approach provides a robust alternative to the 
mean variance approach by explicitly accommodating a risk aversion parameter into 
hedging decisions, and producing hedge ratios that are consistent with the rules of 
stochastic dominance. The results indicate that for both the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
contracts, EMG hedge ratio series are characterised by a step function which is 
strongly related to the hedger's degree of risk aversion. The implication of this result 
is that each spot-futures relationship is associated with several optimal hedge ratios. 
Comparing the behaviour of direct and cross-hedges, while direct hedges are found to 
be a monotonic flmction of risk aversion, the relationship between the behaviour of 
cross-hedges and risk aversion is found to be characterised by reversals. This 
suggests that cross-hedges are likely to be more sensitive to changes in risk aversion 
than direct hedges. 
In chapter five the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 contracts is 
examined. This is an important issue because while index arbitrage sfrategies have 
been discouraged in the US, they have been encouraged in the UK. Given that index 
futiires are frequently used to initiate short term hedging sfrategies, the effectiveness 
of these sfrategies in reducing risk depends crucially on whether the confracts are 
efficiently priced relative to their underiying fair value. The results from this chapter 
indicate that while there are many deviations from fair value both confracts appear to 
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be efficiently priced, with mispricing being generally constrained within transactions 
cost limits. Although mispricings are larger and more frequent for the Mid 250 
contract than for the FTSE 100 contract, this is consistent with the larger transactions 
cost and difficulties associated with trading the illiquid constituents of the Mid 250 
index. The results also suggests that the onset of trading in the Mid 250 index 
contract has been associated with an improvement in the pricing of the FTSE 100 
contract. It appears that by equipping equity market makers and institutional 
investors with a vehicle through which they can achieve more efficient management 
of lower capitalisation portfolios, this has freed capital and resources which have 
been employed to achieve more effective tracking between the FTSE 100 spot and 
fiitures markets. 
Finally, in chapter six the issue of intramarket and intermarket spread frading based 
on the FTSE 100 and Mid 250 confracts is investigated, as an alternative approach 
for testing for ftitures market efficiency. This is an important issue because spread 
trading contributes to the discussion on the economics of arbifrage, with spread 
mispricing having implications for the effectiveness of spread frading in the same 
way that index ftitures mispricing has important implications for hedging 
effectiveness. While the intramarket spread is found to be very efficiently priced, 
trading well within its no-arbitrage limits, the intermarket spread is less efficiently 
priced frequently violating its no-arbitrage limits. In relation to the profitability of 
intramarket spread trading, spread frading opportunities are rare with profits often 
being eliminated once allowance is made for fransaction costs. However, the 
profitability of the intramarket trading strategy could be enhanced by selecting only 
the more profitable mispricing opportunities. Intermarket spreads are found to be 
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both riskier and more complicated than intramarket spreads, owing to the problem of 
spread ratio variability. 
In conclusion, the Mid 250 contract was introduced to complement the well 
established FTSE 100 contract and provide investors with an important mechanism 
for tracking the performance of medium capitalisation stocks in the UK. The 
evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that although the new contract has the 
potential to greatly extend the range of investment services available to users of the 
UK equity market, its practical usefulness to date has been impaired by the thinness 
of the market, high transaction costs arising from wide bid-offer spreads, and 
technical and structural difficulties which impede trading in the illiquid constituents 
of the Mid 250 index. Nonetheless, the findings in this thesis show that there are 
important areas where the Mid 250 contract has a significant contribution to make, 
and offers real benefits to users of the market which would not be attainable from 
using the FTSE 100 contract alone. The results show that the Mid 250 contract is a 
very effective hedging for stock indexes comprising of smaller capitalisation stocks, 
and that additional benefits of the new contract are also evident in relation to 
managed spot portfolios in the form of investment trust vehicles. Furthermore, in the 
context of the EMG framework, the results show that for a strongly risk averse 
investor who is prepared to sacrifice mean return in order to reduce risk, the Mid 250 
contracts provides a more effective hedge than the FTSE 100 contact for all spot 
indexes, even the spot portfolio underlying the FTSE 100 contract. Hence, the Mid 
250 contract has an important role to perform as an additional hedging insttiiment. 
In relation to the pricing efficiency of the Mid 250 confract, while the new contract is 
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found to be more mispriced that the FTSE 100 confract, on no occasion does 
mispricing violate either of the no-arbifrage limits, supporting the view that the Mid 
250 contract is relatively efficiently priced. However, the degree of mispricing has 
important implications for the cost of a hedging sfrategy, with the direction of the 
initial mispricing infroducing a specific mispricing element into the returns on the 
hedged portfolio. Given that deviations from fair value are larger and more sustained 
for the Mid 250 contract than for the FTSE 100 confract the returns associated with 
the mispricing component have much greater relevance for fraders using the Mid 250 
contract than those using FTSE 100 confract. Furthermore, the infroduction of the 
Mid 250 contract offers a unique opportiinity to investigate the potential for 
intermarket spread frading. In the case of the intermarket spread comprising of 
positions in the FTSE 100 confract and Mid 250 confract many arbifrage fransactions 
are triggered and where the duration is typically short the sfrategy is generally 
profitable. Hence, the onset of trading in the Mid 250 confract has provided users of 
the UK equity market with a range of exciting new frading opportimities. 
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Appendix 3 
Mispricing Series - F T S E 100 Contract (Near) 
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Mispricing Series 
Appendix 4 
F T S E Mid 250 Contract (Near) 
1) June 1994 6) September 1995 
2) September 1994 7) December 1995 
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Appendix 5 
Mispricing Series - F T S E 100 Contract (Deferred) 
1) September 1994 6) December 1995 
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Appendix 6 
Spread Mispricing - Intra Marlcet Spread 
1) June / September 1994 
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Appendix 7 
Spread Mispricing - Inter Marliet Spread 
1) June 1994 6) September 1995 
IT 
2) September 1994 7) December 1995 
3) December 1994 8) March 1996 
4) March 1995 9) June 1996 
5) June 1995 10) September 1996 
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